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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Alan J. Krause 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Management 
 
March 2012 
 
Title: Great Expectations and Dodgy Explanations 
 
 
How do organizations assess and explain their performance?  Prior studies have 
attempted to demonstrate that, like individuals, organizations take credit for good 
performance and blame poor performance on influences in their environment.  However, 
these studies have found only a weak relationship between performance and attribution at 
the level of the firm.  This dissertation seeks to elucidate this relationship by 
conceptualizing firms as social agents and by combining aspiration and attribution theory 
for the first time at the level of the firm.  Analysis of performance explanations by large, 
public manufacturing firms in 2004 and 2005 revealed that firms’ performance 
explanations correlated with their cognitive experiences of success and failure.  These 
findings further understanding of organizational cognition, attribution, and image 
management.   
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CHAPTER I 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In August 2005, UTStarcom, one of the worlds' largest electronics manufacturers, 
conducted a standard conference call with major investment firms to discuss 
UTStarcom's second quarter financial performance.  The company had narrowly missed 
recording a profit, and its executive team commented positively on the firm's 
performance.  This may have been enough to satisfy the analysts on the call.  However, 
unbeknownst to UTStarcom, one of the investment banks on the call had patched the call 
through to a consultant, Business Intelligence Advisors (BIA).  Former Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees formed BIA in 2001 to "systematically analyze 
and measure the quality of information in corporate disclosure" (Business Intelligence 
Advisors, 2009).  When Credit Suisse First Boston's analyst suggested that a backlog in 
UTStarcom's recording could indicate a problem with revenue recognition, UTStarcom's 
explanation raised BIA's suspicions.  These suspicions pertained not to the numbers 
UTStarcom reported, but to the reasons its management team gave to explain those 
numbers.  After the call, BIA alerted its client that UTStarcom likely knew of problems 
with revenue recognition and that it did not disclose those problems to investors (Javers, 
2010).   
 
Rationale for the Study 
The opening vignette illustrates the value that both firms and investors place on their 
public explanations of performance.  Public corporations value investors' approval (D. J. 
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Baum & Stiles, 1965; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and carefully craft the image that they 
project publicly regarding their performance (Johns, 1999).  Academic research confirms 
that both firms and investors take firms' performance explanations very seriously (Arnold 
& Moizer, 1984; Bartlett & Chandler, 1997).  Furthermore, accounting scholars have 
shown that only a small fraction of changes in share price can be explained in relation to 
a firm’s quantitative reporting (Cenesizoglu & Timmermann, 2008), suggesting that 
investors gather valuable information on firm performance from other sources, such as 
corporative narratives (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007).   
Firms regularly communicate with investors in the form of quarterly earnings 
announcements and corporate annual reports.  Federal laws, such as the 1964 Securities 
Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, both require and regulate such communication.  
Firms must provide financial statements, prepared in accordance with these accounting 
rules and regulations.  In addition, firms must  furnish qualitative information that 
provides context for their financial statement (Greenstone, Oyer, & Vissing-JÃ¸rgensen, 
2005).  However, accounting regulations say little about the qualitative information that 
firms must provide (Bettman & Weitz, 1983).  Furthermore, with the exception of 
specialized consultants such as BIA, external auditors do not check firms' qualitative 
explanations of performance for accuracy, giving firms a great deal of choice in how they 
describe their performance (M. Clatworthy & Jones, 2003).   
After decades of study it is unclear whether the causal explanations of performance 
that firms include in these descriptions reflect their reported financial performance.  
While it is conceivable that firms use their performance explanations to educate investors 
 3 
 
and to help investors understand the firm's quantitative financial reports (Bettman & 
Weitz, 1983), it is also conceivable that firms use performance explanations for other 
purposes.  Consider the following examples.  To maximize information asymmetries, 
firms might provide as little information as possible in their explanations to investors 
(Chandler, 1962; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007).  To communicate stability, firms 
might provide "boilerplate" descriptions that present uniform explanations of 
performance year-after-year (W. Aerts, 2001).  To communicate strong leadership and 
the ability to direct future performance, firms might claim responsibility for key drivers 
of firm performance regardless of whether performance is positive or negative (Salancik 
& Meindl, 1984).  Finally, to create a positive image of the firm, firms might choose to 
discuss only those activities in which the firm had been successful (Staw, McKechnie, & 
Puffer, 1983).   
 
Research Question 
To elucidate firms' communications with investors, firms' motivations in preparing 
these explanations, and the potential value of firms' performance explanations to 
investors and other stakeholders, this dissertation studies the causal explanations that 
firms publicly provide of their performance.  Its research question asks when and to what 
extent firms' causal explanations of performance reflect a firm's quantitative measures of 
performance.  Unlike most studies of firm performance that cast performance as the 
dependent variable and investigate its antecedents, this study casts performance in the 
role of the independent variable and studies its consequences.  In the end, this dissertation 
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asks whether the data in firms' regulated financial reports influence the causal attributions 
presented in firms' unregulated performance explanations.  In other words, does a firm's 
actual performance influence the explanations it gives for its performance?   
This dissertation examines firms’ assessment of their own performance rather than an 
external analysts’ assessment of a firm’s performance.  Although at the level of the 
individual, scholars have researched attributions both by actors and by observers, these 
studies have demonstrated more predictable tendencies for attribution made by actors 
than for attributions made by observers.  (Johns, 1999; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007; 
Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Weary, Stanley, & Harvey, 1989).  Thus, the 
study of organizations’ assessment of their own performance appears to be a more 
promising research setting.   
To conceptualize firms' explanations of performance, this dissertation borrows 
theories of individual performance explanations developed by attribution scholars 
(Bernard Weiner, 1990).  From these studies, this dissertation develops a typology to 
categorize firms' causal explanations of performance.  To conceptualize how firms assess 
their performance, this dissertation also borrows from aspiration theory, the study of how 
agents' aspirations shape their performance assessments (Frank, 1935; Schneider, 1992).  
Both attribution and aspiration theories were originally developed at the level of the 
individual (Bernard Weiner, 1990).  This dissertation carefully conceptualizes these 
theories at the level of the firm (Whetten, Felin, & King, 2009) to reveal that, 
explanations of firms’ performance reflect their actual performance. 
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Scholars have previously applied attribution theory at the level of the firm in an 
attempt to demonstrate a relationship between firm performance and firm attribution (e.g. 
W. Aerts, 2001; Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Bowman, 1976; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; 
M. Clatworthy & Jones, 2003; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw et al., 1983).  However 
these studies developed little detail in their conceptualization of the focal variables of 
performance and attribution.  This lack of conceptual development may be the reason that 
they found only weak and inconsistent evidence for the hypothesized relationship 
between performance and attribution (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991).   
 
Analysis at the Level of the Organization 
This dissertation uses the organization as its unit of analysis and studies how 
organizations assess and explain their performance.  The study of behavior at the level of 
the organization has an august history, reaching back to Cyert and March's "The 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm".  Early organization scholars argued that organizational 
design counters the limitations of bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 1963) and allows 
organizations to produce more efficiently than individuals (Alchian & Kessel, 1960).  
However, in the wake of these seminal studies, scholars have conducted few studies of 
organizations as social agents that collect and process information (see Whetten and 
Mackey 2002 and Gavetti, Levinthal et al. 2007 for a full discussion of this topic).  
Instead, most scholars have studied the behavior of individuals in and around 
organizations, in many cases reducing organizations to the sum of the activities of the 
individuals that comprise them (Heath & Sitkin, 2001; Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 
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1976).  As a result, organizations' role in gathering, processing, and responding to 
information has gone largely unexplored (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007).   
This dissertation joins work by a minority of scholars who advocate that 
organizations can be studied as social actors (Whetten et al., 2009).  Although the study 
of organizations as social actors can result in poetic license (Andersen, 2008) that can 
mythologize (V. J. Friedman, Lipshitz, & Popper, 2005), anthropomorphize (Andersen, 
2008), and obfuscate them (Whetten et al., 2009), studies of repeated decisions dictated 
by standardized operating procedures provide an opportunity to understand how 
organizations process information and generate their own behavior (Gavetti et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, these scholars argue that organizations can be understood by applying 
behavioral theories developed at the level of the individual to the level of the firm.  Such 
analysis requires careful investigation and modeling of the context in which scholars 
observe and measure organizational constructs (Whetten et al., 2009).   
 
Theoretical Model 
This dissertation follows the above prescription from scholars of organizations as 
social actors.  It borrows theories developed at the level of the individual (aspiration and 
attribution) and uses them to carefully contextualize key variables (performance) at the 
level of the firm.  This dissertation's use of firm performance as an independent variable 
is unusual; its use of aspiration theory to conceptualize the cognitive mechanism 
underlying organizations' causal explanations of their performance is unique.  With this 
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theoretical foundation, this dissertation investigates the relationship between firm 
performance relative to aspirations and firms' causal explanations of performance.   It 
predicts that firms that achieve their performance aspirations take credit for their 
performance and that firms that fail to achieve their performance aspirations blame their 
performance on influences beyond the firm's control.  Figure 1, entitled Theoretical 
Model, illustrates this predicted relationship.   
 
Figure 1:  Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Setting and Preview of Findings 
To investigate this model, this dissertation collects performance explanations from 
CEO letters to shareholders of public manufacturing companies in North America in 
2004 and 2005.  Public corporations are not required to prepare letters to shareholders, 
but many do so and distribute these letters in their corporate annual reports along with 
year-end financial statements.  “The function of the presidents’ letter is to tell what 
happened to explain why it occurred and what may be its significance, to outline such 
Performance Relative to Aspiration 
Firm achieves  
(fails to achieve)  
its performance aspirations   
Attribution 
Firm takes credit for good performance  
(blames poor performance on 
influences beyond its control). 
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future plans as it may be appropriate to reveal, and to present management’s estimate of 
prospects for the year ahead.”  (Beveridge, 1963; Hettinger, 1954).  As the name “Letter 
to Shareholders” implies, firms direct their letters to current shareholders to maintain 
their investment and to prospective investors to attract their investment.  Firms may also 
use letters to shareholders to communicate with other external stakeholders (e.g. analysts) 
and internal stakeholders (e.g. employees).   
Although the terms used to refer to these letters attribute their content to the CEO, 
prior studies have revealed not only that many individuals contribute to letters to 
shareholders but also that codified routines direct the preparation of these letters 
(Bettman & Weitz, 1983).  As such, the causal explanations in these letters to 
shareholders represent an organizational response to firm performance and contribute to 
the image that the firm creates of itself and presents to investors.  
This dissertation samples letters from diverse public manufacturing companies to 
insure that the peculiarities of a specific industry do not determine its findings.  This 
dissertation limits the number of industries it studies in order to control for differences in 
the competitive context between industries.  Limiting the sample to North American 
companies focuses the sample on a single culture of communication: people in different 
cultures show different attributional patterns and firms in different cultures have been 
found to explain their performance differently (Tsang, 2002) .  Finally, sampling firm 
attribution in two consecutive years allows longitudinal analysis.  In its longitudinal 
analysis, this dissertation investigates whether changes in performance explanations from 
one year to the next correspond with changes in performance relative to aspirations.  The 
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resulting sample of over 1,400 letters to shareholders and almost 6,000 individual 
attributions represents the largest dataset ever assembled to study firms' causal 
explanations of performance.   
This dissertation finds that firm attribution reflects firms' achievement of performance 
aspirations.  Firms that achieve their aspirations take credit for their good performance.  
Firms that fail to achieve their aspirations blame their performance on influences beyond 
their control.  These findings establish a parallel between individual's descriptions of 
performance and firms' descriptions of performance.   
 
Overview and Outline of the Study 
This dissertation proceeds as follows.  Chapter II, Theoretical Review, examines three 
literature streams.  It reviews studies of firm attribution to create a typology of firms' 
performance explanations; it reviews studies of firm aspiration to model how firms assess 
performance; and it reviews studies of organizations as social actors for guidance on 
transferring both of these theories from the level of the individual to the level of the firm.  
Through these three literatures, Chapter II creates a new model of firm's causal 
explanations of performance.  Chapter III, Hypothesis Development, creates hypotheses 
to test multiple aspects of the relationship between attribution and performance relative to 
aspiration.  Chapter IV, Research Methodology, describes the research method, empirical 
setting, sample design, and data collection that this dissertation employs to test its 
hypotheses.  Chapter IV also details the operationalization of variables and the 
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framework for statistical analysis.  Chapter V, Results, presents the findings of two 
empirical analyses, a between-firm analysis and a within-firm analysis. The results of 
these analyses provide support for this dissertation's hypotheses and reveal nuances of 
how firms assess their performance.  Chapter VI, Discussion and Conclusion, discusses 
how this dissertation advances aspiration theory, attribution theory, the study of image 
management, and the study of organizations as social agents.  Chapter VI also presents 
this dissertation's limitations, and its implications for scholars and practitioners.   
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL REVIEW & MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Chapter II reviews the work of three groups of scholars and builds upon their findings 
to create a theoretical model of firm attribution.  Chapter II first reviews studies of 
attribution and the difficulties that organizational scholars experienced as they applied 
theories of attribution developed at the level of the individual to the level of the firm.  
Second, Chapter II reviews studies of organizations as social actors and their claims that 
cross level theorizing requires great care in conceptualizing variables at a new level of 
analysis.  Prior studies of firm attribution did not provide such care in conceptualizing 
performance.  Third, Chapter II reviews aspiration theory and its detailed 
conceptualization of performance at the level of the firm.  Finally, Chapter II combines 
the findings of scholars of attribution and aspiration at the level of the firm.  It develops a 
theoretical model of the relationship between firm attribution and firm performance 
relative to aspiration.   
 
Attribution Theory 
Overview 
Academic scholars distinguish themselves by the process with which they examine 
causal relations.  Scholars devote a great deal of time, care, and precision to studying 
theories advanced by other scholars, collecting, categorizing and analyzing data, and 
crafting explanations of their results.  However, academics are not the only individuals 
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who create causal explanations.  All humans create causal explanations to understand, 
navigate, and to a certain extent, control the world in which they live (Weary et al., 
1989).   
Attribution theory studies individuals' creation of causal explanations (Bernard 
Weiner, 1990).  Boiled down to its essentials, attribution theory involves an observer, an 
event, and the observer's explanation of the event.  It endeavors not to assess the veracity 
of an observer's causal statements, but to understand the antecedents that influence the 
observer's choice of causal explanation and the consequences that result from a given 
causal explanation (Harold H. Kelley & Michela, 1980).  Antecedents to attribution fall 
into three groups: the observer's objective knowledge, personal beliefs, and individual 
motivations (Jones & Davis, 1965).  Consequences of attribution also fall into three 
groups:  the observer's social behavior, affect, and expectations for future events (Harold 
H. Kelley & Michela, 1980). 
Many scholars have commented that, in the strict sense of the term, attribution theory 
is not a theory.  Due in large part to its practical nature and the diverse phenomena to 
which it has been applied, attribution can more appropriately be called a conceptual 
framework, a set of loosely structured propositions, or a collection of mini-theories 
whose logical interrelation is not immediately obvious (John H. Harvey, Ickles, & Kidd, 
1976; John H. Harvey & Weary, 1985; Hewstone, 1983; Harold H. Kelley, 1973; Weary 
et al., 1989; Bernard Weiner, 1990).  Nevertheless, scholars regularly refer to this 
conceptual perspective as attribution theory.  In keeping with this tradition, this 
dissertation also uses the term attribution theory.   
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This dissertation focuses on the application of attribution theory in performance 
contexts, one of many areas in which scholars have studied attribution.  Even within this 
arena, however, attribution scholars demonstrate great diversity, borrowing theories from 
different paradigms that are often incompatible with each other.  To provide a thorough 
review of attribution theory, the following section begins by tracing the origin of the 
study of attribution in Kurt Lewin's studies of expectancy theory and in the work of two 
of his students, Fritz Heider and Julian Rotter (Bernard Weiner, 1990).  Next, this section 
reviews attribution in performance settings, examining the key variables, findings, and 
mechanisms developed by subsequent scholars.  Finally, this section reviews 
organizational scholars' application of theories of individual attribution at the level of the 
firm.  It notes the challenges that organizational scholars faced in cross-level theorizing 
and concludes by delineating gaps in the study of firm attribution.   
 
Individual Attribution 
Origins 
Attribution theory originated with Kurt Lewin and two of his students, Fritz Heider 
and Julien Rotter (Bernard Weiner, 1990).  Heider studied how individuals describe the 
behavior of others and Rotter studied how individuals describe their own behavior.  Both 
scholars draw from Lewin's work on expectancy and his emphasis on the importance of 
applied theory (Bernard Weiner, 1990).   
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Fritz Heider 
Fritz Heider, one of Kurt Lewin's students, pioneered the study of attribution (Weary 
et al., 1989; Bernard Weiner, 1990).  Heider (1958) found that an observer's 
interpretation of another's actions relies not only on the observer's objective information 
about the actions, but also on the observer's subjective beliefs about the actor, the 
observer's personal beliefs about himself, and the observer's expectations about causality.  
Heider studied the causal explanations that observers generate to explain an actor's 
attempts to accomplish a task and found that observers commonly imputed results either 
to the actor or to the actor's environment.  The two most common causes imputed to the 
actor were ability and effort.  The two most common causes imputed to the environment 
were task difficulty and luck.  Furthermore, Heider observed that agents matched specific 
explanations with achievement and failure.  Heider combined these elements into a 
formula to explain an observer's causal explanations for performance (Heider, 1958): 
Performance = f (ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck)  
This formula states that observers explain performance as a function of ability, effort, 
task difficulty, and luck.  Furthermore, Heider's empirical studies revealed that observers 
consistently use the same type of attributions to explain good and bad performance.  
Observers consistently attribute poor performance to low ability, weak effort, high task 
difficulty, bad luck, or some combination of the four.  Similarly, observers consistently 
attribute good performance to high ability, strong effort, low task difficulty, good luck, or 
some combination of the four (Heider, 1958).  Subsequent research drew heavily on 
Heider's four types of attribution.   
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Julian Rotter 
Julian Rotter, another of Lewin's students, pioneered the study of  how individuals 
describe their own performance (Bernard Weiner, 1990).  Rotter researched social 
learning theory, the idea that personality results not from unconscious drives but from an 
interaction between the individual and the environment.  He studied how individuals 
interact with the environment, with an emphasis on the expectations they bring to a 
situation and the reinforcement that they receive for a given behavior.  Rotter defined 
thee key concepts in this study: 1) expectancy -- the probability that a given behavior 
would lead to a desired outcome; 2) reinforcement value -- the desirability of a behavior's 
expected outcome; and 3) behavior potential -- the likelihood that an individual will 
engage in a specific behavior.  Rotter combined these three concepts in a single formula 
that predicts behavior potential (BP) as a function of expectancy (E) and reinforcement 
value (RV) (Rotter, 1954):  
BP = f(E & RV) 
Rotter provided valuable insights on both the antecedents and the consequences of 
attribution through his study of expectancy in the above formula.  In a series of 
experiments, Rotter examined subjects’ expectations for success at tasks based on chance 
and skill (James & Rotter, 1958).  Rotter discovered that some subjects had a much 
stronger expectation that they could succeed at a task, regardless of whether the task itself 
depended on luck or skill.  From these results, Rotter developed the concept of locus of 
control:  some individuals believe that their skill or internal capacity determines whether 
they achieve their intended outcomes, while others believe that chance or external 
circumstances determines the outcomes of their efforts.  From this contrast, Rotter 
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developed the I-E scale that distinguishes internals, individuals who attribute their 
behavior to factors within the individual's control, from externals, individuals who 
attribute their behavior to factors outside of the individual's control (Rotter, Chance, & 
Phares, 1972; Bernard Weiner, 1990).  Later scholars adopted Rotter's I-E scale as an 
important antecedent to attribution at the level of the individual.    
 
Individual Attribution in Performance Settings 
Scholars have applied Heider and Rotter's findings in numerous settings.  This 
dissertation examines only the use of attribution in performance settings.   
Although Heider (1958) provided attribution theory with a strong theoretical 
foundation, his empirical studies were limited, resulting in an underdeveloped framework 
for empirical analysis (Weary et al., 1989).  Over the next two decades, scholars studied 
performance in numerous performance settings, including academic evaluations, athletic 
events, occupational performance, and games (Harold H. Kelley & Michela, 1980).  
These studies identified multiple characteristics and variables to further empirical study 
of attribution.  For example, in addition to Heider's distinctions between internal vs. 
external and positive vs. negative causes, these scholars investigated whether attributions 
were made to causes that were stable, controllable, backward or forward looking, and 
implicit or explicit (Weary et al., 1989).   
These studies of performance attribution also furthered Rotter's I-E scale.  For 
example, these studies further defined the antecedents that lead subjects to ascribe 
performance to internal vs. external causes.  These studies also found that an actor's 
feelings of pride following success were heightened when the actor ascribed her results to 
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the internal factors of ability or effort.  Similarly, an observer's praise for an actor's 
success was more pronounced when observers ascribed an actors' performance to the 
internal factors of ability or effort (Reimer, 1975; Barnard Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 
1978).   
Studies of performance attribution utilized numerous variables to measure 
performance.  In each case, the context largely determined the study's performance 
variable.  In academic settings, test grades were used to measure performance (Bernard 
Weiner, 1986; Bernard Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972); in athletic settings, 
the scores of games and contests were used to measure performance (McAuley & 
Duncan, 1990; Spink & Roberts, 1980);  in various games, such as anagrams, subjects 
scored points on a predetermined scale (Zuckerman & Allison, 1976); in work settings, 
scholars measured an employee's performance at defined work tasks (Ilgen & Knowlton 
Jr, 1980; Mitchell & Wood, 1980).   
 
Key Finding of Attribution in Performance Settings: Self-Serving Bias 
Studies of attributions at the level of the individual consistently revealed that 
attributions contain self-serving bias (Johns, 1999; Malle et al., 2007; Mezulis et al., 
2004; Weary et al., 1989).  Self-serving bias occurs when agents take inordinate credit for 
good performance or inordinately little blame for poor performance.  It consists of 
attributing success to internal and stable causes and failure to external and unstable 
causes (Mezulis et al., 2004).  The term 'inordinate' in this definition indicates that an 
agent's performance attributions include some distortion of reality.  Agents may or may 
not realize that they are distorting reality.  Although a large conceptual difference exists 
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between biased attributions that agents make but believe to be unbiased and attributions 
that agents make and know to be biased, empirical studies have struggled to distinguish 
between the two (Johns, 1999).  Consequently this dissertation uses the term self-serving 
attribution to refer both to attributions that contain a bias of which the agent is aware and 
to those that contain a bias of which the agent is unaware.  It is also worth noting that 
accurate attributions, no matter how positive, internal and stable, do not fall within this 
definition of self-serving.  However, in empirical analysis it is difficult to assess the 
accuracy of attributions, so biased attributions and attributions that simply appear to be 
biased cannot be readily distinguished (Johns, 1999).  
  
Mechanisms 
Scholars disagree on the mechanism behind self-serving attribution.  Most scholars 
argue for one of two types of mechanism: rational sense-making or emotional drives.  
Although some scholars conclude that both types of mechanism could contribute to self-
serving attribution, most argue that one type has a much larger influence than the other 
(e.g. Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Staw et al., 1983; Zuckerman, 1979).  In subsequent 
studies of firm attribution, organizational scholars applied these mechanisms directly to 
organizations.  Defining each mechanism at the level of the individual facilitates this 
dissertation's subsequent review of studies of firm attribution.   
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Rational Mechanisms of Self-Serving Bias 
Advocates of rational sensemaking emphasize the role of information as an 
antecedent to attribution.  Scholars have developed two models of how rational 
sensemaking could produce self-serving attribution. 
Some advocates of rational sensemaking conclude that the degree of challenge an 
agent faces in completing a task influences attribution.  Typically, the greater the 
challenge, the more likely credit will be attributed to the individual for succeeding.  For 
example, if an individual sets out to walk a mile and succeeds (an easy task), observers 
would likely attribute the actor's success to the ease of the task.  In contrast, if an 
individual sets out to run a mile in less than four minutes and succeeds (a difficult task), 
observers would likely attribute the actor's success to internal factors, such as natural 
ability, training, or drive:  "When there are known to be constraints, costs, sacrifices, or 
risks involved in taking an action, the action once taken is attributed more to the actor 
than it would be otherwise" (Harold H. Kelley, 1973, p. 114).  Scholars (Bettman & 
Weitz, 1983; H. H. Kelley, 1971; Harold H. Kelley, 1973) have applied this logic to 
competitive environments, equating success in a competitive environment with success at 
a difficult task.  Scholars (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; H. H. Kelley, 1971; Harold H. Kelley, 
1973) argue that competitive environments offer few explanations for success, so when 
agents succeed they attribute success to their own efforts.   These scholars also argue that 
competitive environments offer many explanations for failure, so when agents fail, they 
attribute their failure to environmental influences (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; H. H. Kelley, 
1971; Harold H. Kelley, 1973).  Scholars have studied the influence of the degree of 
challenge on attribution by studying agents in more and less competitive environments 
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and measuring the influence on attribution (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; H. H. Kelley, 1971; 
Harold H. Kelley, 1973).  Such studies have produced inconclusive results (Bettman & 
Weitz, 1983).  Explaining self-serving attribution via the explanations available in the 
competitive environment is known as augmentation theory (Weary et al., 1989).   
Other advocates of rational sensemaking argue that self-serving attribution results not 
from information in the environment, but from agents' faulty logic.  They posit two types 
of faulty logic that could produce self-serving attribution:  1) agents expect success and 
take responsibility for expected outcomes (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Huff & Schwenk, 
1990); 2) agents misinterpret contingency and take responsibility for co-occurrences of 
their behavior with success and ignore co-occurrences of their behavior with failure 
(Bettman & Weitz, 1983; D. T. Miller & Ross, 1975).  Scholars have studied the 
influence of faulty logic on self-serving attribution by trying to isolate logical errors that 
lead agents to take credit for success from logical errors that lead agents to claim no 
responsibility for failure.  These studies have produced mixed results (D. T. Miller & 
Ross, 1975).    Explaining self-serving attribution via these faulty logical processes is 
known as expectancy theory (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Huff & Schwenk, 1990); .   
 
Motivated Mechanisms of Self-Serving Bias 
Other scholars advocate that emotional drives cause self-serving attributions.  
Scholars have developed two models of how emotional drives could cause self-serving 
attribution. 
Some advocates of emotional drives conclude that subconscious drives cause agents 
to develop self-serving attribution.  This focus on affective antecedents builds on Heider's 
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(1958) reference to balance theory: observers align attributions about an actor's behavior 
with their affective disposition toward that actor.  This alignment plays a role whether the 
attribution is made about the self or about others.  These scholars emphasize the 
importance of an agent's positive self-concept and how self-serving attribution supports 
this positive self-concept (Mezulis et al., 2004; Zuckerman, 1979).  Unlike the rational 
mechanisms presented above, this model asserts that the agent is capable of gathering and 
processing the information to make an accurate attribution, but subconsciously chooses 
not to:  "the individual has somehow biased or reconstructed events so as to enhance or 
protect his or her own self-concept" (Staw et al., 1983).   In this model, agents 
subconsciously justify their actions, are not consciously aware of their culpability, and 
genuinely believe that they deserve credit for their successes but not for their failures.  
Psychologists have empirically demonstrated this internal justification and its role in 
creating self-serving attribution by manipulating subjects' self-esteem (Harold H. Kelley 
& Michela, 1980; McAuley & Duncan, 1990; Bernard Weiner, 1990).  Explaining self-
serving attribution via subconscious drives is known as retrospective justification.   
Other advocates of emotional drives argue that conscious drives cause agents to 
develop self-serving attribution.  These scholars argue that contrary to agents' claims, 
agents consciously know that they are not always responsible for success and free of 
blame for failure.  However, agents present themselves as if they can do no wrong in 
order to present a positive image of themselves to others.  "When the individual presents 
himself before others, his performance will tend to incorporate and exemplify the 
officially accredited values of the society, more so, in fact, than does his behavior as a 
whole" (Goffman, 1959, p. 45); (note that Goffman's metaphor with the word 
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'performance' references a theatrical presentation, not the measured result of an activity).  
In this model, agents consciously advocate biased images of themselves to improve how 
others perceive them.  Explaining self-serving attribution as a conscious effort to curry 
favor with others is known as image management.  (Please note: economists might resist 
labeling such intentional image-management as “emotional”.  Economists would likely 
deem such use of self-serving attribution as a rational choice that agents make to 
maximize their utility. Although the psychologists who created this label would likely 
accept that a cold-hearted rational analysis could lead an agent to choose to employ self-
serving attribution, these psychologists would assert that the goal of public acceptance 
stems from an emotional drive.  Thus, psychologists class self-serving attribution as an 
emotional motivation.)   
Empirical studies of retrospective justification and studies of image management have 
often struggled to tease these two concepts apart.  However, social scientists have 
successfully separated retrospective justification from image management by analyzing 
situations in which the agent was expected to take blame for failure.  Bradley (1978) 
reviewed numerous examples of this in prior research:  teachers claiming that their poor 
instruction contributed to their students' poor performance (Shopler & Layton, 1972), 
therapists claiming that their poor treatment contributed to their patients' worsening 
condition (Arkin, Gleason, & Johnston, 1976; Federoff & Harvey, 1976; J. H. Harvey, 
Arkin, Gleason, & Johnston, 1974), agents taking responsibility for poor performance on 
a task that they did not care to complete well (Luginbugh, Crowe, & Kahan, 1975), and 
partners in a learning process sharing credit both for their success and for their partner's 
failure (Bradley, 1978; Feather & Harvey, 1971).  These studies suggest that image 
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management plays a greater role than retrospective justification in the motivation of self-
serving attribution (Bradley, 1978).   
 
Synthesis  
Table 1 summarizes these four theories of attribution in a 2x2 diagram.  It categorizes 
each theory on two axes:  1) whether the cognitive process involves rational sensemaking 
or emotional motivation, and 2) whether bias emerges in an agent's internal processes or 
through an agent's interaction with the external environment.  Table 1 provides 
summaries and references for each theory.  As mentioned above, these theories of 
individual attribution have informed scholars' subsequent study of firm attribution.  As 
also mentioned above, prior studies have found some support for each of these theories.  
However, empirical studies of image-management have produced the most convincing 
explanations of self-serving attribution.  Consequently, this dissertation will focus on the 
role of image management in its investigation of firm attribution.  
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Table 1: Four Theories of Self-Serving Attribution 
  
  
  Domain of Bias Generation 
  
Internal Processes 
Interaction with 
Environment 
Cognitive 
Process 
Rational 
Sensemaking 
Cognitive Expectations:  
Individuals create cognitive 
expectations that include causal 
relations, to organize and 
control the world around them.  
These cognitive expectations 
influence how individuals 
understand and explain things 
in their world.  
 
 (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; 
Huff & Schwenk, 1990; D. T. 
Miller & Ross, 1975)  
Augmentation Theory:  
Individuals collect information 
from their environment.  
Certain environments lead 
agents to make specific 
performance attributions.  
Individuals develop different 
causal relationships depending 
on the environment in which 
they collect information.    
 
(Bettman & Weitz, 1983; H. 
H. Kelley, 1971) 
 
Affective or 
Emotional 
Motivation 
Retrospective Justification:  
Individuals have strong sub-
conscious needs, including 
cognitive balance, hedonism, 
and ego-defense.  These needs 
influence how individuals 
understand their environment.  
Individuals subconsciously 
develop causal explanations 
that meet these emotional 
needs.  
 
 (Heider, 1958; Mezulis et al., 
2004; Staw, 1980; Staw et al., 
1983; Weary et al., 1989; 
Zuckerman, 1979) 
Image Management: 
Individuals consciously 
promote a positive image of 
themselves to others.  
Individuals choose causal 
explanations that improve their 
public image. 
 
 (Bradley, 1978; Goffman, 
1959; Salancik & Meindl, 
1984; Weary et al., 1989) 
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Firm Attribution 
Overview 
Most studies of firm attribution build directly on the theories, concepts, and 
mechanisms of individual attribution described above.  However, despite the plethora of 
theoretical models that scholars have developed to explain individual attribution, the 
study of firm attribution began with no theoretical foundation.  Accounting scholars 
comparing the corporate annual reports of firms with good and bad performance in the 
food processing industry revealed evidence consistent with self-serving attribution at the 
level of the firm (Bowman, 1976).   
Organizational scholars latched on to this finding to apply theories of attribution 
developed at the level of the individual at the level of the firm.  In these studies of firm 
attribution, scholars sought not only to explain firm attribution, but to gain insights that 
they could use to further elucidate attribution at the level of the individual (Bettman & 
Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983).  Unfortunately, studying self-serving bias at the level of 
the firm did not offer new insights.  Instead, at the level of the firm, organizational 
scholars failed to demonstrate the empirical relationships that their colleagues had found 
at the level of the individual.   
This section reviews studies of firm attribution with an eye toward the causes of 
organizational scholars' failure to demonstrate hypothesized relationships.  It first 
examines the variables that scholars use in the study of firm attribution: attribution and 
performance.  Next, it reviews key studies of firm attribution and analyzes how 
organizational scholars applied theory developed at the level of the individual at the level 
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of the firm.  Third, it identifies gaps in the study of firm attribution and opportunities to 
study this phenomenon more effectively.   
 
Variables Used to Study Firm Attribution 
Studies of firm attribution use a common set of measures of attribution but a variety 
of measures of performance.  This sub-section first reviews measures of firm attribution 
and then measures of firm performance.  It defines these measures and investigates 
whether prior studies may have inadequately conceptualized performance at the level of 
the firm.   
 
Dependent Variable: Firm Attribution 
As discussed above, scholars have investigated attribution in a wide variety of 
contexts.  Studies of attribution across all contexts investigate many characteristics of 
attribution:  locus of control (internal or external), valence (positive or negative), 
stability, controllability, implicit or explicit, and past oriented or future oriented.  Early 
studies of firm attribution in performance contexts measured many of these 
characteristics (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983).   For example, scholars coded 
an attribution as “’internal’ if it referred to causal factors internal to the organization (e.g. 
strategy, R&D effort, workforce skill) and ‘external’ if it referred to something outside 
the company (e.g. market prices, inflation, the weather, competition)” (Bettman & Weitz, 
1983).  They (1983) coded an attribution as “’stable’ if the cause could be expected to 
persist over time and thus predict the same outcome for the future.”  (Bettman & Weitz, 
1983).  They assigned an attribution a “past orientation” if it related to past performance 
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and “future orientation” if it related to expected future performance (Staw et al., 1983).   
And scholars coded an attribution as “explicit” when a relationship between a cause and 
performance was “spelled out” and implicit when the relationship was “not spelled out” 
(Staw et al., 1983).   
However, these early studies revealed strong correlations between many of these 
independent variables, eliminating their value in empirical study of firm attribution.  For 
example, empirical studies of firm attribution in performance contexts found all internal 
causes to be changeable and controllable and all external causes to be unchangeable and 
uncontrollable (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Salancik & Meindl, 1984).  Furthermore, 
empirical studies of firm attribution found no relationships of interest between 
attributions with a past vs. a future orientation, implicit vs. explicit attributions, and other 
study variables (Staw et al., 1983).  These empirical results led scholars to focus on a 
smaller set of characteristics in the study of firm attribution.   
Scholars of firm attribution have identified two salient characteristics:  valence and 
locus of causality.  Valence measures whether the imputed cause of performance is said 
to increase or decrease the firm's performance.  Locus of causality measures whether the 
imputed cause relates to the firm or to the firm's environment.  When combined, these 
two binary characteristics result in four types of attribution:  1) enhancement: taking 
credit for success; 2) good-fortune: ascribing success to influences outside the firm's 
control; 3) self-criticism: taking responsibility for failure; 4) blame: ascribing failure to 
influences outside the firm's control (W. Aerts, 2001; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; M. 
Clatworthy & Jones, 2003; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw et al., 1983).  Table 2 presents 
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these four types of attribution and provides examples of each from firms' 2004 letters to 
shareholders.    
 In sum, clear theoretical concepts combined with a series of empirical studies that 
built on each other led scholars of firm attribution to the typology presented in Table 2.   
 
Table 2:  Four Types of Firm Attribution 
  
  
  Locus of Causality 
  Internal External 
Direction 
of 
Influence 
Positive 
 
Enhancement: "Our unique 
operating model contributed 
greatly to our overall 
performance. Our integrated and 
balanced operation enabled us to 
capture value at numerous points 
on the food production chain."  
Bungee Foods Corporation 
 
 
Good Fortune: "Our success was 
fueled by strong markets 
worldwide, notably high prices 
and demand for pork in both the 
domestic and export sales 
channels, and a strong ocean 
freight market."                       
Seaboard Corporation 
Negative 
 
Self-Criticism: "The Coca-Cola 
Company did not perform up to 
expectations in 2004. A detailed 
analysis confirmed that the 
Company's execution was not as 
effective as it must be, and that a 
course correction is required to 
achieve sustainable, long-term 
growth and value for our 
shareowners."                               
Coca-Cola Company 
 
 
Blame: "We [faced] a challenging 
industry landscape. 2004 was a 
volatile year. A short crop in the 
United States caused big price 
swings for soybeans. Ocean 
freight rates moved dramatically."                 
Bungee Foods Corporation 
 
 
Independent Variable: Firm Performance 
Countless academic studies have examined firm performance and have defined it in 
many different ways, including financial results, survival, efficiency, and effectiveness 
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(James G. March & Sutton, 1997; Steers, 1977).  Studies of firm attribution in letters to 
shareholders consistently define organizational performance as financial performance and 
carefully articulate their performance measures.  However, despite scholars' warnings that 
in the study of firm attribution "one must bear in mind the difficulties inherent in the 
development of the measure of performance relative to expectations" (Bettman & Weitz, 
1983, p. 182), prior studies of firm attribution pay little attention to performance 
expectations, to performance assessment, or to the conceptualization of performance in 
general.   
Unfortunately, prior studies of firm attribution don't articulate how they conceptualize 
firm performance:  they do not address how they approached the difficulties of 
conceptualizing firm performance.  However, some aspects of prior scholars' 
conceptualization of performance in the study of firm attribution can be deduced from 
their empirical methods.  The following analysis references six of the most highly cited 
articles on firm attribution published in major journals from 1976 to 2001.  Table 3 
summarizes the operationalization of performance in these six articles.  It lists the 
performance measures, sample, and comparison method in each study.  Text below Table 
3 discusses the different conceptualizations of performance in these articles.  Text below 
Table 3 also provides additional summary of each article.   
These studies use a variety of methods, suggesting a variety of different 
conceptualizations of firm performance.  These differences relate to performance 
expectations and performance assessment.  Some scholars suggest that firms assess their 
performance in relation to the performance of their peers, as evidenced by the studies that 
draw performance comparisons between firms  
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Table 3: Operationalization of Performance in Prior Studies of Firm Attribution 
Study 
Performance 
Measure 
Sample 
Comparison 
Method 
Bowman 
(1976) 
Five year average 
ROE 
82 food processing firms 
in one year 
First quartile vs. 
last quartile 
Bettman & 
Weitz 
(1983) 
Annual Sales 
81 firms in four industries 
over two years: one good 
year and one bad year 
Above or below 
average by 
industry and year 
Staw et al. 
(1984) 
Annual Earnings per 
Share 
81 firms: performance 
either increased or 
declined by 50% in 1977 
Firms above and 
below sample 
mean 
Salancik & 
Meindl 
(1984) 
Sums of Annual Profit 
Margin, Sales, and 
Earnings Per Share 
18 firms over 18 years 
Increase or 
decrease in 
performance  
Clapham & 
Schwenk 
(1991) 
5 year average 
Earnings per Share 
20 utilities (gas and 
electric firms) over 5 
years 
Firms above and 
below sample 
mean 
Aerts 
(2001) 
Annual ROE, ROA, or 
Profit Margin 
22 firms in 22 industries 
over 8 years 
Significant 
correlation 
ROE stands for Return on Equity and equals a firm’s net income divided by its equity 
ROA stands for Return on Assets and equals a firm’s net income divided by its assets 
 
(Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Bowman, 1976; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Salancik & 
Meindl, 1984; Staw et al., 1983).  Other scholars suggest that firms assess performance in 
relation to their past performance, as evidenced by one study that assesses changes in 
firm performance over time (W. Aerts, 2001).  Some scholars suggest that firm 
performance and performance assessment vary by industry, as evidenced by their 
comparisons between firms within a single industry (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Bowman, 
1976; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991).  Other scholars imply that firm performance and 
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performance assessment are uniform across industries, as evidenced by their cross-
industry comparisons of performance (Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw et al., 1983).  
Some scholars suggest that firms with extremely strong performance will assess their 
performance differently from those with extremely weak performance, as evidenced by 
their segmentation of sample firms into quartiles (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Bowman, 
1976), or by their purposeful selection of firms with extremely high or extremely low 
performance (Staw et al., 1983).   Other studies suggest that firms with minor differences 
in performance will assess their performance differently, as evidenced by the contrasts 
that they draw between firms above and below averages (W. Aerts, 2001; Clapham & 
Schwenk, 1991; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw et al., 1983).   
In these prior studies, a lack of a clear theoretical foundation for the concept of firm 
performance, combined with empirical studies that fail to build on one another, result in 
any number of different conceptualizations of firm performance.  Furthermore, results 
from these studies are inconclusive, giving give no indication of which conceptualization 
of firm performance provides the insight necessary to effectively study firm attribution.   
 
Studies of Firm Attribution 
With the above review of variable constructs for performance and attribution, the next 
sub-section outlines the six articles introduced above in Table 3.  This analysis focuses on 
the mechanisms used in these studies and makes clear how readily scholars of firm 
attribution borrowed mechanisms of attribution developed at the level of the individual.  
Table 4 below summarizes these articles' mechanisms, research questions, and findings.   
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Table 4: Prominent Articles on Firm Attribution in Letters to Shareholders 
Study Mechanism  Research Question Findings 
 
Bowman 
(1976) 
 
None - 
exploratory 
In the food industry, how do 
the corporate annual reports 
of the best and worst 
performing firms differ? 
The best performing firms 
discuss their assets and strategy; 
the worst performing firms 
discuss government regulation 
and the weather.   
Bettman 
& Weitz 
(1983) 
Augmentation 
Theory  
Does firm attribution 
correlate with inputs (the 
availability of information) 
or with outputs (presenting 
the firm positively)?   
Mixed results:  in good years, 
firm attribution can be explained 
by availability of information; in 
bad years, it can be explained by 
presenting the firm positively. 
Staw et 
al. (1983) 
Retrospective 
Justification 
Is firm attribution driven by 
retrospective justification or 
by image management? 
No correlation found between 
firm performance and firm 
attribution.  The lack of 
correlation suggests that image 
management drives firm 
attribution. 
Salancik 
& Meindl 
(1984) 
Impression 
Management 
Is firm attribution driven by 
symbolic management? 
Yes, executives with less control 
over their firms take more 
responsibility for firm 
performance.   
Clapham 
& 
Schwenk 
(1991) 
Cognitive 
Expectations 
& Cognitive 
Maps 
Is symbolic management 
less pronounced in highly 
regulated industries? 
No, firms demonstrate the same 
patterns of firm attribution in 
highly regulated industries.  This 
suggests that image management 
does not drive firm attribution.   
Aerts 
(2001) 
Impression 
Management 
Do firms use the same 
patterns of attribution from 
one year to the next to 
conform to norms of 
stability in financial 
reporting?   
Yes, a firm's use of attribution 
can largely be predicted by the 
firms' attributions in the prior 
year.  However, declining 
performance changes firm 
attribution.   
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Inception - Sans Theory 
How did the study of firm attribution begin?  The first study of attribution at the level 
of the firm (Bowman 1976) derived from empirical exploration, devoid of theory.  
Bowman’s 1976 study was inspired by his prior work on corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), Bowman and Haire (1975).  This predecessor to the study of firm attribution did 
not intend to study firm’s causal explanations or even firm performance.  Rather, 
Bowman and Haire (1975) set out to identify the extent to which firms that received high 
ratings for CSR discussed CSR in their corporate annual reports.  The authors analyzed 
the annual statements of 82 food processing firms.  In the course of this analysis, they 
found not only the relationship that they had hypothesized between CSR ratings and 
discussion of CSR in firms' corporate annual reports, but also a relationship with 
performance.  Firms that devoted more text to discussing CSR produced financial results 
that were 50% better than those of other firms (Bowman & Haire, 1975).   
Subsequently, Bowman (1976) grouped the firms in this sample by financial 
performance to identify other differences between the best and worst performing firms in 
the industry.  This study also did not intend to study attribution.  Bowman (1976) 
identified multiple contrasts in the texts of the firms' corporate annual reports, including 
discussion of the weather, price controls, a firm's product portfolio, planning for firm 
changes, crisis mitigation, and future market trends.  Bowman (1976) concluded that 
firms with lower performance complain more about the weather and price controls, 
comment less about their product portfolio and future trends, and made fewer plans for 
firm changes or crisis mitigation.  Post hoc, Bowman (1976) argued that firm alignment 
(Miles, Snow, & Meyer, 1978) explains these results.  When executives align a firm with 
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its environment, they anticipate and take advantage of opportunities and mitigate 
challenges in the firm's environment, creating superior performance.  Conversely, when 
executives fail to align the firm with its environment, they miss opportunities and fail to 
address challenges, resulting in inferior firm performance (Bowman, 1976).  Bowman's 
explanation is notable in two respects.  First, it assumes that the causal explanations in 
firms' annual reports represent firms' actual causal expectations and firms' prior actions.  
Second, it assumes that these causal expectations drove firm performance.  In effect, 
Bowman (1976) posits that attribution drives performance (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991).   
 
Mechanisms Developed at the Level of the Individual Applied at the Level of the Firm 
Although Bowman's (1976) paper did not use the term self-serving to describe the 
attributions he found in corporate annual reports, organizational scholars noticed the 
similarity.  Firms that performed poorly blamed failure on external circumstances, 
specifically weather and price controls (Bowman, 1976).  Firms that performed well took 
credit for success, specifically noting the firm's products, strategy, and crisis mitigation 
plans (Bowman, 1976).  These attributions of firm performance demonstrated self-
serving bias: firms took credit for good performance and blamed poor performance on 
external circumstances (Bettman & Weitz, 1983).  In addition, the lack of a priori 
theoretical foundation in Bowman's (1976) analysis inspired organizational scholars to 
test mechanisms of individual attribution in their study of firm performance.  The 
following sub-section details the six studies presented above in Table 4, focusing on how 
each study tested a different mechanism for self-serving attribution.  This sub-section 
reviews the key article for each of the four mechanisms of individual attribution 
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presented above in Table 1:  augmentation theory, retrospective justification, image 
management, and cognitive maps.   
 
Augmentation Theory 
Bettman and Weitz (1983) conducted the first formal study of firm attribution to test 
1) whether attribution demonstrates self-serving patterns at the level of the firm and 2) 
whether augmentation theory can explain it.  As discussed above, the augmentation effect 
posits that attributional bias results from the type and quantity of information available in 
an agent's environment.  Bettman and Weitz (1983) hypothesized that firms operating in 
positive economic environments would cite more positive environmental circumstances 
(attributions of good fortune).  Similarly, they hypothesized that firms operating in 
negative economic environments would cite more negative environmental circumstances 
(blaming attributions).   
To gather data in contrasting environments, Bettman and Weitz (1983) analyzed 
letters to shareholders from 82 firms in a very good year (1972) and the same 82 firms in 
a very bad year (1974).  Bettman and Weitz (1983) found self-serving attributions in both 
time periods and they found significant differences between the attributions made in each 
period.  However, they only found partial support for their hypotheses.  In line with 
predictions, their results showed that in a bad year executives used more blaming 
attributions, citing negative environmental factors.  This result supports the augmentation 
effect.  In contrast with predictions, however, in a good year their results showed that 
executives did not attribute performance to good fortune.  Instead, in a good year, 
executives used enhancement, attributing performance to positive influences within the 
 36 
 
firm. This second result supports the emotional mechanism of retrospective justification 
(Bettman & Weitz, 1983).   In sum, Bettman and Weitz were unable to confirm whether 
augmentation is the mechanism that drives firm attribution.  
 
Retrospective Justification 
In the second article on firm attribution published in a major journal, Staw, 
McKechnie, and Puffer (1983) tested whether retrospective justification explains 
attribution at the level of the firm.  As discussed above, in retrospective justification 
agents subconsciously filter causal explanations to protect self-esteem, to maintain 
cognitive balance, or to increase hedonism, thereby maintaining a positive self-image.  
To investigate the influence of retrospective justification, Staw et al. hypothesized that 
executives in high performing firms would use enhancing attribution, taking credit for 
success, and that executives in low performing firms would use blaming attribution, 
shirking responsibility for failure.  To create contrast in their data, Staw et al. (1983) 
sampled letters to shareholders from 49 firms whose financial performance increased by 
50% in one year and from 32 firms whose financial performance fell by 50% in the same 
year.  Attributions by executives in their sample of firms demonstrated self-serving 
attribution bias.  However, all executives described performance in the same way:  
attributions by high performing firms displayed no significant differences from those 
made by low-performing firms.  This failure to demonstrate a relationship between 
performance and attribution failed to support their hypothesis that ego-defense 
mechanisms drive firm attribution.   
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However, Staw et al. (1983) did demonstrate that when executives convey negative 
events, they attribute these events to external causes. Similarly, they demonstrated that 
when executives convey positive events, they attribute these events to internal causes.  
Staw et al. (1983) were surprised that firms' communication of positive and negative 
events did not correlate with performance.  Post hoc, Staw et al. (1983) argue that firms' 
consistent attribution of negative news to external causes and positive news to internal 
causes constitutes image-management.  They conclude that self-serving bias in firm 
attribution results not from retrospective justification but from image-management.   
 
Image Management 
In contrast with Bettman and Weitz (1983) and Staw et al.'s (1983) attempts to 
demonstrate that unconscious rational or emotional processes drive firm attribution, 
Salancik and Meindl (1984) set out to demonstrate that managements consciously present 
biased attributions to investors to improve the firm's image.  In a previous study, Salancik 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) had argued that external forces largely determine firm 
performance and that management plays a primary symbolic role (Pfeffer, 1981).  Firm 
attribution provided an opportunity to empirically demonstrate this symbolic leadership.  
Salancik and Meindl (1984) conceptualize firm attribution in letters to shareholders as a 
medium through which management exerts symbolic leadership by creating the 
impression that they are in charge of the firm:  "presentation biases, moreover, could 
represent... strategic efforts to present management as being sufficiently in control of 
organizational outcomes as to encourage people to participate in the organizational 
coalition" (Salancik & Meindl, 1984, p. 251).   
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Salancik and Meindl (1984) argued that managements who don't control their firms' 
performance have the greatest need for symbolic management.  These managements 
would exert symbolic management by using significantly more internal attribution 
(enhancement and self-criticism) than do managements that actually control their firms.  
This use of internal attribution would symbolically demonstrate that management was in 
control of the firm's outcomes.  In contrast, managements who control their firms' 
performance need less symbolic management.  These managements would exert less 
symbolic management and would attribute performance more often to environmental 
influences (blame and good fortune).   
Salancik and Meindl's (1984) results confirmed their expectations.  Management of 
firms with high need for symbolic management attributed firm performance more often to 
the firm, even when this results in management taking credit for poor performance 
(Salancik & Meindl, 1984).  In sum, although Salancik and Meindl did not demonstrate a 
relationship between performance and attribution, the relationship that they revealed 
between firm stability and attribution allowed them to argue that image management 
drives firm attribution.   
To further their argument that firm attribution serves as a tool of image management, 
Salancik and Meindl (1984) investigated the relationship between attribution and the 
firm's future performance.  They hypothesized that the more managements exerted 
symbolic management by taking credit for their firms' performance, the better their firms 
would perform in the future.  Conversely, they hypothesized that the more managements 
attributed performance to environmental circumstances, the worse their firms would 
perform in the future.  Salancik and Meindl's (1984) results supported both hypotheses.  
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They conclude that managements intentionally manipulate symbols that communicate to 
observers inside and outside the firm that management controls firm performance.  By 
conveying control of the firm, managements inspire confidence in stakeholders and gain 
access to resources essential to firm success.  These results support Salancik and 
Meindl’s (1984) claim that managements use firm attribution for impression 
management.  
 
Cognitive Maps 
Despite Salancik and Meindl's success in demonstrating that image management 
influences firm attribution, a subsequent study by Clapham and Schwenk (1991) 
challenged their results.  Clapham and Schwenk (1991) cited differences in the 
methodologies and the findings of Salancik and Meindl (1983) and Staw et al. (1983) to 
justify their doubts about the findings of both studies and the need to further investigate 
mechanisms of self-serving bias in firm attribution.   
Clapham and Schwenk (1991) conceptualized agents' preconceived expectations in 
the form of a cognitive map and argued that this map drives firm attribution.  As 
discussed above in the review of attribution at the level of the individual, an agent's 
expectations connect the individual's behavior to success.  Similarly, Clapham and 
Schwenk argued that executives make a priori cognitive maps that connect a firm's 
intended actions with success.  During ex post analysis, executives refer back to their 
original cognitive maps.  If the firm succeeds, these a priori cognitive maps indicate that 
firm activity leads to that success, so executives attribute success to the firm.  If the firm 
fails, executives' a priori cognitive maps do not connect the firm's actions with failure, so 
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executives attribute failure to the firm's environment (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Huff 
& Schwenk, 1990).    
Clapham and Schwenk (1991) posited that regulated firms, such as electric and gas 
utilities that receive a great deal of scrutiny from external regulators, face reduced 
opportunities for image-management.  Any deception by firms in regulated industries 
would quickly be discovered, resulting in harm to the firm's image.  If image 
management drives firm attribution, as Salancik and Meindl (1984) claimed, then 
attribution in firms in regulated industries should manifest less image-management and 
demonstrate a weaker self-serving bias.  In contrast, if an unconscious mechanism like 
mental maps drives executives' choice of attributions, then industry regulation should not 
influence the amount of self-serving bias in executives' attributions (Clapham & 
Schwenk, 1991).   
Clapham and Schwenk (1991) hypothesize that attribution by firms in regulated 
industries will demonstrate the same self-serving bias as attribution by firms in non-
regulated industries.  In addition, in contrast with Salancik and Meindl, (1984) who found 
that internal attribution correlated with improved future performance, Clapham and 
Schwenk (1991) hypothesized that the more internal attribution, the worse a firm will 
perform in the future.   
To test these hypotheses, Clapham and Schwenk (1991) gathered data on 20 electric 
and gas utility companies over 5 years.  Their results showed that attribution in firms in 
regulated industries demonstrated the same self-serving bias as the attribution in firms in 
unregulated industries.  Furthermore, their results demonstrated a negative relationship 
between internal attribution and future performance.  These results support Clapham and 
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Schwenk's (1991) hypotheses.  They conclude that image management does not explain 
firm attribution and that self-serving bias could result from executives' cognitive maps 
(Huff & Schwenk, 1990; D. T. Miller & Ross, 1975), retrospective justification (Staw et 
al., 1983; Zuckerman, 1979), or firm alignment (Bowman, 1976; Miles et al., 1978). 
 
Image Management - Round 2 
In light of the lack of demonstrated relationship between firm performance and firm 
attribution in prior research, Aerts (2001) argued that the absence of a relationship 
between attribution and performance results from image management.  Aerts (2001) 
argued that in their financial reporting, firms follow legal requirements and socialized 
norms regarding financial reports.  Furthermore, investors and other external stakeholders 
value stability and predictability in a firms' financial reporting.  Firms that provide 
consistent data in their financial reports, including uniform numbers of enhancing and 
blaming attributions, in the letter to shareholders, meet these expectations.  Aerts argued 
that firms intentionally use uniform proportions of enhancement and blame from one year 
to the next in their public descriptions of performance, regardless of actual performance, 
to achieve firm legitimacy: firm attribution follows "uncritical and passive adherence to 
prescribed disclosure norms" (W. Aerts, 2001, p. 5).  Based on the mechanism of image 
management and the expectation that investors prefer that firms project a consistent 
image, Aerts (2001) argued that attribution in a firm's letter to shareholders remains 
constant from year to year. Furthermore, he predicts that the number and type of 
attributions a firm uses in its letter to shareholders in one year predicts the number and 
type of attributions a firm uses in the following year.  
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Aerts (2001) tested this by analyzing the relationship between firm attribution and the 
financial community to which the company reports.  If different financial communities 
have different reporting expectations, these different expectations would manifest 
themselves in consistent but different patterns in each community.  Prior studies had 
demonstrated that listed companies provide more detailed financial reports than unlisted 
companies (Cooke, 1992; Firth, 1980).  Extrapolating from these findings, Aerts (2001) 
theorized that different reporting norms exist for listed and unlisted companies.  He 
hypothesized that attributions in letters to shareholders from listed firms differ from 
attributions in letters to shareholders from unlisted firms.   
To test his hypotheses regarding the role of social reporting norms in firm attribution, 
Aerts (2001) gathered panel data on 22 Dutch firms over eight years.  To create variation 
in the data, he sampled both publicly listed and unlisted firms.  He first analyzed the 
extent to which the number and type of attributions in the letter to shareholders in one 
year predict the number and type of attributions in the same firm's letter to shareholders 
in the following year.  Aerts (2001) found partial support for this first hypothesis.  Over 
time, firms' letters to shareholders demonstrated great consistency in the total number of 
attributions, the number of positive attributions, and the length of the attributions. 
However, the number of negative attributions varied significantly.  When firm 
performance fell, firms used more negative attributions.  This change in the use of 
negative attributions failed to support Aerts (2001) hypotheses.   
In conclusion, Aerts (2001) found partial support for his argument that the 
mechanism of image management causes firms to use consistent numbers and types of 
attributions year after year, regardless of performance.   
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Summary of the Study of Firm Attribution 
The study of firm attribution demonstrates both similarities and differences with the 
study of individual attribution.  At both levels of analysis, scholars study antecedents and 
consequences of attribution to determine what influences an agent's choice of attribution.  
At both levels of analysis, scholars find widespread presence of self-serving bias.  At 
both levels of analysis, scholars have proposed multiple mechanisms to explain self-
serving bias: the informational mechanisms of augmentation (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; 
Harold H. Kelley, 1973) and cognitive expectations (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Huff & 
Schwenk, 1990; D. T. Miller & Ross, 1975) and the emotional motivation mechanisms of 
retrospective justification (Staw et al., 1983; Zuckerman, 1979) and self-presentation 
(Bradley, 1978; Goffman, 1959; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Weary et al., 1989).  And at 
both levels of analysis, scholars find the most consistent support for image management.  
Nevertheless, at both levels of analysis, scholars find only partial support for any one 
mechanism and continue to debate which mechanism best explains the prevalence of self-
serving bias in attribution.   
However, studies of firm attribution also contrast with studies of individual 
attribution.  At the level of the individual, scholars consistently find a strong relationship 
between performance and attribution.  In contrast, at the level of the firm, scholars find 
no consistent empirical relationship between performance and attribution.  This lack of 
correlation at the level of the firm provides no support for the mechanisms of cognitive 
maps, retrospective justification, or augmentation theory, or image management.  
Consequently, scholars have proposed alternative variable relationships: Salancik and 
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Meindl (1984) propose that symbolic management creates a relationship between stability 
and attribution that supports the mechanism of image management; and Aerts (2001) has 
proposed that institutional norms in the reporting of financial information create a 
relationship between a firms' attributions from one year to the next that supports the 
mechanism of image management.   
 
Gaps in the Study of Firm Attribution 
Although prior studies provide valuable insight on firm attribution, the prevalence of 
self-serving bias in firm attribution remains unexplained.  Those mechanisms that explain 
self-serving bias at the level of the individual have found no empirical support at the level 
of the firm.  Furthermore, those mechanisms of firm attribution for which scholars have 
found at least partial empirical support - image management in relation to symbolic 
leadership and image management in relation to social norms of financial reporting - do 
not explain the overwhelming presence of self-serving bias.    
In the presence of firms' pervasive use of self-serving attribution, scholars' claims that 
image management drives firm attribution independent of firm performance is 
problematic.  Separate studies of image-management have found that self-serving 
attribution decreases an observer's impression of a firm.  In an experimental setting, 
Schwenk (1990) found that subjects were more positively disposed to firms that 
presented financial results with no performance explanations than they were to firms that 
presented financial results with self-serving explanations.  Similarly, in her studies of 
actual interaction between firms and external stakeholders, Elsbach (1994) found that 
following a negative event, external stakeholders prefer that firms explain performance 
 45 
 
issues with acknowledgements, clarity, and minimal use of enhancing and blaming 
attributions.  Consequently, the mechanisms of symbolic leadership and social norms do 
not lend themselves to explaining why firms use so many enhancing and blaming 
attributions.  The results of these studies do not identify a tangible benefit for firms that 
use enhancing and blaming attributions.  Thus, despite Salancik and Meindl's (1984) and 
Aerts' (2001) contributions to the understanding of firm attribution, these studies have not 
explained the most common types of firm attribution, enhancement and blame.   
This lack of explanation of firms' extensive use of enhancement and blame, also 
known as self-serving attribution, has ramifications beyond academic research.  It also 
has practical ramifications.  Some scholars have interpreted this lack of correlation 
between firm performance and firm attribution, along with researchers' inability to 
explain self-serving attribution, as evidence of deception by firms.  They conclude that 
additional regulations should be enacted to prevent firms from providing misleading 
attributions.  These scholars argue that the "disparity between the financial performance 
recorded in the financial statements and the language used in the accounting narratives" 
presents "a clear need to consider a more rigorous and intensive independent review than 
currently occurs" (M. Clatworthy & Jones, 2003, pp. 183-184).   
In sum, the study of firm attribution leaves three distinct gaps to be filled.  First, it 
presents an opportunity to identify how firms use attribution to manage their image.  As 
discussed above, although prior studies have found the greatest support for image 
management as the mechanism that drives attribution, these studies have not explained 
how self-serving attribution independent of performance provides any benefits to firms' 
image.  Second, the study of firm attribution presents an opportunity to reexamine 
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conceptualizations of firm performance.  As discussed above, although all prior studies of 
firm attribution investigate the relationship between firm performance and firm 
attribution, these studies under theorize the role of performance at the level of the firm.  
Third, the study of firm attribution presents an opportunity to reveal a relationship 
between firm performance and firm attribution.  Although empirical studies have 
repeatedly demonstrated a relationship between performance and attribution at the level 
of the individual, repeated attempts by organizational scholars to reveal a similar 
relationship at the level of the firm have failed.   
Despite their contributions, prior studies of firm attribution leave unanswered the 
question of what mechanism drives this phenomenon.  These studies do not reveal a 
relationship between firm performance and firm attribution.  In addition, these studies 
provide few conceptual underpinnings to their focal independent variable, firm 
performance.  Finally, these studies have demonstrated little to no success importing 
attribution theory from the level of the individual to the level of the firm.  A study that 
could take the next step and explain the dominance of self-serving attribution, "a robust 
and amply demonstrated phenomenon in human cognition" (Mezulis et al., 2004, p. 711), 
at the level of the firm would significantly advance our understanding of firm attribution.  
The remainder of Chapter II investigates scholars' insights on effective cross-level 
theorizing with an eye toward identifying more effective ways to apply attribution theory 
developed at the level of the individual at the level of the firm.   
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Importing Theory across Levels of Analysis 
Overview 
The above review of attribution at the level of the individual and at the level of the 
firm clearly demonstrates that the former provides explanations for self-serving 
attribution and the latter does not.  If a mechanism of individual attribution could 
effectively be transferred to the level of the firm, it would provide an opportunity to 
explain self-serving attribution at the level of the firm.   
Such a transfer from the level of the individual to the level of the firm is necessary 
due to the process by which organizations generate attributions.  Numerous departments 
and individuals contribute to and vet these attributions in the preparation of the letter to 
shareholders.  In addition, in the preparation of letters to shareholders, individuals follow 
specified roles that largely determine their individual contributions: different individuals 
could be placed in the same role with little to no effect on the attributions the attributions 
in a firm’s letter to shareholders.  Consequently, this dissertation addresses attribution at 
the level of the firm.   
Such a transfer from one level of analysis to another presents significant challenges.  
Scholars often avoid importing theories from the level of the individual to the level of the 
organization.  In addition, scholars have largely avoided theorizing about organizations as 
social actors (Heath & Sitkin, 2001).  However, scholars have recently argued that many 
theories developed at the level of the individual can be transferred to the level of the firm 
(Gavetti et al., 2007; King, Felin, & Whetten, 2009).  This subsection of the Chapter II 
discusses the challenges of importing theory from one level of analysis to another and 
how scholars can overcome these challenges.  
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Challenges to Developing Theories of Organizations 
During the last half century, the role of the organization has shrunk dramatically 
within the field of organizational studies (Gavetti et al., 2007). Heath and Sitkin (2001) 
articulate the difference between the study of the behavior of individuals in organizations, 
the study of behavior in an organizational context, and the study of the behavior and 
influence of organizations themselves. These scholars report that the first two categories, 
the study of behavior in and around organizations, have come to dominate organization 
studies and that studies of the third type, the study of organizations themselves, have 
become extremely rare (Heath & Sitkin, 2001). In most cases, scholars have chosen to 
study individuals in organizations (e.g. prospect theory), environments around 
organizations (e.g. network theory), and resources in organizations (e.g. resource based 
theory), rather than to study the behavior of the organization itself. Scholars have 
demonstrated a great willingness to shift attention away from what makes organizations 
distinct, focusing instead on the sum of the actions taken by individuals operating within 
them: "We in effect talk 'around' the organization.... our theories do not lend themselves 
to disciplinary introspection on the subject of the organization itself, specifically with 
regard to the subject of the organization as an actor"  (King et al., 2009, p. 290).   
Scholars’ preference for studies of individuals in organizations and the environment 
around organizations has manifested itself as a discipline-wide shift away from studying 
organizations as social actors (King et al., 2009, p. 290).   Scholars have cited good 
reasons for abandoning studies of organizations as distinct, active entities that influence 
data collection, interpretation of information, and decision making.  First, scholars have 
prioritized learning and change management (Gavetti et al., 2007) and marginalized 
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theories of organizations as nouns.  Theories that cast organizations as nouns have proven 
ineffective in conceptualizing radical or continual change (Weick & Quinn, 1999).  
Second, and even more problematic, the study of organizations as social agents has 
resulted in overstatement that has ascribed human qualities to organizations (Andersen, 
2008). Although some of this overstatement could be allowed on the grounds of poetic 
license, it has failed to increase scholarly understanding of organizations.  Instead of 
making organizations more understandable, metaphorical and theoretical comparisons 
between organizations and human beings have mythologized organizations (V. J. 
Friedman et al., 2005), anthropomorphized them (Andersen, 2008), and increased our 
misunderstanding (Whetten et al., 2009).  These arguments make clear the challenges 
scholars face in creating theories about organizations as social actors.   
 
Opportunities in Developing Theories of Organizations 
However, a study of organizations themselves, in contrast with a study of the 
activities and behaviors that occur in and around organizations, could identify how 
organizations affect individuals.  Scholars have argued that organizations influence 
individuals' identities (Whetten, 2006), change their expectations (Greve, 2003), and alter 
their understanding of the organization and its environment (Walsh & Ungson, 1991).  
Such a study could elucidate organizations as a noun: "the core of an organization is the 
relatively stable pattern of individuals' behavior interwoven with those of other people" 
and it can be understood through its "goals (purposes), people, structure, activity, 
resources, and norms," (Andersen, 2008, pp. 184-185). This dissertation’s goal is to 
conduct such a study and to elucidate firm attribution.   
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The question remains, however, of how to undertake such a study:  how could a study 
elucidate the organization as a noun, rather than anthropomorphize, mythologize, and 
misunderstand it?  First, Gavetti et al. (2007) argue that scholars can study the 
organization by focusing on decision making rather than learning and on fixed operating 
procedures rather than evolving routines.  Focusing on processes that organizations repeat 
time after time, rather than on processes that organizations must change in order for to 
survive, provides an opportunity to understand how organizations behave in predictable 
ways.  Second, Whetten et al. (2009) argue that when studying organizations as social 
actors, scholars cannot blindly transfer theories from other levels of analysis to another; 
rather scholars must carefully contextualize theories at the new level of analysis.  
Whetten et al. (2009) undertake such a careful contextualization of identity at the level of 
the organization.  A similar study could be undertaken regarding attribution.  Firm 
attribution represents a process undertaken by numerous participants (executives, the 
finance department, investor relations, and public relations), that follows standardized 
operating procedures, is repeated over time, and shows no direct evidence of change in 
procedures over time.   
In summary, based on the insight of scholars of organizations as social actors, 
importing the mechanisms of individual attribution to the level of the firm should provide 
insight on firm attribution.  However, to assure that these theories clarify rather than 
mythologize the firm, scholars must carefully contextualize them at the new level of 
analysis.  In light of the finding in the above review of prior studies of attribution at the 
level of the firm, that these prior studies under-theorized the key variable of performance 
at the level of the firm, the remainder of Chapter II examines the opportunity to provide a 
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strong conceptual foundation for performance at the level of the firm.  This conceptual 
foundation can be found in the concept of organizational aspiration.   
 
Aspiration Theory 
Overview 
The word "aspiration" derives from the Latin word "aspirationem", the action of 
breathing on or into (Harper, 2010).  In the thirteenth century, it was used to refer to 
divine inspiration (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989), a calling to a higher purpose that 
directs and motivates an agent to action.  Scholars currently take more modern 
perspectives on aspirations, but continues to address goals that inspire action.  Aspiration 
theory analyzes "the level of future performance in a familiar task which an individual ... 
explicitly undertakes to reach" (Frank, 1935);  "...performance which exceeds the level of 
aspiration is success, and performance which falls short of the level of aspiration is 
failure" (Starbuck, 1963: 51); "the aspiration level is the borderline between perceived 
success and perceived failure" (Greve, 2003, p. 39).   
Aspiration theory studies the antecedents that influence agents' choice of aspired 
performance levels and the consequences of achieving or failing to achieve an aspired 
performance level.  Studies of aspired performance typically identify two reference points 
that serve as antecedents: an agent's past performance and the performance of an agent's 
peers.  Scholars have studied aspiration theory at the level of the individual and at the 
level of the firm and have found strikingly similar results at both levels.  Aspiration 
theory is an example of effective cross level theorizing (Johns, 1999).  At the level of the 
firm, aspiration theory plays a key role in theories of organizational behavior (Cyert & 
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March, 1963):  management scholars consistently find changes in organizational behavior 
that relate to aspiration, such as to problemistic search (Greve, 2003).  Problemistic 
search is the search for new processes when a performance feedback indicates that the 
current process produces unsatisfactory results.  For example, many studies have found 
that agents that achieve their aspired performance level reduce problemistic search and 
agents that fail to achieve their aspired performance level increase problemistic search 
(Greve, 2003).  
This section first reviews the development of aspiration theory at the level of the 
individual.  Second, it describes how scholars of firm aspiration apply these theories at 
the level of the firm.  Aspiration theory serves as an example of effective cross-level 
theorizing.  More importantly, aspiration theory provides an opportunity to 
contextualized performance at the level of the firm.  This attention to how firms assess 
their performance creates an opportunity to study attribution theory more effectively at 
the level of the firm.   
 
Individual Aspiration 
Like attribution theory, aspiration theory originated with Kurt Lewin and his 
students in social psychology during the early and middle parts of the 20th century 
(Bernard Weiner, 1990).  Through the study of goal achievement in the release of 
tension, Lewin began investigating how agents set goals.  Tamara Dembo originated the 
concept of "level of aspiration" to refer to defined performance goals in a specific activity 
(Dembo, 1931; Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944).  For example, she and her 
colleagues measured the number of times individuals claimed that they would succeed in 
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throwing a ring on a post.  These scientists measured changes in subjects' aspiration 
levels through repeated trials at the same task, recording how achieving or failing to 
achieve an aspired performance level influenced the agent's choice of the next aspired 
performance level (Lewin et al., 1944).  Dembo found that subjects choose aspiration 
levels in reference to past performance: achieving an aspired performance level led the 
subjects to raise their aspiration and failing to achieve an aspired performance level led 
subjects to decrease their aspiration.  For example, subjects who aspired to land 6 out of 
10 rings on a post and succeeded might increase their aspired performance on the next try 
to 7 rings out of 10.  Conversely, subjects who failed to land the aspired 6 out of 10 rings 
on a post might decrease their aspiration to 5 out of 10 rings on the next try.   
Early studies of individual attribution also demonstrated that agents choose 
aspiration levels in reference to that of their social group.  These studies demonstrated 
that individuals reference not only past performance, but also the performance of their 
peers.  For example, students asked to estimate the score that they would receive on a test 
(Anderson & Brandt, 1939) or on a group project (Hilgard, Sait, & Margaret, 1940) 
consistently estimated that they would perform close to the announced mean for the class.  
This result held even for subjects who regularly earned scores above or below the class 
average, suggesting that subjects form aspirations in relation to the performance level of 
their peers (Lewin et al., 1944).   
Scholars have combined aspiration and attribution theory at the level of the 
individual.  Early scholars of attribution theory built directly off of aspiration theory.  For 
example, Julian Rotter asked subjects to guess whether a card would be an 'x' or an 'o'.  
He invoked attribution theory by giving subjects explanations for their performance: he 
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told one group of subjects that some individuals demonstrate an ability to guess the next 
card;  he informed another group of subjects that guessing correctly depended only on 
chance.  Rotter then tracked changes in subjects' aspiration levels and found that subjects 
who were told that some people could perform this task consistently generated higher 
aspirations than those who were told that guessing was purely chance (James & Rotter, 
1958).  Scholars have used aspiration theory and attribution theory together at the level of 
the individual since their inception by Kurt Lewin and his students (Bernard Weiner, 
1990).   
 
Firm Aspiration 
This section identifies key aspects of aspiration theory at the level of the firm, 
reviewing its origins, mechanisms, antecedents, consequences, and challenges.   
 
Origin 
Cyert and March formally introduced aspiration theory to the study of organizations 
in The Behavioral Theory of the Firm:  "Satisfactory profits represent a level of aspiration 
that the firm uses to evaluate alternative policies.... it defines a utility function with 
essentially only two values - good enough and not good enough" (Cyert & March, 1963: 
9).  Cyert and March (1963) argue that in contrast with economists' concept of rationally 
maximizing agents, managers operate rationally but within limits on information, 
expense, and attention.  Executives manage complex firms in complex environments and 
have limited cognitive capacity to do so (Simon, 1947).  To make decisions 
expeditiously, organizations harness routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), heuristics, and 
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belief structures (Cyert & March, 1963).  Aspirations represent one type of heuristic that 
guides managerial decision making:  aspirations help executives interpret performance 
information and facilitate their decision making process.   
Cyert and March (1963) directly acknowledge the challenge of applying a cognitive 
process identified in individuals to the study of firms:  "People (i.e. individuals) have 
goals; collectivities of people do not.... Individual goals are perceived as lodged in the 
individual human mind, the problem is to specify organizational goals without 
postulating an 'organizational mind' " (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 26).  Cyert and March 
(1963) address this challenge by conceptualizing the organization as a coalition.  Within 
this coalition, individuals not only hold goals for themselves, but also for the 
organization.  Through a socio-political process of negotiation, individuals advocate for 
their goals, form sub-coalitions with like-minded individuals, and eventually agree on 
firm level aspirations.  Quarterly earnings predictions, budgets, and market share goals all 
represent examples of aspired levels of firm performance.   
 
Mechanism 
Once a coalition creates firm level aspirations, a firm generates plans to achieve these 
aspirations and to monitor performance in relation to these aspirations (Cyert & March, 
1963).  When a firm achieves its performance aspirations, this achievement confirms a 
coalition's expectations, and encourages it to continue with the same perspective and 
decision making rules that it used previously.  When successful, a firm typically makes 
few or no modifications to standard operating procedures.  In contrast, when a firm fails 
to achieve aspired performance levels, executives engage in problemistic search, 
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collecting data from new sources, reevaluating their perspective, modifying decision 
rules, and reconsidering goals.  This problemistic search can lead to organizational 
learning and the development of new strategies, new tactics, and new aspired levels of 
performance (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003).   
Although aspiration theory translates easily to empirical study, methodological 
difficulties related to collecting and processing panel data delayed the first study of 
aspiration theory at the level of the firm until 1978 (Argote & Greve, 2007).  Articles on 
aspiration theory began to appear regularly in management journals in the 1990's (i.e. 
Bromiley, 1991; T. K. Lant, 1992).  During the past two decades, aspiration theory has 
been an active area of research (Argote & Greve, 2007).   
 
Antecedents 
Firms create aspirations from two reference points: a firm’s past performance and the 
performance of a firm’s peers (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003).  Past performance 
provides an example of the level of performance that a firm can achieve.  It encapsulates 
a great deal of information about the firm itself.  Firms generally have excellent access to 
their own performance data, allowing for precise benchmarking against prior 
performance.  However, comparisons with a firm's past performance often fail to take 
into account changes in a firm’s environment.  Independent of changes in the firm's 
environment, firms typically expect to perform as well, or slightly better, than they did in 
the past (Bromiley, 1991).  Performance expectations that reference past experience are 
known as historical aspirations (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003).     
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Firms also create aspirations in relation to the performance of their peers (Cyert & 
March, 1963).  Comparisons against peers can be made in the same time period, 
incorporating information on the business environment and its impact on the focal firm 
and its peers.  Comparisons with peers often fail, however, to take account of differences 
between firms.  Furthermore, firms often have less information about their competitors' 
performance than they do about their own performance, making comparisons with peers 
subject to errors in data collection.  Firms typically expect to perform as well, or slightly 
better, than their peers.  Performance expectations that reference the experience of peers 
are known as social aspirations (Bromiley, 1991; Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003).   
 
Consequences 
The formation of an aspiration itself has few, if any, direct consequences on behavior.  
However, a firm's achievement or failure to achieve aspired performance levels does, as 
does a firm’s expectation that it will achieve or fail to achieve an aspired performance 
level.  As described above, achievement of aspired performance levels confirms firms’ 
existing goals, plans, and decision making processes.  In contrast, failure to achieve 
aspired performance levels prompts firms to engage in problemistic search and to develop 
new goals, new plans, and new decision making processes.  Prior studies of firm 
aspiration have investigated numerous specific changes that executives make when their 
firms fail to achieve aspired performance levels, including changes in aspirations (Glynn, 
Lant, & Mezias, 1991; Greve, 2002; T. Lant & Shapira, 2008; Mezias, Chen, & Murphy, 
2002), overall strategy (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; T. K. Lant, 1992; D. Miller & 
Chen, 1994), increased risk taking (Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988), 
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increased innovation (Greve, 1998, 2003; Levinthal & March, 1981), increased 
commitment to research and development (Bolton, 1993), increased partnering with 
distant firms (J. A. C. Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & You-Ta, 2005), and increased learning 
from other firms (J. A. C. Baum & Dahlin, 2007).   
 
Challenges in the Study of Aspiration 
Although scholars agree on the main concepts of aspiration theory presented above, 
they continue to debate finer points of how to operationalize them.  For example, 
regarding aspired performance determined by historic performance, scholars agree that 
recent performance (i.e. last year) heavily influences historical aspiration while more 
distant performance (i.e. two to five years ago) has less influence (Bromiley, 1991; 
Greve, 2003).  However, scholars continue to debate the relative importance of each 
historical year.  Similarly, regarding social performance level, scholars agree that the 
more similarities between two firms, the more one will influence the other's social 
aspiration (Greve, 1998; Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Reger & Huff, 1993).  
However, scholars continue to debate which firm characteristics hold the most salience 
and how many characteristics firms must hold in common to consider themselves peers.   
To facilitate the operationalization of social aspiration at the level of the firm, this 
dissertation references work on relative performance evaluation.  Recent studies on 
relative performance evaluation conclude that executives compare their firms' 
performances to that of other firms of a similar size in the same industry (Albuquerque, 
2009).  The methodology section in Chapter IV presents a more in-depth discussion of 
the operationalization of variables.   
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In addition, scholars debate whether a firm's historical aspiration and social aspiration 
levels should be combined to create a single composite aspired performance level, or 
whether executives consider social and historical aspiration levels as distinct firm goals 
(Greve, 2003).  Cyert and March (1963) originally argued for averaging aspiration levels 
to create one combined level of aspiration.  Subsequent studies have proposed other 
options.  Some scholars argue that executives hold two distinct levels of aspiration, but 
shift from one to the other depending on the context and only refer to one at any given 
time (James G. March & Shapira, 1992; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996).  Other scholars 
argue that executives hold two different levels of aspiration and reference both types 
simultaneously (Greve, 1998).   
In addition, scholars debate whether firm behavior changes suddenly or gradually 
when firm performance passes a firm's aspired performance level.  Cyert and March 
(1963) conceptualized a distinct change from localized search to problemistic search 
when a firm failed to achieve its aspired performance level.  In contrast, empirical studies 
have found gradual changes in firm behavior when firms reach their aspired performance 
levels (Audia et al., 2000; J. A. C. Baum et al., 2005; Bolton, 1993; Fiegenbaum & 
Thomas, 1988; Greve, 1998, 2003; T. K. Lant, 1992; D. Miller & Chen, 1994).   
 
Summary of Aspiration Theory 
In sum, aspiration and attribution theory share a common origin in the work of Kurt 
Lewin and his students.  Cyert and March (1963) introduced aspiration theory at the level 
of the firm as a heuristic for performance evaluation in boundedly rational decision 
making. Antecedents to aspiration formation include a firms' historical performance and 
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the performance of the firm's peers.  Consequences of achieving an aspiration include 
whether a firm maintains or changes its perspective and routines: firms that fail to 
achieve their aspired performance search for new perspectives and routines.   
Despite agreeing on these key aspects of firm aspiration, scholars continue to debate 
its finer points.  This continued debate on the conceptualization of firm aspirations 
suggests that additional study of aspiration theory could yield benefits.  By combining 
aspiration theory with attribution theory at the level of the firm, this dissertation has the 
opportunity to address two gaps in the study of firm aspiration.  First, this dissertation has 
the opportunity to test whether social and historical aspirations exert a separate and 
independent influence on firm attribution.  Second, by virtue of the behaviors that it 
studies, this dissertation can investigate whether firms change behavior in a discrete or 
gradual manner when firm performance crosses the threshold of aspiration.  As discussed 
above, prior empirical studies have found that firms change their aspiration gradually 
when they achieve aspirations.  However, this gradual change may result from two 
sources: a gradual change in firms' assessment of their performance, or a sudden change 
in firms' assessment of their performance that manifested itself in gradual change in 
behavior due to investments in fixed assets, long planning horizons, or other factors 
contributing to firm inertia. In contrast with these other firm behaviors, firm attribution 
can be changed very quickly at little to no cost.  As it studies a firm behavior that can 
change quickly and easily, this dissertation provides an opportunity to identify nuances in 
firms' cognitive response to aspirations.  
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Model Creation: Aspiration Theory and Attribution Theory 
The above discussion of studies of firm attribution, cross-level theorizing, and firm 
aspiration makes clear the opportunity to further knowledge by combining aspiration and 
attribution theories at the level of the firm.  Prior studies of firm attribution have under-
conceptualized the concept of performance.  This lack of conceptualization of firm 
performance could be responsible for scholars' inability to identify an empirical 
relationship between performance and attribution at the level of the firm.  In contrast, 
aspiration theory provides a solid conceptual foundation for firm performance.  Scholars 
have previously combined attribution and aspiration theory at the level of the individual, 
suggesting that such a combination at the level of the firm could also yield insights on 
firm behavior.   
This dissertation seeks to address these gaps in prior literature.  First, gaps in prior 
studies of organizational cognition create an opportunity to conceptualize performance in 
the study of firm attribution.  This dissertation achieves such a reconceptualization by 
applying aspiration theory in the study of firm attribution.  Second, inconclusive findings 
from prior empirical studies of aspiration provide the opportunity to better understand 
how firms use aspirations to assess their performance.  For example, do firms favor 
performance assessment in relation to their past performance or in relation to their peers?  
This dissertation undertakes the challenge of furthering our understanding of aspiration.  
Third, limited findings in prior studies of attribution provide little insight on how firms 
use attribution to manage their image.  This dissertation undertakes the challenge of 
furthering our understanding of how firms use attribution to manage their image.  Finally, 
prior studies have failed to demonstrate a robust relationship between firm performance 
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and firm's explanations of performance, limiting our understanding of how firms generate 
these performance explanations.  This dissertation hypothesizes that there is a 
relationship between firm performance and firm's performance explanations.   
Combining attribution and aspiration theories at the level of the firm provides a 
model of how firms process information related to performance and generates 
performance explanations.  Figure 1 in the introduction presents this model.   
Combining aspiration and attribution theory at the level of the firm provides an 
opportunity for new insights about attribution theory.  Conceptualizing firm performance 
and firm performance assessment in relation to aspirations creates a new theoretical 
model with a much richer context at the level of the firm.  This new model creates new 
opportunities for empirical study that could reveal an empirical relationship between firm 
performance and firm attribution.   
In this new, combined model, firm attribution changes in relation to firms' 
assessment of performance relative to aspirations.  This relationship has the potential to 
reveal a relationship between self-serving attribution and firm performance.  Firms that 
achieve their aspirations are expected to use more enhancement.  Firms that fail to 
achieve their aspirations are expected to use more blame.  Chapter III develops 
hypotheses to test this model.   
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
In Chapter III, this dissertation creates hypotheses to test the theoretical model 
created in Chapter II.  Chapter III tests the two basis relationships in this model:  1) do 
firms that perform well relative to aspirations use enhancement to explain their 
performance and 2) Do firms that perform poorly relative to aspirations use blame to 
explain their performance?  Chapter III also tests two different ways of assessing 
performance.  Do firms assess their performance like high jumpers clearing the bar:  a 
dichotomous assessment of achieving or not achieving aspirations?  Or do firms assess 
their performance like golfers counting strokes against par, with an incremental measure 
of the difference between their actual and aspired performance?  Chapter III presents 
theoretical justification and hypotheses that formalize these questions.  
 
Motivation for Firms’ Use of Self-Serving Attributions 
As detailed in Chapter II and as illustrated in the opening vignette, firms describe 
their performance to investors and others stakeholders (Arnold & Moizer, 1984; Bartlett 
& Chandler, 1997; Greenstone et al., 2005).  Multiple individuals and departments 
contribute to these performance descriptions, following established practices and 
guidelines (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Beveridge, 1963; Hettinger, 1954).  The image that a 
firm projects of itself in these performance descriptions can be crucial to its success.  
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Management scholars have argued that firms depend on access to external resources, 
including labor, financing, raw materials, and distribution networks (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  The image that shareholders and other external stakeholders have of a firm can 
influence its ability to access these resources (Salancik & Meindl, 1984).  Furthermore, 
firms may manipulate verbal communications and other symbols presented to 
stakeholders to influence the firm's image in stakeholders' eyes (Pfeffer, 1981).   Firms 
explain performance "because they need to communicate to constituents that they are 
capable of producing results" (Salancik & Meindl, 1984, p. 239); "taking credit for 
positive events and eschewing blame for negative events is ... one means of positive self-
presentation" (Salancik & Meindl, 1984, p. 596).   
Prior studies have demonstrated that the greater the decline in firm performance, the 
more negative events a firm discloses (Abrahamson & Park, 1994).  As performance 
declines, negative events become more salient and require more attention and more 
explanation in communication with stakeholders (Bettman & Weitz, 1983).  Performance 
has a direct influence on the number of negative influences that firms report (W. Aerts, 
2001).  As firms have been shown to attribute negative events to external influences 
beyond the firm's control, this logically leads to an expectation that firms with declining 
performance use more blaming attribution (Staw et al., 1983).  Prior research has paid 
less attention to firms’ discussion of positive events.  However, it is possible that firms’ 
discussion of positive events also varies in relation to performance.  As firms have been 
shown to attribute positive events to the firm, if firms do vary discussion of positive 
events in relation to performance, this would logically lead firms with improving 
performance to use more enhancing attribution.  Thus, this dissertation expects that 
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"reasons internal to the organization will be cited for favorable performance outcomes 
and external factors will be noted for unfavorable outcomes" (Bettman & Weitz, 1983, p. 
167).   
In sum, to improve their external image, to assure access to resources, and to 
maximize their performance, firms use enhancement to explain good performance and 
blame to explain poor performance.   
 
Types of Attribution: Enhancement and Blame 
As detailed in the literature review, prior studies demonstrate that firms most 
commonly use two types of attribution: enhancement and blame (Walter Aerts, 2005; 
Johns, 1999; Salancik & Meindl, 1984).  Each of these types of attribution gives firms an 
opportunity to improve their image.  When they perform well, firms can enhance their 
image by taking credit for their good performance.  When they perform poorly, firms can 
defend their image by blaming poor performance on factors beyond the firms' control 
(Staw et al., 1983).  Empirical studies have demonstrated similar relationships at the level 
of the individual:  when individuals perform well relative to aspirations, they use more 
enhancement; when individuals perform poorly relative to aspirations, they use more 
blame (Mezulis et al., 2004).  Agents' use of enhancing and blaming attributions to 
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improve their image is so common that scholars have developed a label for it: self-
serving attribution (Johns, 1999).  
1
 
This dissertation creates separate hypotheses for enhancement and blame.  As firms 
use enhancement to explain performance above aspiration and blame to explain 
performance below aspiration, it is possible that enhancement and blame mirror each 
other: as enhancement increases, blame decreases, and vice-versa.  However, it is also 
possible that enhancement and blame demonstrate different relationships with 
performance relative to aspiration.  Some prior scholars have argued that independent 
mechanisms drive firms' use of enhancement and blame: a firm's drive to improve its 
image through the use of enhancement could operate separately from a drive to defend its 
image through blame (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983).  For example, firms 
may change their use of blame in relation to firm performance, but not change their use 
of enhancement in relation to firm performance (W. Aerts, 2001).  Consequently this 
dissertation tests enhancement and blame separately by preparing two sets of hypotheses, 
one set for enhancement (hypotheses 1, 3, & 5) and the other set for blame (hypotheses 2, 
4, & 6).   
  
                                                          
 
1
 Prior empirical studies have not examined the other two types of attribution: self-criticism and good 
fortune.  Due to limitations in project scope, this dissertation also concentrates its empirical study on 
enhancement and blame.   
 
 67 
 
Performance Assessment 
This dissertation examines two different cognitive models with which firms might 
evaluate achievement of aspired performance.  In the first model, firms evaluate 
performance in a dichotomous fashion: all performance that achieves or surpasses 
aspirations is considered equally successful and all performance that falls short of 
aspirations is considered equally unsuccessful.  In the second model, firms evaluate 
performance in a more nuanced fashion that takes into account the extent by which 
performance surpasses or falls short of aspirations:  firms that surpass aspirations by a 
large margin would assess their performance differently from those that just barely 
achieve their aspirations.   
Two sports exemplify these different cognitive models for performance evaluation:  
high-jumping and golf.  High jumpers assess their performance on a dichotomous scale.  
High-jumpers literally set a bar at a specified height and aspire to clear the bar.  If the 
jumper clears the bar, the jump in successful; if the jumper fails to clear the bar, the jump 
is a failure.  For example, if a high-jumper sets a bar at 6' and clears the bar, the jumper 
receives credit for jumping 6'.  Whether the jumper actually jumps 6' and barley clears 
the bar or jumps 10' and clears the bar by an enormous margin is not scored.  Similarly, if 
the jumper fails to clear the bar, the jumper receives no credit.  It makes no difference 
whether the jumper fails by the width of a human hair or if the jumper falls a full body 
length short of the bar.  The jumper sets an aspired performance level and records 
whether she attains or fails to attain that performance level, with no consideration for the 
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extent by which she surpassed or fell short of the bar.  This recording of only two values, 
success or failure, represents a dichotomous assessment of performance.   
In contrast, golfers assess their performance on a continuous scale and note the 
difference between their actual and aspired performance.  Golfers score by counting the 
number of shots necessary to put a golf ball in a hole.  The fewer shots, the better the 
score.  In addition, each golf course and each golf hole is assigned a par, or aspired score.  
A golfer assess her score in relation to par: she records the exact number of strokes taken 
on a hole and the exact number of strokes by which she beats par or is over par.  For 
example, on a par five hole, if a golfer takes five shots, then the golfer scores "par".  If on 
the same hole, a second golfer takes 4 shots, then the second golfer scores "1 under par".  
If on the same hole, a third golfer takes six shots, then the third golfer scores "1 over 
par".  And, if on the same hole, a fourth golfer takes 8 shots, then the fourth golfer scores 
"3 over par".  In golf, players are judged by the number of strokes by which they beat or 
exceed par.  For example, in the example above, the second golfer with a score of "1 
under par" would beat the golfer who scored "par".  This recording of many different 
levels of performance represents a continuous assessment of performance.   
 
Dichotomous Performance Assessment 
Achievement of a Single Aspiration 
As described in Chapter II, seminal studies of organizational behavior assert that 
firms evaluate their performance in a dichotomous fashion, as a simple judgment of 
success or failure (Cyert & March, 1963; J. G. March & Simon, 1958).  These seminal 
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works invoke aspirations to explain how choices are made within the limits of bounded 
rationality.  They depict organizational goals as aspirations:  "most organizational 
objectives take the form of an aspiration level rather than as an imperative to 'maximize' 
or 'minimize' " (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 28).  In relation to this aspired performance 
level, performance is judged to be either  acceptable or unacceptable (J. G. March & 
Simon, 1958).  The limits of bounded rationality prevent firms from conducting a more 
nuanced performance assessment.  For example, bounded rationality prevents firms from 
distinguishing between 'highly acceptable' and 'marginally acceptable' performance. This 
conceptualization of firm aspiration matches how high jumpers score their 
accomplishments, simply noting whether or not they clear a bar and ignoring the extent 
by which they surpass their aspiration.   
Furthermore, achieving or failing to achieve aspired performance levels leads firms to 
choose different behaviors.  For example, firms that achieve their aspirations engage in 
local search that reinforces prior beliefs, while firms that fail to achieve aspirations 
engage in problemistic search to develop new opportunities to improve performance 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1996; James G. March & Shapira, 1992).  These 
scholars argue that firms commit themselves to one behavior or the other, not to half-
measures that combine equal parts of reinforcing and replacing prior beliefs.  Using this 
dichotomous scale of firm performance assessment, a graph of the relationship between 
firm performance and firm behavior reveals a step function.  Figure 2 illustrates the 
relationship between firm performance and the use of enhancement that would result 
from a dichotomous model of the assessment of firm performance in relation to 
aspiration.   
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The vertical axis in Figure 2 depicts the attributions in a letter to shareholders that are 
enhancing.  If all attributions in a letter to shareholders are enhancing, then that letter 
would be considered 100% enhancing.  If none of the attributions in a letter to 
shareholders are enhancing, then the letter would be considered 0% enhancing.   
 
Figure 2: Dichotomous Influence of Aspiration on Use of Enhancement 
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This depiction of aspiration, as a cognitive tool that results in dichotomous 
performance assessment and leads firms to choose between distinct behaviors, provides 
one possible model of the relationship between firm attribution and firm performance 
relative to aspirations.  Hypothesis 1 applies this model to firms' use of enhancement.  As 
discussed at the beginning this chapter, firms use enhancement to improve the firm's 
image in order to maximize access to resources that are vital to the firm's future success. 
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Hypothesis 1 posits that firms that achieve a performance aspiration use more attribution 
than firms that don't achieve a performance aspiration.   
 
 Hypothesis 1: When a firm achieves (fails to achieve) a performance aspiration, it uses 
more (less) enhancement to explain performance than when it fails to 
achieve (achieves) a performance aspiration.   
 
As discussed on page 63, it is possible that the relationship between enhancement and 
performance relative to attribution mirrors the relationship between blame and 
performance relative to attribution.  In other words, when firms use more enhancement 
they use less blame, and vice-versa.  However, it is also possible that these two 
relationships do not mirror each other.  Consequently, this dissertation develops separate 
hypotheses for enhancement and blame.  Hypothesis 2 tests the same dichotomous 
cognitive model of performance assessment with firms' use of blame.  As discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, firms use blame to defend the firm's image and to maintain 
access to valuable resources that are vital to the firm's success.  Hypothesis 2 posits that 
firms that fail to achieve a performance aspiration use more blame than firms that achieve 
a performance aspiration.   
 
 72 
 
Hypothesis 2: When a firm fails to achieve (achieves) a performance aspiration, it uses 
more (less) blame to explain performance than when it achieves (fails to 
achieve) a performance aspiration.   
 
Achievement of Multiple Performance Aspirations 
Seminal studies of organizational behavior regularly reference performance 
aspirations as a plural noun, suggesting that firms may aspire to more than one goal.  For 
example, a firm might have separate aspirations for top-line growth (revenue growth) and 
for bottom-line growth (earnings growth).  In any given performance period, a firm could 
achieve its aspirations for both top-line and bottom-line growth, or it could achieve one 
of these two performance aspirations but not the other, or it could fail to achieve both of 
these performance aspirations.  Similarly, a firm could outperform its competition, 
achieving its social aspirations, but perform worse than it did in prior years, failing to 
achieve its historical aspirations.  Furthermore firms could include descriptions of 
multiple performance metrics in their annual reports.  For example, if firm 'A' achieves its 
aspirations for both revenue and net income, it could conceivably report both 
accomplishments and take credit for both accomplishments.  In this scenario, firm A 
responds to achieving multiple aspirations by generating multiple enhancing attributions.  
In contrast, if firm B achieves its revenue aspiration but fails to achieve its net income 
aspiration, it could conceivably take credit for achieving its revenue aspiration and blame 
its failure to achieve its net income aspiration on environmental factors.  Firm B responds 
to achieving one aspiration and failing to achieve another by generating one enhancing 
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attribution and one blaming attribution.  In this scenario, firm A achieves more 
aspirations than firm B and uses more enhancement than firm B.   
However, it is also possible that firms that achieve multiple aspirations don't use more 
enhancement in their letters to shareholders than firms that achieve only one aspiration.  
When firm 'B' achieves its revenue aspiration but not its net income aspiration, it could 
focus all of its performance explanations on revenue and omit any mention of net income 
from its communications with stakeholders.  In this manner Firm 'B' could conceivably 
make two enhancing attributions related to achieving its revenue aspiration and omit any 
reference to its failure to achieve its net income aspiration.  In this second scenario, firm 
A achieves more aspirations that firm B, but both firms use the same amount of 
enhancement.   
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, firms use enhancement to improve their 
image and to maximize access to resources vital to the firm's success.  Hypothesis 3 tests 
whether achievement of multiple aspirations corresponds with use of even more 
enhancement to further improve a firm's image and further improve access to resources.   
 
Hypothesis 3:  The more (less) performance aspirations a firm achieves the more (less) 
enhancement it uses to explain performance.   
 
As discussed on page 63, this dissertation does not assume that enhancement and 
blame follow similar but opposite relationships with performance relative to aspiration.  
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Hypothesis 4 uses the same logic as Hypothesis 3, but uses it to test whether failure to 
achieve multiple aspirations influences a firm's use of blame.    
 
Hypothesis 4:  The fewer (more) performance aspirations a firm achieves, the more (less) 
blame it uses to explain performance.   
 
Continuous Performance Assessment 
In contrast with the dichotomous, high jumper like depiction of performance relative 
to aspiration in early conceptual studies of firm behavior (Cyert & March, 1963; J. G. 
March & Simon, 1958), subsequent empirical studies find that performance relative to 
aspiration exerts a more nuanced influence on firm decision making.  As described 
above, firms may incorporate the difference between their actual and aspired performance 
in their performance assessment, similar to how golfers count the number of shots they 
take relative to par.  As described in Chapter II, in contrast with conceptual studies such 
as the Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March, 1963), numerous empirical studies 
find that firm behavior does not change suddenly.  Rather, these empirical studies find 
that firms change their behavior gradually as performance approaches aspiration (Audia 
& Greve, 2006; J. A. C. Baum & Dahlin, 2007; J. A. C. Baum et al., 2005; Glynn et al., 
1991; Greve, 1998, 2002).  The following sub-section develops the concept of gradual 
change in firm attribution as performance approaches aspiration, reviews two of these 
studies, and develops logic to support gradual change in attribution as performance 
approaches aspiration.   
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Gradual Change Related to Performance Relative to Aspiration 
Prior empirical studies find that all performance above or below aspirations is not 
equal.  Rather, the difference between actual firm performance and aspired firm 
performance plays a role in firms' performance assessment.  In other words, these 
empirical studies find that a firm that greatly surpasses its performance aspirations deems 
itself more successful than a firm that just barely achieves its performance aspirations.  
Similarly, these empirical studies find that a firm that falls far short of aspirations 
assesses its performance as a greater failure than a firm that falls just short of aspirations.  
As described above, this gradual and continuous assessment of performance relative to 
aspiration resembles how golfers score the number of shots they take relative to par.   
These empirical studies find that firm behavior also manifests itself in a nuanced 
manner.  Rather than changing abruptly from one distinct type of behavior to another, 
firm behavior changes gradually.  In addition, these empirical studies find that the degree 
of behavioral change corresponds with the size of the difference between actual and 
aspired performance.  The larger the difference between actual and aspired performance, 
the larger the subsequent change in firm behavior.   
Greve (2003) characterizes this relationship between firm behavior and the difference 
between actual and aspired performance as a linear function with different rates of 
change above and below the aspired performance level.  Figure 3 illustrates one example 
of such a relationship, with one rate of change when actual performance is below aspired 
performance and a different rate of change above aspired performance.   
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These empirical studies also find that this relationship has a different rate of change 
when performance exceeds firm aspiration than when it falls short of firm aspiration.  For 
example, in many studies firm behavior changed dramatically with the extent to which 
performance fell short of aspiration.  In contrast, these studies found that firm behavior 
changed little or not at all in relation with the extent to which performance surpassed 
aspiration (Audia & Greve, 2006; J. A. C. Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Greve, 1998, 2003).  
These findings suggest that scholars should conduct separate tests of the difference 
between actual and aspired performance above and below aspiration.   
Below, Figures 3A and 3B illustrate these relationships.  Figure 3A presents this 
incremental linear relationship between enhancement and performance.  Figure 3B 
presents this incremental linear relationship between blame and performance.   
 
Empirical Studies of Gradual Change Related to Performance Relative to Aspiration 
Numerous empirical studies have found such a relationship between firm 
performance and firm behavior.  In other words, the difference between actual 
performance and aspired performance influences firm behavior.  These studies have 
demonstrated such a relationship for firm behaviors as varied as choice of firm strategy 
(Audia et al., 2000; T. K. Lant, 1992; D. Miller & Chen, 1994), increased risk taking 
(Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988), increased innovation (Greve, 1998, 
2003; Levinthal & March, 1981), increased commitment to research and development 
(Bolton, 1993), increased partnering with distant firms (J. A. C. Baum et al., 2005), and 
increased learning from other firms (J. A. C. Baum & Dahlin, 2007).   
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Figure 3: Gradual Influence of Performance on Enhancement (A) and Blame (B) 
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changes radio stations make to their music format in response to performance feedback.  
Greve (1998) hypothesizes that the worse a station performs relative to aspiration, the 
greater the chance the station will change its music format.  Furthermore, Greve (1998) 
hypothesizes that the probability of change will decrease slowly as the radio station's 
performance approaches aspiration.  Greve (1998) attributes this gradual reduction in the 
radio stations' propensity to change to "commitment to failing courses of action (Staw, 
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), perceptual and attributional biases (Milliken & Lant, 
1991), or preferences for the status quo (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979)."  Greve (1998) finds that, as predicted, the probability for change in 
radio station format declines gradually as a radio station's performance approaches 
aspiration.   
Baum et al. (2005) also find that firm behavior changes gradually as performance 
approaches aspiration.  Baum et al. (2005) study a firm's willingness to accept risk in the 
form of partnering with a nonlocal firm with which the firm has no ties.  Baum et al. 
(2005) ground this argument in learning theory.  They argue that firms that perform 
above aspiration do not seek risk:  performance above aspirations "reinforces lessons 
drawn from earlier experience" (J. A. C. Baum et al., 2005, p. 541). In contrast, they 
argue that firms that perform below aspiration accept risk: performance below aspiration 
"calls existing practices and strategies into question" (J. A. C. Baum et al., 2005, p. 541), 
inspiring firms to accept the risk of partnering with unknown firms.  In addition, they 
argue that firms that perform far below aspiration embrace more risk than firms that 
perform slightly below aspiration.  Firms that perform slightly below aspiration can hope 
to achieve aspiration through minor tweaks to past practice.  In contrast, firms performing 
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far below aspirations "must increase their emphasis on more exploratory, problematic 
search and risky undertakings that offer the possibility of raising the organization's 
performance to its aspiration level" (J. A. C. Baum et al., 2005p. 541).    
 
Gradual Change in Attribution as Performance Approaches Aspiration 
This depiction of aspiration provides a second model of the relationship between 
attribution and performance relative to attribution.  In this second model, aspiration 
serves as a reference point from which firms assess degrees of success and failure.  The 
greater the degree of success, the more a firm will engage in a certain behavior (i.e. lack 
of change or risk avoidance).  The greater the degree of failure, the more a firm will 
engage in an alternate behavior (i.e. change or risk acceptance).  In this second model, the 
difference between actual and aspired performance influences firms' use of attribution.  In 
addition, this model suggests that the rate of change in firms' use of attribution relative to 
performance could be different above and below aspired performance levels.   
As described in chapter II, firms need to maintain a positive image in order to 
maintain access to vital resources and they use enhancement to improve their image.  In 
this continuous model of performance assessment relative to aspiration, firms that vastly 
surpass their aspired performance would use the most enhancement.  Firms that just meet 
their performance aspirations would use less enhancement.  Firms that perform below 
aspirations would use still less enhancement.  And, firms that perform far below 
aspirations would use the least enhancement. 
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Hypothesis 5a tests the relationship between enhancement and performance above a 
firm's aspired performance relative to aspiration.  Hypothesis 5b tests the relationship 
between enhancement and performance below a firm's aspired performance level.   
 
Hypothesis 5a: The further (less) a firm's performance is above aspiration, the greater 
(lesser) its use of enhancement to explain performance.   
 
Hypothesis 5b: The further (less) a firm's performance is below aspiration, the lesser 
(greater) its use of enhancement to explain performance.   
 
As discussed on page 63, this dissertation does not assume that enhancement and 
blame follow similar but opposite relationships with performance relative to aspiration.  
Hypothesis 6 uses the same logic as Hypothesis 5, but uses it to test whether failure to 
extent by which a firm achieves or fails to achieve aspired performance influences its use 
of blame.  Hypotheses 6a tests the relationship between blame and performance above a 
firm's aspired performance level and hypothesis 6b tests the relationship between blame 
and performance below a firm's aspired performance level.   
 
Hypothesis 6a: The further (less) a firm's performance is above aspiration, the lesser 
(greater) its use of blame to explain performance.   
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Hypothesis 6b: The further (less) a firm's performance is below aspiration, the greater 
(lesser) its use of blame to explain performance. 
 
Summary 
In summary, Chapter III develops six hypotheses.  These hypotheses test the 
relationship between firm performance relative to aspiration and firms' use of attribution.  
These hypotheses test both firms' use of enhancement and their use of blame.  In addition, 
these hypotheses test whether the achievement of multiple aspirations has a cumulative 
influence on firm attribution.  Finally, these hypotheses test whether firms assess 
performance in a dichotomous fashion, like high-jumpers, and change attribution as a 
step function; or if firms assess performance in a continuous manner, like golfers, and 
change their attribution gradually in relation to the difference between aspiration and 
performance.  Table 5 summarizes the six hypotheses that test the relationship between 
attribution and firm performance in relation to aspiration.     
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Table 5: Summary of Characteristics Tested in Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Type of Attribution Type of Performance Assessment 
1 Enhancement Dichotomous 
2 Blame Dichotomous 
3 Enhancement Cumulative 
4 Blame Cumulative 
5a Enhancement Continuous - above aspiration 
5b Enhancement Continuous - below aspiration 
6a Blame Continuous - above aspiration 
6b Blame Continuous - below aspiration 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Chapter IV describes the research method that this dissertation uses to empirically test 
the hypotheses presented in Chapter III.  Chapter IV begins by describing the nature and 
rationale for the research method.  It next discusses the empirical setting, the sample 
design, and data collection.  It also defines variables and how they are operationalized.  
Finally, chapter IV presents this dissertation's framework for statistical analysis.   
 
Description of the Research Method 
In light of this dissertation's goals, and the research methods of prior studies, this 
dissertation uses archival data.  Prior studies of firm attribution have worked primarily 
from either case studies or archival data.  Scholars conducting case studies have 
examined relationships between firm attribution and its consequences.  These studies 
have focused on internally observable firm characteristics, including strategic 
reorientation (Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 2003), the pace of change (Gordon, Stewart, 
Sweo, & Luker, 2000), and CEO replacement (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006).  In 
contrast, scholars using archival data have examined relationships between firm 
attribution and its antecedents.  These studies have focused on externally measurable firm 
characteristics, including firm performance (Staw et al., 1983), industry performance 
(Staw et al., 1983), and the performance of the economy as a whole (Bettman & Weitz, 
1983).  As this dissertation seeks to identify the relationship between performance, an 
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externally measurable antecedent to firm attribution, and attribution, it collects archival 
data.   
Scholars have used both cross-sectional and longitudinal data in the study of firm 
attribution.  Early studies of firm attribution used cross-sectional data (Bettman & Weitz, 
1983; Bowman, 1976; Staw et al., 1983).  Subsequent studies used longitudinal data in 
order to study variation in financial performance (Salancik & Meindl, 1984) or change in 
attributions over time (W. Aerts, 2001).  For example, Salancik and Meindl (1984) 
sampled 18 firms over 18 years, Clapham and Schwenk (1991) sampled 20 firms over 5 
years, and Aerts (2001) sampled 22 firms over 8 years. As this dissertation analyzes both 
variation in financial performance and changes in firm attribution over time, it analyzes 
longitudinal data.   
 
Empirical Setting 
Letters to shareholders provide a good opportunity to study the relationships 
between firm attribution and firm performance. These letters give firms an opportunity to 
describe, explain, and justify their performance to shareholders (Staw et al., 1983).  Firms 
produce letters to shareholders after they have compiled their annual financial 
performance:  the firm first compiles data on its annual financial performance, then writes 
explanations for its performance in the letter to shareholders, and finally delivers 
financial statements and the letter to shareholders.  This temporal sequence mirrors the 
hypothesized causal relationship in which performance acts as an antecedent to financial 
performance.   
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In contrast with other explanations of performance, especially those that occur in 
interviews or conference calls, the letter to shareholders represents a firm's most 
formalized explanation of firm performance.  The letter to shareholders is presented in 
written form, allowing no opportunity for changes or improvisation to explanations in the 
delivery.  In addition, the letter appears as part of the annual report.  Preparation of the 
annual report consists of a well scripted process between multiple individuals in multiple 
divisions of the firm.   
Firms produce these letters to shareholders to provide context around firm 
performance.  Accounting regulations suggest that these letters should help shareholders 
understand the firm's performance (Bettman & Weitz, 1983).  Furthermore, in contrast 
with auditors' careful scrutiny of firms financial statements, their letters to shareholders 
receive only a cursory review that verifies that any quantitative information in these 
statements matches that in audited financial reports.  Auditors do not review the reasons 
firms give for the their performance (Bettman & Weitz, 1983), giving firms the freedom 
to explain firm performance as they choose (M. Clatworthy & Jones, 2003).  
Furthermore, investors value the information firms provide in the letter to shareholders.  
Studies show that letters to shareholders are the most widely read narrative portion of a 
firm's annual report (Bartlett & Chandler, 1997) and that investment analysts regard them 
as the annual report’s most influential information source (Arnold & Moizer, 1984).   
Prior studies have revealed that firms' CEOs and presidents generally do not write the 
letter to shareholders.  Teams of employees from investor relations, public relations, 
finance, accounting, and the legal department typically draft letters to shareholders.  An 
executive committee then edits the letter and presents it to the CEO for revision.  The 
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new version of the letter is then reviewed by numerous individuals before receiving final 
approval (Bettman & Weitz, 1983).  In addition, many firms ask external consultants to 
contribute to the preparation of the letter to shareholders.  This engagement by many 
individuals, including outside specialists, suggests that firms take a strong interest in the 
image that they present in the letter to shareholders.  Public relations texts confirm the 
widespread acceptance of these group processes in the production of letters to 
shareholders (Beveridge, 1963; Hettinger, 1954).  Consequently, this dissertation regards 
the letter to shareholders as a product of the firm, namely its policies, procedures, and 
people, not as an expression of the personal opinions of the CEO or president.   
 
Sample Design 
Prior studies have sampled a relatively small number of firms over spans of one or 
more years.  Table 6 summarizes the sampling techniques used in the six influential 
studies of attribution in letters to shareholders described in the literature review.  None of 
these studies tested for performance relative to industry peers, nor did these studies 
collect the data to do so.  Although three of these studies took industry into account in 
their sampling, none of them gathered enough data within a single industry to generate 
statistically significant tests:  Bowman (1976) sampled 10 firms in one industry, Bettman 
and Weitz (1983) sampled 82 firms across 4 industries, and Clapham and Schwenk 
(1991) sampled 20 firms in two industries.  Other studies of firm attribution did not 
consider industry in their samples: Staw et al. (1983) sampled 81 firms across all 
industries, Salancik and Meindl (1984) sampled 18 firms across all industries, and Aerts 
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(2001) sampled 22 firms across 22 industries.  In addition, none of these studies 
considered firm size in their sample selection.   
 
Table 6: Research Design of Prior Studies of Firm Attribution 
 
Study Sample 
Performance 
Measure 
Comparison 
Method 
Bowman 
(1976) 
10 food processing firms in 
one year 
Five year average 
ROE 
First quartile vs. last 
quartile 
Bettman & 
Weitz 
(1983) 
81 firms in four industries 
over two years: one good 
year and one bad year 
Annual Sales 
Above or below 
sample average by 
industry and year 
Staw et al. 
(1984) 
81 firms whose 
performance either 
increased or declined by 
50% in 1977 
Annual Earnings 
per Share 
Firms above and 
below sample mean 
Salancik & 
Meindl 
(1984) 
18 firms over 18 years 
Sums annual Profit 
Margin, Sales, and 
Earnings Per Share 
Increase or decrease 
in performance 
measure 
Clapham & 
Schwenk 
(1991) 
20 utilities (gas and electric 
firms) over 5 years 
5 year average 
Earnings per Share 
Firms above and 
below sample mean 
Aerts 
(2001) 
22 firms in 22 industries 
over 8 years 
Annual ROE, 
ROA, or Profit 
Margin 
Significant 
correlation from 
year-to-year  
 
 
Like some prior studies, this dissertation collects longitudinal data.  Collecting 
longitudinal data allows for analysis of changes in attribution.  This dissertation collects 
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data from 2004 and 2005 because these two years represent years of relative 
macroeconomic stability.  Using the S&P 500 as a proxy for macroeconomic stability, the 
S&P500 returned 10.88% in 2004 and 4.91% in 2005. 
2
  On average, from 1925 to 2004 
the S&P500 yielded an average return of 10.4% (Gannon & Blum, 2006).  The returns in 
2004 and 2005 fall closer to the S&P500's average annual return than the return in any 
other two consecutive years over the last two decades.   
In contrast with prior studies, this dissertation samples firms according to industry 
and firm size.  It argues that firms compare their performance to that of peers.  Relative 
performance evaluation, the study of how agents separate their contribution to firm 
performance from exogenous influences, demonstrates that executives consider firms of 
the same size in the same industry as their peers (Albuquerque, 2009).  Furthermore, 
studies of relative performance evaluation show that two digit SIC codes effectively 
approximate peer groupings by industry (Albuquerque, 2009).  Creating a dataset that 
allows for such comparisons within industries resulted in a multi-step process in defining 
the dataset.   
First, this dissertation begins with all firms in the Compustat database.  It is one of 
the most complete representations of publicly traded companies, representing over 98% 
of the world's total market capitalization.  Within this group, this dissertation includes 
only firms in North America.  Studies of attribution have demonstrated that different 
cultures use attribution differently (Tsang, 2002).  Limiting the sample to firms in North 
America reduces the influence of such cultural differences.   
                                                          
 
2
 Retrieved May 5, 2010, from http://www.moneychimp.com/features/market_cagr.htm 
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From this group of North American firms, this dissertation includes only firms with 
market value of over $100 million.  Preliminary empirical investigation indicates that 
firms with market value of under $100 million rarely produce letters to shareholders or 
don't make these letters publicly available.  This could be because the expense of 
producing a glossy annual report that includes a letter to shareholders is prohibitive for 
these smaller firms.  Instead, smaller firms may communicate performance information 
via the 10-K report, which they are required to produce in accord with accounting 
regulations and which does not contain a letter to shareholders.  It is also possible that 
firms with smaller market capitalization have a small number of owners who rely on 
informal channels of communication.   
From this group of North American manufacturing firms with sales of over $100 
million, this dissertation includes only firms with a fiscal year end in December, the most 
common fiscal year end.  Limiting the sample to firms that share the same fiscal year 
eliminates time as an uncontrolled exogenous influence and eliminates two potential 
sources of noise in the data.  First, limiting all measures of firm performance and firm 
attribution to a uniform period facilitates comparisons between firms.  Firms do not limit 
performance comparisons to year-end statements.  Rather, firms access data on 
competitors' performance from multiple sources in real time and compare performance 
across a single time period.  Limiting this dissertation's between-firm performance 
comparisons to firms with the same financial year end more faithfully models firms' 
actual process of social comparison.  Second, the business environment may influence the 
attributions that firms make of their performance.  As the business environment varies 
from one time period to another, comparisons of attributions from different firms across 
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different time periods would manifest differences due to changes over time in the 
business environment.  Limiting the dataset to a single time period controls for changes 
in the business environment and eliminates this source of noise in the data.   
The remaining group contains 2,231 firms.  Collecting data on all 2,231 firms could 
prove valuable.  However, due to constraints on time and other resources, this dissertation 
further reduces this group to manufacturing firms, to include all firms in SIC codes 2000-
3999.  Although a dataset comprised of manufacturing firms is not the only viable dataset 
for this study, it presents numerous strengths.  First, manufacturing firms present a great 
deal of variety.  From the production of high-tech products to basic materials, these firms 
provide a broad representation of the economy.  In addition, measures of average firm 
size by industry, the number of firms per industry, and industry volatility show that 
manufacturing encompasses a wide range of industries and firms.     
Table 7 presents a profile of the resulting sample.  It shows that, although the 
resulting sample contains only 769 firms or 11% of the firms in the Compustat database, 
that it represents 41 industries or 44% of all industries in the Compustat database.  Table 
7 also shows that the average firm in the manufacturing sector has a higher market value, 
sales, and net income than the average firm in the Compustat database.  These higher 
values would be expected in more concentrated industries and the manufacturing sector 
contains some concentrated industries, most notably tobacco, petroleum, and automotive.  
However, these higher averages result from a small number of extremely large firms.  If 
these outliers are excluded, the average size of sample firms falls much closer to the 
average for Compustat firms.      
  
 91 
 
Table 7: Profile of Firms in Sample 
Category 
Number 
of Firms 
Number of 
Industries 
(4 Digit 
SIC) 
Average 
Firm 
Market 
Value        
($ mil) 
Average 
Firm Sales 
($ mil) 
Average 
Firm Net 
Income       
($ mil) 
Compustat Firms 7,112 93 2,823 2,342 141 
Compustat Firms 
in North America 
5,329 93 2,914 2,077 141 
Compustat Firms 
in North America 
with market value 
over $100 million 
3,082 93 4,823 3,296 232 
Compustat Firms 
in North America 
with market value 
over $100 million 
and December 
Year End 
2,231 93 4,826 3,296 232 
Compustat Firms 
in North America 
with market value 
over $100 million 
and December 
Year End in 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
769 41 6,090 4,410 307 
 
Below, Table 8 breaks out the number of firms in each industry, where industry is 
defined as a 2-digit SIC code.   
In addition, this dissertation collects annual performance data for the period from 
2000-2003.  It uses performance data from the years 2000-2005 to calculate the volatility 
of firm performance.   
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Table 8: Sample Firms by Industry (2-Digit SIC Code) 
SIC Code Industry Group Name 
Average Market 
Value of Firms in 
Industry 
Industry 
Beta 
Number of 
Firms in 
Industry 
2000 Food Processing 8,815 0.66 17 
2082 Beverage (Alcoholic) 14,423 0.64 3 
2085 Tobacco 61,986 0.69 3 
2087 Beverage (Soft Drink) 30,669 0.59 8 
2300 Apparel 2,773 0.88 8 
2500 Furn./Home Furnishings 1,857 0.89 13 
2600 Paper/Forest Products 6,902 0.86 13 
2640 Packaging and Container 4,194 0.88 17 
2700 Publishing 4,184 0.94 11 
2710 Newspaper 6,253 0.91 11 
2810 Chemical (Basic) 18,429 1.03 7 
2813 Chemical (Diversified) 8,481 0.9 11 
2820 Chemical (Specialty) 3,067 0.89 30 
2830 Biotechnology 8,031 1.39 28 
2834 Drug 6,334 1.43 112 
2840 Household Products 8,292 0.8 10 
2844 Toiletries/Cosmetics 5,073 0.8 4 
2900 Petroleum (Integrated) 35,406 0.9 22 
3000 Tire & Rubber 2,920 1.03 5 
3140 Shoe 990 1.02 12 
3200 Building Materials 2,765 0.9 15 
3240 Cement & Aggregates 3,456 0.81 5 
3311 Steel (General) 1,768 1.06 13 
3312 Steel (Integrated) 1,305 1.67 3 
3400 Metal Fabricating 4,022 0.93 11 
3500 Machinery 3,580 0.9 43 
3533 Oilfield Svcs./Equip. 6,028 1.01 48 
3570 Office Equip/Supplies 6,980 1.01 9 
3573 Computers/Peripherals 6,768 2.01 34 
3579 Computer Software/Svcs. 2,477 1.84 64 
3600 Electrical Equipment 29,341 1.45 28 
3630 Home Appliance 3,650 0.87 5 
3663 Entertainment Tech 2,096 2.09 10 
3670 Electronics 1,075 1.47 28 
3674 Semiconductor 10,958 2.68 29 
3680 Semiconductor Equip 2,262 2.1 6 
3710 Auto & Truck 58,057 1.2 9 
3716 Auto Parts 2,789 1.09 19 
3720 Aerospace/Defense 9,881 0.89 21 
3792 Manuf. Housing/RV 511 1.14 4 
3800 Precision Instrument 1,554 1.57 23 
Average/Total   9,766 1.14 769 
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Data Collection  
This dissertation uses the firm as its unit of analysis:  it collects information on 
performance and attributions on a firm-by-firm basis.  Like prior studies, this dissertation 
collects textual data and quantitative data, both from archival sources.  Textual data come 
from letters to shareholders in firms' corporate annual reports.  Letters were obtained 
from online versions of corporate annual reports and from microfiche copies of these 
reports in library reserves at the University of Oregon.   
Following Salancik and Meindl (1984), this dissertation uses a two-step process to 
analyze attribution in these letters.  First it identifies performance related attributions in 
letters to shareholders.  This dissertation defines performance related attributions as 
phrases which identify a cause of performance.  Some attributions state causation directly 
via causal phrases, such as "because", "due to", "as a result of".  Other attributions imply 
causation, but do not explicitly use causal phrases. For example, Coca-Cola's 2004 annual 
report to shareholders makes the following causal statement without a specific causal 
word: "The Coca-Cola Company did not perform up to expectations in 2004. A detailed 
analysis confirmed that the Company's execution was not as effective as it must be".  The 
attributed cause and the resulting performance may be found in the same sentence or they 
may be separated by other text.  When a single causal word links multiple causes, this 
dissertation counts each cause as a separate attribution.  For example, the sentence 
“income improved due to tighter inventory controls and reduced market costs for raw 
materials” would be coded as two attributions:  one internal cause (“improved internal 
efficiencies”) and one external cause (“reduced market costs for raw materials”).   
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Second, similar to prior studies, this dissertation identifies two characteristics for 
each attribution: valence and locus of causality.  First, valence can be positive or 
negative.  If the letter to shareholders indicates that the referenced event improved the 
firm’s performance, this dissertation codes it positive.  If the letter to shareholders 
indicates that the referenced event detracted from the firm’s performance, this 
dissertation codes it negative.  Second, locus of causality can be internal or external.  If 
the letter to shareholders attributes performance to something the firm controls (e.g. 
strategy, employees, products, distribution, etc.), this dissertation codes it "internal".  If 
the letter to shareholders attributes performance to something the firm does not directly 
control (e.g. the weather, government regulation, the economy, competitor moves), this 
dissertation codes it "external".  References to influences over which the firm has 
moderate control, such as suppliers, alliance partners, or customers are coded depending 
how control is depicted in the attribution.  For example, if an attribution states that the 
firm managed its supply chain poorly, this dissertation would code this "internal".  In 
contrast, if the attribution stated that a supplier provided faulty parts, this dissertation 
would code this "external".   
As described in the literature review, these two characteristics of attribution 
combine in a 2x2 to define the four types of attribution: enhancement, good fortune, self-
criticism, and blame.  Table 9 presents this 2x2 diagram.   
To check for coding bias, a student with a BA in Finance coded 20% of the 
sample.  This dissertation checks the correlation between coders to assess the reliability 
of the coding.   
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Table 9: 2x2 of Firm Attribution 
  Locus of Causality 
  Internal External 
V
a
len
ce
 
Positive Enhancement Good-Fortune 
Negative Self-Criticism Blame 
 
 
Quantitative data come from firms' audited financial statements.  This dissertation 
accesses these audited statements via the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database, the Compustat database, and the Corporate Library.  All three databases are 
available through the Wharton Research and Data Services website.   
 
Data Sources and Operationalization of Variables 
Dependent Variables - Attribution 
This dissertation measures two aspects of the dependent variable, attribution.  It 
measures the number of each type of attribution in each letter to shareholders and the 
total number of attributions in each letter to shareholders.  It then uses these data to 
calculate the percentage of each type of attribution in each letter to shareholders.  For 
example, Coke's 2004 letter to shareholders contained a total of 10 attributions:  3 
enhancing attributions, 1 self-critical attribution, 2 attributions of good fortune, and 4 
blaming attributions.  This dissertation codes Coke's 2004 letter as 30% enhancement, 
10% self-criticism, 20% good fortune, and 40% blame.   
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Table 10 presents the five dependent variables in this analysis: one count variable, 
and four percentages that range from 0 to 1.   
 
Table 10:  Dependent Variables in this Dissertation 
Construct 
Name 
Type of 
Variable 
Data Source Operationalization 
Total 
Attributions 
Count 
Coding of letters 
to shareholders 
Number of Attributions per letter to 
shareholders 
Enhancement 
Continuous 
Ratio 
Coding of letters 
to shareholders 
The number of enhancing attributions 
divided by the total number of 
attributions 
Blame 
Continuous 
Ratio 
Coding of letters 
to shareholders 
The number of blaming attributions 
divided by the total number of 
attributions 
Good 
Fortune 
Continuous 
Ratio 
Coding of letters 
to shareholders 
The number of attributions of good 
fortune divided by the total number 
of attributions 
Self-
Criticism 
Continuous 
Ratio 
Coding of letters 
to shareholders 
The number of self-critical 
attributions divided by the total 
number of attributions 
 
Independent Variables - Performance in Relation to Aspiration 
This dissertation carefully measures performance, its independent variable.  It selects 
independent variables to measure firms' subjective perception and interpretation of firm 
performance.  This entails three steps: 1) establishing the metrics firms employ to 
measure their performance; 2) identifying the benchmark against which firms assess their 
performance; and 3) specifying the interpretive framework with which firms assess 
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performance in relation to their benchmark.  This subsection presents this dissertation's 
metrics, benchmarks, and its interpretive framework for firm performance.   
 
Performance Metric 
Organizational scholars have conceptualized firm performance in many ways, 
including financial performance, firm survival, quality of products or services, employee 
satisfaction, or environmental sustainability.  Studies of organizational effectiveness, the 
study of the "end state that mangers strive to achieve" (Steers, 1977, p. xi), state that no 
one conceptualization of organizational performance fits all contexts:  "the concept of 
organizational effectiveness means different things to different people, depending on 
one's frame of reference” (Steers, 1977, p. 1).  These statements mirror Weiner's 
argument that studies of attribution should reflect the subject's achievement strivings 
(Bernard Weiner, 1986).  Studies of attribution must accurately represent the subjects' 
perspective on performance in the context in which the attribution is made: "The 
overriding flaw in the empirical research has been a failure to conceptualize the situation 
as perceived by the respondent" (Bernard Weiner, 1986, p. 111).   
Following the framing provided by Steers (1977) and Weiner (1986), a study of firm 
attribution should reflect the context in which firms make attributions regarding their 
achievement goals.  A study of attributions in letters to shareholders should conceptualize 
performance in the same way that firms do when addressing investors.  It would be an 
oversimplification to state that firms consider only the firm's financial performance when 
assessing their performance for investors.  However, it is clear that firms pursue profit 
(Cyert & March, 1963; England, 1967; Simon, 1947) and that investors concern 
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themselves with financial return (M. Friedman, 1970; Margolis & Walsh, 2003).  
Furthermore, as firms present the letter to shareholders in conjunction with their annual 
financial data, this document has traditionally afforded a venue for executives to provide 
context and explanations for financial performance (Graves, 1982).  Texts on investor 
relations state that the letter to shareholders should review "the last year from the points 
of view of sales, earnings, financial position, acquisitions, new products or services, and 
other items of current significance (Beveridge, 1963, p. 152).  Consequently, in the study 
of attributions, this dissertation uses financial measures of firm performance:  
conceptualizing firm performance as financial performance aligns with both the context 
in which these attributions are made and with the achievement strivings of the firms who 
make them.   
Scholars and practitioners have used many measures of firm performance.  
Studies indicate, however, that firms consider earnings to be the most important measure 
of financial performance and sales to be the second most important measure (Graham, 
Campbell, & Rajgopal, 2007; Murphy, 2000).  In light of these findings, this dissertation 
adopts three performance measures related closely to earnings and sales:  earnings per 
share (EPS) growth, sales growth, and profitability (earnings divided by Sales).  This 
dissertation measures EPS and sales growth rather than EPS and Sales for two reasons. 
First, firms typically discuss the growth of these two measures.  Second, in comparisons 
across firms, sales growth and EPS growth provide a measure of performance; in 
contrast, in comparisons across firms, raw measures of sales provide a measure of size 
and raw measures of EPS provide a measure of stock price.  This dissertation does not 
transform profitability into a growth measure for the same two reasons: firms discuss 
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profitability, not growth in profitability; in addition, when compared across firms, 
profitability provides a measure of performance.  Furthermore, prior studies have found 
that letters to shareholders most commonly mentioned EPS growth, sales growth, and 
profitability (Salancik & Meindl, 1984).  Many other studies of firm attribution used one 
of the three measures (i.e. W. Aerts, 2001; Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Clapham & 
Schwenk, 1991; Staw et al., 1983).   
 
Performance Benchmark 
Following the work of aspiration theorists described previously in the literature 
review, this dissertation considers two performance benchmarks: a firm's past 
performance and the performance of a firm's peers.  This dissertation operationalizes a 
firm's past performance as performance during the prior fiscal year.  Although scholars 
have argued that it may be more accurate to operationalize a firm's historical aspirations 
as a weighted average of performance in numerous prior years (Greve, 2003), scholars 
have not determined how many years to include or how much weight to place on each 
year.  In addition, scholars suggest that different firms and different industries may have 
different time horizons relative to past performance (Greve, 2003).   As this dissertation 
makes comparisons across firms and across industries, it cannot calibrate its measures to 
one specific industry.  As a result, it adopts the admittedly unsophisticated 
operationalization of historical performance as defined by a firm's performance in the 
prior fiscal year.   
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Following the work of scholars of relative performance evaluation (Albuquerque, 
2009; Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002; Murphy, 2000), this dissertation operationalizes the 
performance of a firm's peers as the average performance of the firm's peers.  
Furthermore, it forms peer groups for each firm according to two criteria: size and 
industry.  It operationalizes size in relation to market value.  Firms with market value of 
$100 million or more are considered to be peers.  It operationalizes industry in relation to 
SIC Codes.  Firms with the same two-digit SIC code are grouped in the same industry.   
 
Performance Scale 
As discussed above in the review of aspiration literature, aspiration scholars have 
proposed two mental models of firm performance assessment in relation to aspirations.  
One model assesses firms like high jumpers, in a dichotomous manner: performance at or 
above an aspired performance level is satisfactory; performance below an aspired 
performance level is unsatisfactory (Bromiley, 1991; Cyert & March, 1963).  The second 
model assesses firms like golfers, along a continuous scale on which the extent by which 
performance exceeds or falls short of aspiration impacts the assessment of performance.  
For example, a firm with performance that greatly exceeds aspirations (a large positive 
difference) would assess its performance as superior to that of a firm with performance 
that barley meets aspirations (a small positive difference)  (Greve, 1998, 2003).   
Because aspiration scholars have not determined whether firms interpret their 
performance in a dichotomous manner or in a continuous manner, this dissertation 
develops variables to test both cognitive models of performance assessment.  Measures of 
dichotomous performance assessments take one of two values: "0" if performance is 
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below aspirations and "1" if performance meets or exceeds aspirations.  Measures of 
continuous performance assessments take continuous values in relation to performance 
aspirations.  For example, a firm that aspires to grow revenues by 10% but only grows 
revenues by 8% would have a performance measure of minus 2%.  Similarly, a firm that 
aspires to grow revenues by 10% but grows revenues by 15% would have a performance 
measure of plus 5%.   
 
Performance Measures 
Combining these three characteristics of performance assessment, measurement, 
benchmark, and assessment model, results in twelve performance variables (3 
measurements x 2 benchmarks x 2 assessment models = 12).  Table 11 presents each of 
the 12 performance variables.  
 
Control Variables 
As this dissertation uses regression analysis, it also uses control variables.  Many of 
the control variables in this dissertation were independent variables in prior studies.  Most 
prior studies of attribution have used few if any control variables.  This is due to 
extensive use of mean-difference analysis and correlation analysis in these articles:  most 
prior studies have not used regression to study the relationship between firm performance 
and firm attribution.   
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Table 11: Independent Variables, Performance Variables 
Name Abbreviation Benchmark 
Assessment 
Model 
Metric 
Historical 
Dichotomous 
Revenue Change 
HD  
Revenue  
Historical 
Aspiration 
Dichotomous 
Is Revenue Change t > 
Revenue Change t-1 
Historical 
Dichotomous EPS 
Change 
HD  
EPS  
Historical 
Aspiration 
Dichotomous 
 Is EPS Change t >  
EPS Changet-1 
Historical 
Dichotomous 
Profitability 
HD 
Profitability 
Historical 
Aspiration 
Dichotomous 
Is Profitability t >  
Profitability t-1 
Social Dichotomous 
Revenue Change 
SD  
Revenue 
Social 
Aspiration 
Dichotomous 
 Is Revenue Change 
firm > Revenue Change 
peers 
Social Dichotomous 
EPS Change 
SD  
EPS  
Social 
Aspiration 
Dichotomous 
Is EPS Change firm >  
EPS Change peers 
Social Dichotomous 
Profitability 
SD 
Profitability 
Social 
Aspiration 
Dichotomous 
Is Profitability firm > 
Profitability peers 
Historical 
Continuous 
Revenue Change 
HC  
Revenue  
Historical 
Aspiration 
Continuous 
Revenue Change t -
Revenue Change t-1 
Historical 
Continuous EPS 
Change 
HC  
EPS  
Historical 
Aspiration 
Continuous 
 EPS Change t - 
EPS Changet-1 
Historical 
Continuous 
Profitability 
HC 
Profitability 
Historical 
Aspiration 
Continuous 
Profitability t - 
Profitability t-1 
Social Continuous 
Revenue Change 
SC  
Revenue  
Social 
Aspiration 
Continuous 
 Revenue Change firm - 
Revenue Change peers 
Social Continuous 
EPS Change 
SC  
EPS  
Social 
Aspiration 
Continuous 
EPS Change firm - 
EPS Change peers 
Social Continuous 
Profitability 
SC 
Profitability 
Social 
Aspiration 
Continuous 
Profitability firm -
Profitability peers 
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This dissertation uses the following control variables: CEO tenure, firm size, firm 
age, firm industry, and acquisitions.  Two of these variables demonstrated significance as 
independent variables in prior studies.  CEO tenure demonstrated significance in one 
study: the longer a CEO’s tenure, the more enhancement and blame in a firm’s letter to 
shareholders.  Scholars explain this effect as a new CEOs opportunity to criticize prior 
management by attributing poor performance to prior management and good performance 
to environmental influences (Staw et al., 1983).  Both new CEO and industry 
demonstrated significance in one study (M. Clatworthy & Jones, 2003).  Neither firm size 
nor firm age has demonstrated a significant relationship in prior studies with firms’ use of 
enhancement or blame.  However, as management scholars often find differences 
between firms of different size and different age, this dissertation includes them as 
control variables.  The influence of acquisitions, whether a firm acquires another firm 
during the year for which a letter to shareholders is written, has not been studied in this 
context.  However, the addition of an acquisition necessarily changes a firm's annual 
financial performance through the addition of new operations.  This dissertation includes 
a dummy variable for acquisitions to account for this change.  Table 12 presents the 
control variables in this analysis. 
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Table 12: Control Variables in this Dissertation 
Construct 
Name 
Type of 
Variable 
Data Source Operationalization 
CEO Tenure Continuous 
Corporate 
Library 
The number of years the CEO 
has held that position in that firm 
Firm Size Continuous 
Compustat 
Database 
The firms' total fiscal market 
value 
Firm Age Continuous 
Compustat 
Database 
The number of years since the 
firm was founded. 
Industry Categorical 
Compustat 
Database 
Dummy codes that represent a 
firm's two-digit SIC code 
Acquisitions Dummy-binary SDC Platinum 
Did the firm make an acquisition 
in the prior year? 
 
 
Framework for Statistical Analysis 
The following section reviews the statistical methodologies used by prior studies of 
firm attribution, presents this dissertation's methodology, describes the distribution of this 
dissertation's dependent variables, and identifies regression models that work with this 
distribution.   
 
Methodology in Prior Studies of Attribution 
Prior studies of firm attribution have relied on three methodologies to analyze the 
relationship between firm performance and firm attribution:  t-tests, correlation analysis, 
and log-linear analysis.  Of these three, scholars have heavily favored t-tests and 
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correlation analysis.  Only Bettman and Weitz (1983) used log-linear analysis.  It is 
notable that none of these studies used regression analysis.  In comparison with t-tests, 
regression analysis provides many advantages, including simultaneous analysis of 
multiple independent variables and the use of control variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
Kennedy, 2003).   
The prevalence of t-studies and lack of regression analysis in prior studies could be 
the result of many factors.  These studies all have small sample sizes.  Small samples tend 
to produce better results in t-tests than in regression analysis.  However, these researchers 
conceivably could have gathered sufficient data to conduct regression analysis if they had 
chosen to do so.  The lack of regression analysis in prior studies could reflect attribution 
theory's origins in experimental social psychology and cognitive psychology, which rely 
heavily on t-tests in many areas of investigation, including analyses of attribution at the 
level of the individual.  This lack of regression analysis could also be due to the era in 
which most of these studies were performed:  the computational power to conduct 
regression analysis was less commonly available in the 1980s than it has been during the 
past two decades.  Table 13 summarizes the methodologies used in the six key studies of 
firm attribution reviewed in Chapter II.   
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Table 13: Methodologies in Prior Studies of Firm Attribution 
Study Method Analysis 
Bowman 
(1976) 
t-test 
Contrasts text in corporate reports of high and low 
performing firms. 
Bettman & 
Weitz (1983) 
t-test 
Contrasts internal vs. external attribution by year and 
by industry. 
log-linear 
analysis 
Uses year, outcome, and industry to predict 
attributions' locus of causality. 
Staw et al. 
(1983) 
t-test 
Contrasts internal vs. external attribution; past vs. 
future orientation; and whether explanations of 
performance appear before or after financials. 
correlation 
analysis 
Analyzes covariation of enhancement and blame with 
the firms' financial performance and the CEO's 
personal characteristics.  Also analyzes covariance of 
negativity the negativity of letters to shareholders with 
firm attribution. 
Salancik & 
Meindl 
(1984) 
t-test 
Contrasts mean attributions for stable and unstable 
firms. 
correlation 
analysis 
Analyzes covariation of positive/negative attributions 
with firm financial performance and GDP growth. 
Clapham & 
Schwenk 
(1991) 
t-test Contrasts firm attribution of stable vs. unstable firms. 
correlation 
analysis 
Analyzes covariation of attribution with future 
performance and risk. 
Aerts (2001) 
correlation 
analysis 
Analyzes covariation of attribution this year with 
attribution last year in the same firm. 
 
 
 
Research Methodology 
In contrast with prior studies of firm attribution, this dissertation uses regression 
analysis.  Regression analysis allows for more nuanced analysis through the use of 
multiple independent variables and control variables (Kennedy, 2003).  This dissertation 
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conducts two types of regression analysis: between-firm analysis on pooled cross-
sectional data and within-firm analysis on longitudinal data.   
This dissertation combines the independent variables, dependent variables, and 
control variables described above into a single regression equation.  In this equation "i" 
represents individual firms, "j" represents individual firm characteristics, and "t" 
represents individual years.   
 
(equation 1)  Attributionijt = α + β1 (Met) it + β2 (Difference) it + β3 (Met) it*(Difference) it  
+ β4 (Controls) ijt + β5 (Year) t + ε it 
 
Variables in this equation have the following meanings:  
 "Attribution" represents the percentage of attribution of type "j" in firm "i"'s 
letter to shareholders during time "t".  As discussed in Chapter II, firms use 
four types of attribution: enhancement, blame, good-fortune, and self-
criticism.   
 "Met" is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm achieved its 
performance aspiration. The first six variables listed in Table 11 (the names of 
which contain the abbreviation "D") are represented here.  "Met" 
operationalizes the "high jumper" model of performance assessment.   
 "Difference" indicates the extent by which performance surpassed or fell short 
of aspiration (actual performance minus aspired performance).  The last six 
variables listed in Table 11 (the names of which contain the abbreviation "C") 
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are represented here.  "Difference" operationalizes the "golfer" model of 
performance assessment.   
 "Controls" represents an observable characteristic "j" of firm "i" observed at 
time "t" that serves as a control variable.  These control variables are: firm 
age, firm size, industry, CEO tenure, and firm acquisitions.   
 "Year" represents the time period in which observations are taken.  These are 
dummy variables for each year (Year) that account for unobserved effects in 
the business environment for that year.   
 
Below, Figure 4 presents a visual illustration of the relationships that Equation 1 tests.  
Figure 4 presents this information for one type of attribution, enhancement.  Similar 
diagrams can be created for blame.     
In Figure 4, the vertical axis represents the % of enhancement a firm uses to describe 
its performance and the horizontal axis represents the firm's performance.  The dotted 
horizontal line represents a firm's aspired performance level.  Lines AB and CD graph the 
percentage of enhancement that the firm uses at a given level of performance.  In formula 
1, coefficient β1 represents the distance between points B and C on the Y axis.  
Coefficient β2 represents the slope of line AB. and coefficient β3 indicates whether the 
slope of line CD is equivalent to the slope of line AB.  Finally coefficients β4 and β5 
indicate whether control variables influence attribution.  Figure 4 does not explicitly 
illustrate either β4 or β5.   
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Figure 4: Illustration of Relationships Tested in Regression Analysis 
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The following sub-sections present this dissertations' application of equation 1 in 
between-firm analysis and within-firm analysis.   
 
Between-firm analysis 
Between-firm analysis uses cross sectional data to establish comparative values 
between firms.  It compares different firms in a single year.  It does not control for 
endogeneity.  However, cross-sectional data mimics the perspective of investors and 
investment analysts who evaluate the performance of numerous firms during a given time 
period.  In addition, after pooling data from different years, year fixed effects can be used 
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to account for changes over time.  In this manner, between-firm analysis demonstrates 
whether time variant variables influence firm attribution.   
However, between-firm analysis's primary value lies in identifying how invariant firm 
characteristics influence firm attribution.  Between-firm analysis also allows for between-
firm comparisons of attribution: 1) whether firms that achieve aspired performance levels 
use attribution differently than firms that fail to achieve aspired performance levels and 
2) whether firms with a greater difference between actual and aspired performance use 
attribution differently than firms with a smaller difference between actual and aspired 
performance.   
Regressing equation 1 with pooled cross sectional data and determining values for β1 
to β5 shows the following:  
1. β1 - Met Aspiration (high jumper model) 
a. If β1 is positive (negative) and significant, then firms that achieve 
aspirations use more (less) of that type of attribution than firms that fail to 
achieve aspiration.  In other words, achieving aspiration changes firms' 
use of attribution. The distance between points B and C in Figure 4 is 
greater than zero.   
b. If β1 is non-significant, then firms that achieve aspirations use that type of 
attribution in the same manner as firms that fail to achieve aspirations.  In 
other words, achieving aspiration does not change firms' use of 
attribution.  The distance between points B and C in Figure 4 is not 
significantly greater than zero.   
2. Β2 - Difference Between Actual and Aspired Performance (golfer model) 
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a. If β2 is positive (negative) and significant, then firms with a greater 
positive difference between actual and aspired performance (actual minus 
aspired performance) use more (less) of that type of attribution, and firms 
with a smaller positive difference between actual and aspired performance 
use less (more) of that type of attribution.  In addition, firms with a smaller 
negative difference between actual and aspired performance use more 
(less) of that type of attribution, and firms with a larger negative 
difference between actual and aspired performance use less (more) of that 
type of attribution.  In other words, the extent by which firms achieve or 
fail to achieve aspirations influences firms' use of attribution.  The slope 
of line AB in Figure 4 is not zero.     
b. If β2 is insignificant, the difference between actual and aspired 
performance has no influence on attribution.  In other words, the extent by 
which performance surpasses or falls short of aspiration does not 
influence attribution.  The slope of line AB in Figure 4 is zero.   
c. β3 Interaction Term – Met Aspiration * Difference  
d. If β3 is positive (negative) and significant, then firms that achieve 
aspirations use more (less) of that type of attribution as the positive 
difference between actual and aspired performance increases and less 
(more) of that type of attribution as the absolute value of the difference 
between actual and aspired performance decreases, than firms that fail to 
achieve aspirations. In other words, the rate of change in firms' use of 
attribution above aspiration differs from the rate of change in firms' use of 
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attribution below aspiration.  Line AB and line BC in Figure 4 have 
different slopes.   
e. If β3 is insignificant, then the difference between actual and aspired 
performance has the same influence on attribution above and below 
aspiration.  In other words, the rate of change above attribution is 
equivalent to the rate of change below attribution.  Lines AB and BC in 
Figure 4 have equivalent slopes.   
3. β4 Control Variables - Observed Time Variant Firm Characteristics 
a. If β4j is positive (negative) and significant, then firms with the "j"th firm 
characteristic user more (less) enhancement than firms without 
characteristic "j".  In other words, the control variable in question 
influences attribution.  As mentioned above, these firm characteristics are: 
firm age, firm size, firm industry (where each industry receives a separate 
dummy code) CEO tenure, and acquisition.  In other words, the control 
variable in question influences attribution.   
b.  
c. If β4j is insignificant, then firms with characteristic "j" use attribution in 
the same way as firms without characteristic "j".  In other words, the 
control variable in question does not influence attribution.   
4. β5t Year  
a. If β5t  is positive (negative) and significant, then firms used more (less) of 
a type of attribution in year "t".  In other words, firms used attribution 
differently in that year.   
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b. If β5t  is insignificant, then firms used the same amount of enhancement in 
that year as in other years.  In other words, firms used attribution in the 
same way in that year as they did in other years.   
 
Fixed Effect Analysis 
Latent endogenous variables present the greatest challenge to demonstrating a causal 
relationship between performance and attribution.  Both performance and attribution 
could be the result of a "good firm" effect.  It is possible that some firms are simply better 
managed than other firms and that this good management would persist over time and 
would last the duration of the study period.  It is also possible that these well managed 
firms use more enhancing attributions and fewer blaming attributions, independent of 
firm performance or achievement of aspirations.  If this were the case, then the data 
collected on these firms would show that they achieve aspiration and that they use 
enhancing attributions to describe their performance, but there would be no direct 
relationship between a firm achieving aspirations and a firm using enhancing attributions.  
Both achievement of aspirations and use of enhancing attribution would result from the 
exogenous firm characteristic of good management.  The "good firm" effect could create 
a correlation between performance relative to aspiration and attribution independent from 
any causal relationship between performance relative to aspiration and attribution.  
Demonstrating that the "good firm" effect is not responsible for any observed correlation 
between performance and attribution is necessary to demonstrate a causal relationship 
between performance and attribution.   
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This dissertation conducts within-firm analysis to mitigate the "good firm" effect.  It 
controls for both observed and unobserved firm characteristics by comparing firms to 
themselves over time.  Within-firm analysis compares changes in attribution to changes 
in performance and changes in achievement of performance aspiration.  Any changes 
observed in within-firm analysis could not be caused by time invariant firm 
characteristics. This dissertation also uses within-firm analysis to examine the influence 
of variables that change over time.   
In its fixed effect analysis, this dissertation uses a first-difference model rather than a 
standard mean difference model.  The first-difference model mitigates serial correlation, 
which could result from unobserved variables in the business environment form one year 
to the next.  In addition, first differences give this dissertation's dependent variable a 
distribution that resembles a normal distribution, thus facilitating regression analysis.  
This dissertation discusses the distribution of the dependent variable in the following sub-
section.   
This dissertation presents the equation it uses for within-firm analysis below in 
equation 2.  Equation 2 is a version of equation 1 that has been modified to measure first 
differences.   
 
(equation 2) Δ Attributionit = α + β1 (Δ Met) it + β2 (Δ Difference) it    
    + β3 (Δ Met) it (Δ Difference) it + β4 (Δ Controls) it + ε it 
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Variables in this equation have the same meanings as variables by the same name in 
equation 1.  Thy symbol Δ or "delta" stands for change in the variable in question in the 
first-differences model.  As this dissertation collects data for 2004 and 2005, Δ signifies 
that the value for 2004 has been subtracted from the value for 2005.  Please note that only 
three of the five "Observed Firm" control variables can change from one year to the next:  
Δ acquisitions it (the firm conducted acquisitions in one year but not the other) and Δ 
CEO it (the firm acquired a new CEO), and Δ Firm Size.  As firms do not change industry 
from one year to the next, the variable Δ Industry has no value. In addition, although the 
age of each firm changes over time, these changes are uniform for all firms (1 year), and 
the variable Δ Firm Age drops out of the calculation as invariant across all observations.  
In addition, as this dissertation only collects data over two years, the first-differences 
analysis generates only one value for each firm (2005 minus 2004), and the variable 
"Year" drops out of the equation as invariant across all observations.   
Analysis of the regression coefficients in equation 2 shows the following.   
1. β1 Met Aspiration (high jumper model) 
a. If β1 is positive (negative) and significant, then when a firm achieves an 
aspiration, it uses attribution differently.  In other words, when a firm 
achieves an aspiration, it changes the attributions it uses to describe 
performance.  The distance between points B and C in Figure 4 is greater 
than zero. 
b. If β1 is insignificant, then achievement of an aspiration does not influence 
firm attribution.  In other words, a firm uses the same attribution to 
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describe performance whether or not it achieves aspirations.  The distance 
between points B and C in Figure 4 is not greater than zero.     
2. Β2 Difference (golfer model) 
a. If β2 is positive (negative) and significant, then a firm uses more (less) of a 
certain type of attribution as the positive difference between actual and 
aspired performance increases, and less (more) of that same type of 
attribution as the positive difference between actual and aspired 
performance decreases.  In addition, a firm uses less (more) of that same 
type of attribution as the absolute value of the negative difference between 
actual and aspired performance increases, and more or that same type of 
attribution as the absolute value of the negative difference between actual 
and aspired performance decreases.  In other words, a firm changes its 
attribution in relation to the extent by which it surpasses or falls short of 
aspiration.  The slope of line AB in Figure 4 is not zero.     
b. If β2 is insignificant, the difference between actual and aspired 
performance has no influence on firm attribution.  In other words, a firm 
uses the same attributions regardless of the extent by which it surpasses or 
falls short of aspiration.   The slope of line AB in Figure 4 is equal to zero.   
3. β3 Interaction – Met Aspiration * Difference 
c. If β3 is positive (negative) and significant, then firms that achieve 
aspirations use more (less) enhancement as the difference between actual 
and aspired performance increases and less (more) enhancement as the 
difference between actual and aspired performance decreases, in 
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comparison with firms that don't achieve aspirations.  In other words, the 
difference between actual and aspired performance has a different 
relationship with attribution when a firm achieves an aspiration than it 
has when a firm doesn't achieve an aspiration.  Line AB and line BC in 
Figure 4 have different slopes.   
d. If β3 is insignificant, then the difference between actual and aspired 
performance has the same influence on firms whether they achieve 
performance aspirations or not.  In other words, the relationship between 
attribution and the difference between actual and aspired performance is 
the same whether or not a firm achieves its aspiration.  Line AB and line 
BC in Figure 4 have equivalent slopes.   
4. β4 Observed Time Variant Firm Characteristics 
a. If β4j is positive (negative) and significant, then an increase in the "j"th 
firm characteristic corresponds with a firm using more (less) of a certain 
type of attribution.  In other words, attribution changes when the control 
variable in question changes.  As mentioned above, these control variables 
are: firm size, CEO tenure, and acquisition.   
b. If β4j is insignificant, then firms use the same amount of a certain type of 
attribution regardless of changes in characteristic "j".  In other words, 
attribution does not change when the control variable in question 
changes.   
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Combined, the above within-firm effect analyses provide valuable descriptive 
information and valuable isolation of the relationship of interest between performance 
and attribution.   
 
Regression Model 
This dissertation will use both Tobit and OLS for its regression model.  As this 
dissertation's dependent variable is a percentage and has many observations at the 
extremes of the range (0% and 100%) it is not normally distributed (Kieschnick & 
McCullough, 2003).  Taking account of the bound nature of this distribution, this 
dissertation employs a Tobit model in between-firm analysis.  In addition, this 
dissertation transforms the distribution of its dependent variable by employing the first-
differences method in its within-firm analysis.  This transformation results in a 
distribution of the dependent variable that gives it a more normal distribution.  As a 
result, in within-firm analysis, this dissertation employs ordinary least squares (OLS).  
The following sub-section describes the distribution of the dependent variable, and 
selection of the Tobit and OLS models.   
 
Distribution of the Dependent Variable 
As with all regression analyses, distribution of the dependent variable plays a large 
role in selection of the optimal regression model.  As discussed above, this dissertation 
investigates hypotheses regarding two key dependent variables:  the percentages of 
enhancement and blame in letters to shareholders.  Both of these dependent variables 
range on an open interval from 0 to 1.  It is important to note that these variables may 
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regularly take on the extreme values in this range.  For example, a letter with no 
enhancing attributions would be recorded as 0% enhancement; a letter with just one 
attribution total, which was positive, would be recorded as 100% enhancement; and a 
letter with many attributions, all of which are enhancing would be recorded as 100% 
enhancement.  A sizeable proportion of the observations collected are at these bounds of 
the range.   
This distribution of the dependent variable is unusual.  Most other studies of 
attribution do not have dependent variables that are defined over a bound interval and that 
are observed so frequently at the extremes of this interval.  Prior studies of attribution in 
letters to shareholders have not explicitly addressed this challenge.  One study measures 
percentages of attributions without commenting on the distribution of the dependent 
variable (Bettman & Weitz, 1983).  Other studies eliminate this issue by representing the 
dependent variable in different ways.  Some studies count the number of attributions 
rather than calculating a percentage (Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw et al., 1983), while 
others combine different types of attribution to transform the distribution (W. Aerts, 
2001; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991).  Both methods should reduce the number of 
observations at the extremes of the range.  As a result, the dependent variable can 
reasonably be assumed to follow a normal distribution (i.e. Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).  In 
contrast, this dissertation must carefully consider its assumptions for distribution of the 
dependent variable.   
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Analysis of Regression Options 
As discussed above, this dissertation's dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1 and is 
often observed at the extremes of this range.  A variable bounded by 0 and 1 cannot be 
assumed to be normally distributed (Kieschnick & McCullough, 2003).  To be normally 
distributed, a variable must demonstrate a constant conditional variance (Kennedy, 2003).  
In contrast, the conditional variance of a bound variable correlates with the dependent 
variable:  it shrinks as the dependent variable approaches either extreme of 0 or 1 
(Kieschnick & McCullough, 2003).  This shrinking of the conditional variance typically 
results in overestimation of the significance of coefficients.   
Although a bound variable cannot be assumed to follow a normal distribution, most 
studies of variables bounded by 0 and 1 assume a normal distribution (Kieschnick & 
McCullough, 2003).  A normal distribution can achieve reasonable estimation if most 
observations of the dependent variable fall in the middle of the range, between 0.25 and 
0.75.  However, when the observations of the dependent variable regularly fall near one 
extreme or the other, as does this dissertations' dependent variable, assuming a normal 
distribution will likely provide inaccurate estimation (Kieschnick & McCullough, 2003).   
 
Choice of Regression Models 
This dissertation will conduct between-firm analysis using the Tobit distribution.  In 
comparison with ordinary least squares regression (OLS), Tobit provides superior 
estimation of a bound distribution with values at the extremes of the range.  Despite this 
advantage, results obtained from Tobit analysis should be expected to overestimate 
significance.   
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This dissertation will conduct within-firm analysis using OLS.  Applying the first-
differences method transforms the dependent variable so that the majority of observations 
fall between .25 and .75, resulting in a distribution that resembles a normal distribution.  
Unlike the Tobit model, OLS produces coefficients on a consistent scale, which allows 
comparison of coefficients from one regression with those from another.   
 
Summary of Research Methods 
In many ways this dissertation follows the methodology of prior studies:  it uses 
longitudinal data; it gathers data on public firms through their annual reports to 
shareholders; it measures firm performance in relation to earnings and sales; and it 
focuses on firms' use of enhancement and blame.  In other respects, this dissertation 
breaks new methodological ground: it uses multivariate regression in the study of firm 
attribution; it assumes a Tobit distribution for between-firm analysis; it measures 
performance relative to aspiration; and it introduces dichotomous variables that represent 
firms' achievement or failure to achieve aspiration.   
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
This section first presents descriptive information, second it conducts a between-firm 
analysis of pooled cross sectional data, and third it conducts a within-firm analysis of 
longitudinal data.  This dissertation uses data from these analyses to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter III.  It determines whether a relationship exists between firms' use 
of enhancement and blame and firm performance relative to aspiration.  In addition, 
Chapter V assesses whether firms assess performance like high jumpers or like golfers.  
Chapter V also assesses whether firm attribution reflects achievement of social or 
historical aspirations.   
 
Descriptive Information 
This section describes the sample firms, their use of attribution, their performance, 
and correlations between attribution and performance.  This section also presents graphs 
that describe the distribution of key independent and dependent variables.   
 
Sample Selection - Firms that Use Attribution 
As discussed in the methods section, this dissertation collects data on 769 firms.  Of 
these 769 firms, 526 presented letters to shareholders in their corporate annual reports 
and 458 made attributions in those letters to shareholders in 2004 and 445 made 
attributions in those letters in 2005.  Table 14 presents the number of firms and 
percentages of the total in each of these groups.    
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Table 14: Firms Using Attribution in Letter to Shareholders 
Time 
Period 
All 
Sample 
Firms 
Firms that 
Produce 
Letters to 
Shareholders 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Produce 
Letters to 
Shareholders 
Firms that 
Make 
Attributions 
in Letters to 
Shareholders 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Make 
Attributions 
in Letters to 
Shareholders 
2004 769 526 68% 458 62% 
2005 769 526 68% 445 60% 
Total 1,538 1,052 68% 903 61% 
 
 
To determine whether firms that make attributions are representative of all firms for 
which data were collected, Tables 15-17 present the mean performance measures for each 
of the three groups.  Table 15 presents the number of observations, mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum for all firms for which data were collected.  
Table 16 presents this information for all firms that included a letter to shareholders in 
their corporate annual report.  Table 17 presents this information for all firms that made 
causal attributions in their letters to shareholders.  Note: a few firms did not record 
revenue in 2003 or 2004 or earnings in 2004; consequently the variables Revenue 
Change, EPS Change, and Profitability could not be calculated for these firms.  As a 
result, these variables show slightly fewer observations than other variables.     
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics for All Firms for which Data Were Collected 
Measure Obs Mean Median S. Dev. Min Max 
Revenue ($MM) 769 $4,417 $584 $17,604 $0 $263,989 
Net Income ($MM) 769 $281 $24 $1,519 -$4,753 $25,330 
EPS ($) 769 $0.90 $0.72 $3.18 -$57.84 $34.59 
Assets ($MM) 769 $6,025 $638 $36,583 $8 $750,507 
Equity ($MM) 769 $1,802 $281 $7,267 -$4,080 $110,821 
Revenue Change  763 32% 15% 129% -100% 1800% 
EPS Change 765 94% 72% 740% -8400% 13700% 
Profitability (NI/Sales) 765 -342% 4% 2603% -42833% 112% 
ROA  769 -2% 4% 24% -209% 67% 
ROE  769 6% 10% 256% -3037% 5550% 
CEO Tenure (years) 769 7.2 5.0 7.0 0 50 
Size (m. value $MM) 769 $6,229 $910 $24,457 $2 $367,474 
Acquisition (yes/no) 769 0.22 0 0.47 0 1 
 
 
Table 16: Descriptive Statistics for 2004 for Firms that Produce Letters 
Measure Obs. Mean Median S. Dev. Min Max 
Revenue ($MM) 524 5,823 900 20,667 0 263,989 
Net Income ($MM) 524 397 41 1,777 -2,165 25,330 
EPS ($) 524 1.25 1.06 2.52 -12.26 34.59 
Assets ($MM) 524 8,108 983 43,237 17 750,507 
Equity ($MM) 524 2,423 440 8,537 -1,020 110,821 
Revenue Change  520 30% 15% 107% -85% 1732% 
EPS Change 521 79% 26% 381% -2200% 4600% 
Profitability (NI/Sales) 522 -117% 5% 772% -9351% 112% 
ROA  524 1% 5% 20% -171% 50% 
ROE  524 20% 11% 256% -480% 5550% 
CEO Tenure (years) 524 7.1 5.0 7.0 0 50 
Size (m. value $MM) 524 8,310 1,307 28,680 2 367,474 
Acquisition (yes/no) 524 0.26 0 0.50 0.00 1 
 
  
 125 
 
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics for 2004 for Firms with Attributions 
Measure Obs. Mean Median S. Dev. Min Max 
Revenue ($MM) 458 6,496 1,044 21,983 1 263,989 
Net Income ($MM) 458 456 54 1,892 -2,165 25,330 
EPS ($) 458 1.51 1.24 2.51 -12.26 34.59 
Assets ($MM) 458 9,085 1,122 46,154 17 750,507 
Equity ($MM) 458 2,675 490 9,073 -622 110,821 
Revenue Change  457 31% 16% 112% -53% 1732% 
EPS Change 455 86% 31% 403% -2200% 4600% 
Profitability (NI/Sales) 458 -39% 5% 533% -9351% 112% 
ROA  458 4% 5% 11% -68% 50% 
ROE  458 21% 12% 264% -480% 5550% 
CEO Tenure (years) 458 7.24 5.0 7.18 0 50 
Size (m. value $MM) 458 9,011 1,548 30,222 2 367,474 
Acquisition (yes/no) 458 0.28 0 0.52 0 1 
 
 
Each of these three groups of firms demonstrates a great deal of variation for each 
variable.  Firm size ranges from $17 million (Columbia Labs Inc.) to $750 billion 
(General Electric), with an average size of $9 billion.  CEO tenure ranges from zero to 
fifty years (Encore Wire Corporation), with an average of 7.24 years.  Sample firms made 
acquisitions in 28% of the sample's firm-years.   
Comparative analysis between firms that use attribution (Table 17 and the full set of 
firms for which data was collected (Table 15) demonstrates significant differences.  
Firms that produce letters to shareholders have significantly larger revenue (t(1196) = 
1.80; P<.1), net income (t(1196) = 1.76; P<.1), EPS (t(1196) = 3.46; P<.01), equity 
(t(1196) = 1.834; P<.1), profitability (t(1196) = 2.45; P<.05), and ROA (t(1196) = 5.22; 
P<.01), size (t(1196=1.737; P<.1), and acquisitions (t(1196)=2.064; P<.05).  However, 
these firms have an insignificantly larger ROE and insignificantly longer CEO tenure.  In 
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addition, sample firms that use attributions in letters to shareholders grow revenue and 
EPS slower than sample firms that don't produce letters to shareholders or don't use 
attributions in their letters to shareholders (the difference is insignificant).   
This analysis demonstrates that firms that use attribution in letters to shareholders are 
significantly larger (higher sales, net income, EPS, assets, & size) and more efficient 
(higher profitability & ROA) than other firms for which data were collected.  More 
frequent use of letters to shareholders and of attribution in letters to shareholders by 
larger firms suggests that these firms provide more information to shareholders than 
smaller firms.  It is also possible, however, that smaller firms disseminate the same 
information, but use less formal means to communicate it to shareholders.  More frequent 
use of letters to shareholders and attribution in letters to shareholders by more efficient 
firms might suggest that more successful firms more often write letters to shareholder and 
use attributions in their letters to shareholders.  However, this increased efficiency could 
also result from economies of scale achieved by these larger firms.  More importantly, 
firms that use attributions in their letters to shareholders do not grow revenue or earnings 
any faster than other firms for which data were collected, an important indication of 
parity in performance between firms that do and don't generate performance attributions 
in letters to shareholders.  In sum, firm size is the only reliable difference between firms 
that make attributions in letters to shareholders and firms that don't prepare letters to 
shareholders.   
Differences between Tables 15-17 indicate that firms that make attributions in letter 
to shareholders may not be representative of public firms as a whole.  The lack of smaller 
firms in the analysis means that the study's results may reflect the biases of large firms.   
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Dependent Variable - Attribution 
This dissertation's dependent variable, attribution, shows consistent use over the two 
years of the study.  Table 18 presents descriptive statistics for the number of attributions 
of all types in each letter to shareholders in each year of the study and for the study as a 
whole.  Data in Table 18 show that firms used comparable amounts of attribution in the 
two years of the study.   
 
Table 18: Attributions by Year 
Time Period Obs. Mean Median S. Dev. Min Max Total 
2004 458 7.8 6.0 6.0 1 40 3,562 
2005 446 7.7 6.0 6.2 1 55 3,418 
2004 & 2005 904 7.7 6.0 6.1 1 55 6,980 
 
 
As discussed in chapter II, firms use four types of attribution.  Similar to prior 
empirical studies of firm attribution, enhancement accounts for the largest percentage of 
total attributions at 60%.  Blame accounts for the second largest percentage of total 
attributions at 17%.  Good Fortune accounts for the third largest percentage at 16%.  Self-
criticism accounts for 5%.  At the level of the firm, each type of attribution ranges from 
0% to 100% of total attributions.  Table 19 presents the total number of each type of 
attribution in the sample, the mean of each type, and the percentage of total sample 
attributions that each type represents.   
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Table 19: Attributions by Type 
  
  
  Locus of Causality 
  Internal External Total 
Direction 
of 
Influence 
Positive 
Enhancement Good Fortune Positive 
Total = 4,210 Total = 1,152 Total 5,362 
Mean = 4.4                   
Std. Dev. = 4.0 
Mean = 1.3                   
Std. Dev. = 1.2 
Mean = 5.6                             
Std. Dev. = 5.2 
60% 16% 77% 
  Self-Criticism Blame Negative 
Negative 
Total = 450 Total = 1,169 Total = 1,619 
Mean = 0.5                         
Std. Dev. = 1.1 
Mean = 1.2                     
Std. Dev. = 2.0 
Mean = 1.7                            
Std. Dev. = 2.6 
  6% 17% 23% 
Total 
Total Internal Total External   
Total = 4,660 Total = 2,321   
Mean = 4.9 Mean = 2.4   
Std. Dev. = 4.1 
67% 
Std. Dev. = 3.0 
33%   
 
 
As discussed in chapter IV, this dissertation examines the two most common types of 
attribution, enhancement and blame. Enhancement is defined from 0 (no enhancement) to 
1 (all enhancement).  Table 20 presents the utilization of enhancement by year.   
 
Table 20: Enhancement by Year 
Time Period Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
2004 458 0.68 0.67 0.27 0 1 
2005 446 0.62 0.64 0.30 0 1 
2004 & 2005 904 0.65 0.67 0.28 0 1 
 
Similarly, blame is defined from 0 (no blame) to 1 (all blame).  Table 21 presents the 
use of blame by year.   
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Table 21: Blame by Year 
Time Period Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
2004 458 0.14 0.0 0.20 0 1 
2005 446 0.16 0.0 0.22 0 1 
2004 & 2005 904 0.15 0.0 0.21 0 1 
 
 
Note: percentages of enhancement differ between Table 19 and Table 20 and 
percentages of blame differ between Table 19 and Table 21.  This difference results from 
different methods of aggregating individual attributions.  Table 19 tallies each attribution 
separately independent from the letter in which it appeared.  Percentages in Table 19 
represent the number of total enhancing attributions and blaming attributions in the study.  
In contrast, Tables 20 and 21 tally attributions by letter.  The percentages in Tables 20 
and 21 represent the average percentage of enhancement and blame in each letter.   
As discussed in Chapter IV, a second researcher coded 20% of the letters to 
shareholders in the sample.  This dissertation checks for agreement between the two 
coders to reduce the probability of bias in coding.  The second coder reviewed all firms in 
the food industry (SIC Codes 2000-2099) and the electronics industry (SIC Codes 3600-
3699).  The two coders achieved 100% agreement on the presence of attributions in a 
letter to shareholders.  Combined, the food and electronics industries contain 133 firms.  
The second coder confirmed that, of these 133 firms, 97 produced letters to shareholders.  
These 97 firms account for 21% of the 458 firms in this study that generated attributions 
in their letters to shareholders.  Furthermore, the second coder confirmed that these 97 
letters contained 1,526 attributions.  These 1,526 attributions account for 22% of the total 
of 1,554 attributions, or 22% of the total attributions in the study.   
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The two coders produced just under 100% agreement on the type of attributions in the 
letters in the study.  The two coders agreed on 1,552 of the 1,554 attributions, an 
agreement rate of 99.87%.  The two attributions on which the coders disagreed were 
retained in the analysis to avoid altering the number or proportion of attributions in each 
letter.  At random, one of these two attributions was coded as indicated by coder number 
1 and the other was coded as indicated by coder number 2.   
 
Distribution of Dependent Variable 
As discussed in Chapter IV, although both enhancement and blame are observed 
across the full range of their distributions, these variables are frequently observed at the 
bounds of their range.  Chapter IV drew this conclusion based on analysis of a subsample 
of the data.  Analysis of the entire sample confirms this tendency.  Enhancement is most 
often observed at its upper limit, 1.  Combining letters from both years of the study 
results in 904 observations of the percentage of enhancement and blame.  Of the 904 
observations of enhancement, 232 or 26% are at the upper limit of 1.  Conversely, blame 
is most often observed at its lower limit of 0.  Of the 904 observations of blame, 488 or 
54% are at the lower limit of 0.  Figure 5 presents a histogram of enhancement and blame 
for all sample firms.  
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Figure 5: Histograms of Enhancement and Blame (n=904) 
 
 
These skewed distributions of enhancement and blame, with their mode at one 
extreme of their bounds, likely result in part from firms' intention to improve their image 
through extensive use of enhancement or to defend their image through extensive use of 
blame.  However, this skewed distribution could also result in part from enhancement and 
blame's non-continuous distribution.  Although both enhancement and blame can 
theoretically take any value from 0 to 1, the number of attributions in a letter to 
shareholders limits the number of values that each variable can take.  Mathematically, if 
the number of attributions in a letter is defined as "a", enhancement and blame can each 
take "a + 1" possible values.  For example, in a letter that contains one attribution, 
enhancement and blame can take only two values: 0% or 100%.  In a letter with two 
attributions, enhancement and blame can only take three values: 0%, 50%, or 100%.  In a 
letter with three attributions, enhancement and blame can take four values: 0, 33%, 66%, 
or 100%.  Etc.  These limitations make enhancement and blame "chunky" measures and 
may prevent them from providing a fully nuanced measure of a firm's attribution of its 
performance.   
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Such "chunky" variables may provide a poor measurement of a firm's genuine 
assessment of its performance.  If letters to shareholders contained more total attributions, 
it is possible that fewer letters would be observed with enhancement of 100% and blame 
of 0%.  This dissertation tests this possibility by comparing letters with 1 or more 
attributions (n=904), against letters with 5 or more attributions (n=591), against letters 
with 10 or more attributions (n=271) to see if similar proportions of each group use100% 
and enhancement and 0% blame.  All comparisons are conducted on a pooled sample of 
letters over two years.  If letters with more attributions less frequently use 100% 
enhancement and 0% blame, then this "chunky" distribution may inadequately measure 
firms' assessment of their performance.   
Analysis shows that letters with more attributions less frequently use enhancement of 
100% and blame of 0%.  Figure 6 presents histograms of enhancement and blame for 
letters that contain 5 or more attributions.  In this first subsample, 57 firms or 9% of the 
subsample used 100% enhancement, down from 26% in the full sample.  Similarly, in 
this first subsample, 247 firms or 42% of the subsample used 0% blame, down from 54% 
in the full sample.   
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Figure 6: Histograms of Enhancement and Blame, Attributions >5 (n=591) 
 
 
Figure 7 presents histograms of enhancement and blame for letters that contain 10 or 
more attributions.  In this second subsample, only 8 firms or 2% of the subsample used 
100% enhancement.  Similarly, only 80 firms, or 30% of the subsample, used 0% blame.     
 
Figure 7: Histograms of Enhancement, Attributions >10 (n=271) 
 
 
In light of these findings, this dissertation conducts empirical analysis on letters with 
5 or more attributions.  Optimal empirical analysis depends on the quality and the 
quantity of data used in statistical analysis.  Including all letters with 5 or more 
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attributions provides a much more normally distributed dependent variable, increasing 
the reliability of conclusions drawn on regression analysis.  In addition, including all 
letters with 5 or more attributions preserves a large enough quantity of data that the 
analysis can reasonably be expected to produce significant findings.  It would be valuable 
to conduct a future study with a larger number of letters to shareholders.  Such a study 
could reasonably restrict its quantitative analysis to letters to shareholders with 10 or 
more attributions.  This will reduce the risk of drawing conclusions based on the 
"chunky", non-continuous distribution of the dependent variables, enhancement and 
blame.  This dissertation will check the robustness of these findings through analysis of 
the entire sample.   
 
Graphic Representations of Data 
Researchers often use graphic representations of data to gain insight into the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables.  As this dissertation uses 
multiple independent variables and control variables, it does not present all data for all 
variables in one graph.  Rather, this dissertation presents the focal dependent variables, 
Enhancement or Blame, with each of the three measures of performance.  These graphs 
reveal two things: first that the majority of the data cluster around the mean; second that 
the data contains outliers.   
Figure 8 presents Enhancement with Revenue Change.  The graph on the left, Figure 
8A, presents observations for the entire sample. This graph of all observations shows the 
general distribution of the data and reveals that the majority of observations occur close 
to the median of 14% revenue change.  The graph on the right focuses on those 
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observations that fall close to the median to better illustrate their distribution.  It presents 
firms with Revenue Change from -1 to 1, which account for 96% of all observations.   
 
Figure 8: Enhancement on Revenue Change 
8A: All Observations   8B: 96% of Observations 
 
 
 
Figure 9 presents similar information for Blame, representing all observations in 
Figure 9A and 96% of observations in Figure 9B.  Descriptive statistics for these 96% of 
observations presented in Figures 9B and 9B are mean 17%, median 13%, standard 
deviation 18%.   
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Figure 9: Blame on Revenue Change 
9A: All Observations   9B: 96% of Observations 
 
  
 
Figures 10 and 11 present the same information for EPS Change.  Figures 10A and 
11A present all values of EPS Change.  Figures 10B and 11B present values over the 
range -20 to 20.  Descriptive statistics of this sample that represents 96% of all 
observations are mean .51, median .20, standard deviation 2.41.   
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Figure 10: Enhancement on EPS Change 
10A: All Observations   10B: 96% of Observations 
 
  
  
 
Figure 11: Blame on EPS Change 
11A: All Observations   11B: 96% of Observations 
 
  
 
Figures 12 and 13 present the same information for Profitability.  Figures 12A and 
13A present all values of profitability.  Figures 12B and 13B present values over the 
range -1 to 1.  The descriptive statistics of this sample that represents 96% of all 
observations are mean .06, median .06, standard deviation .10.   
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Figure 12: Enhancement on Profitability 
12A: All Observations   12B: 96% of Observations 
 
  
 
Figure 13: Blame on Profitability 
13A: All Observations   13B: 96% of Observations 
 
  
 
 
These visual depictions of observations of the three key measures of performance 
suggest that a small number of outliers significantly change both the visual representation 
of the data and the sample's descriptive statistics.  Consequently, empirical analysis will 
be conducted on a trimmed sample that removes the most extreme 4% of observations 
(approximately 2% removed from each tail).  These visual descriptions also make clear 
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that observations of the independent variable bunch around the sample mean.  In contrast, 
observations of the dependent variables, Enhancement and Blame, range much more 
freely from one extreme to the other (0 to 1).   This clustering of data around a small 
range could be the result of a discontinuity in the dependent variable close to the mean 
value of the independent variable.  
 
Primary Sample 
Designation of Primary Sample 
This dissertation began by collecting data on 769 firms over two years for a total of 
1,538 firm-years.  However, these 769 firms and 1,538 firm-years yielded only 336 firms 
and 562 letters that provide adequate data for analysis.  Hereinafter, this dissertation 
refers to the dataset of these 336 firms and 562 letters as the primary sample.  This 
dissertation uses the entire primary sample in between-firm analysis.  Table 22 and the 
text below it explain the development of this dissertation's primary sample which it uses 
in between-firm analysis.  Table 22 also presents information on the 215 firms that 
contributed letters to the primary sample in both 2004 and 2005.  This dissertation uses 
these 215 firms in within-firm analysis.   
Numerous factors contributed to the number of observations in the primary sample.  
First, many firms did not produce letters to shareholders in one or both years of the study: 
only 615 of the 769 firms (80%) produced letters to shareholders. These 615 firms 
produced 1,052 letters to shareholders, representing 68% of the total 1,538 firm-years for 
which data were collected.  Second, many of the firms that produced letters to 
shareholders did not make attributions in their letters:  only 480 firms (62%) produced 
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Table 22: Development of Primary Sample 
Filter 
Number of 
Firms 
%  
Number of 
Letters 
% 
Data collected on firm 769 100% 1538 100% 
Firm produced letter to shareholders 615 80% 1052 68% 
Firm's letter contains attributions 480 62% 903 59% 
Firm's letter contains 5 or more 
attributions 364 47% 591 38% 
Firm without extreme performance  336 44% 562 37% 
5 or more attributions in 2004 & 2005 215 28% 430 28% 
 
 
letters to shareholders that contain attributions.   These 480 firms produced 903 letters to 
shareholders that contain attributions, or 59% of the total number of firm years.  
Hereinafter, this dissertation will refer to these 480 firms and the 903 letters to 
shareholders that they produced as the full sample.  Third, due to the "chunky" nature of 
the distribution of the dependent variable, this dissertation will limit its analysis to letters 
that contain 5 or more attributions:  only 336 (44%) produced letters with 5 or more 
attributions.  These 336 firms produced 562 letters with 5 or more attributions, or 37% of 
the number of firm years (277 firms in 2004 + 285 firms in 2005 = 562 firm years).  
Eliminating letters with fewer than 5 attributions results in 591 letters to shareholders, or 
38% of the total number of firm years.  Fourth, to reduce noise in the sample, this 
dissertation eliminates letters produced by firms in a year of extreme performance, 
resulting in 562 letters, or 37% of the total of firm years.  This dissertation conducts 
between-firm analysis on this pool of 562 letters produced in 2004 and 2005.   
It is important to note that many of these 562 letters were not produced by the same 
firms.  Only 215 of the 336 firms in the primary sample produced letters in both 2004 and 
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2005: 58 of the 336 firms produced a letter only in 2004 and 62 firms produced a letter 
only in 2005.  In between-firm analysis, this dissertation uses pooled data from all 562 
letters in the primary sample.  In within-firm analysis, this dissertation only uses letters 
from those firms that produced a letter in the primary sample in both 2004 and 2005.  
This reduction to 215 firms and 430 letters represents 23% of the 769 firms and the 1,538 
firm years for which data were collected.   
In addition to conducting analysis on this primary sample, this dissertation will 
conduct robustness checks using all 903 letters to shareholders in the dataset that 
included attributions.  This larger dataset includes letters to shareholders with fewer than 
5 attributions and letters produced by firms with extreme performance measures.  
Hereinafter, this dissertation will refer to this dataset with 903 observations as the full 
sample.   
The 336 firms in the primary sample fairly represent the 769 firms for which data 
were collected.  Table 23 breaks these firms down by industry.   Table 23 shows that no 
one industry dominates the primary sample.   
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Table 23: Primary Sample by Industry 
Industry 
2 Digit SIC 
Code 
# of Firms 
in Industry  
% of 
Industry 
# of Firms 
in Primary 
Sample 
% of 
Primary 
Sample 
Food & 
Beverage 20 31 4% 21 6% 
Apparel 23 8 1% 5 1% 
Furniture 25 10 1% 5 1% 
Paper 26 30 4% 25 7% 
Printing 27 22 3% 16 5% 
Chemicals 28 202 26% 52 15% 
Petroleum 29 22 3% 14 4% 
Rubber 30 5 1% 3 1% 
Shoes 31 12 2% 4 1% 
Glass 32 20 3% 16 5% 
Steel 33 16 2% 5 1% 
Metals 34 11 1% 8 2% 
Machinery 35 198 26% 68 20% 
Electrical 36 106 14% 53 16% 
Transport 37 53 7% 32 10% 
Specialized 38 23 3% 9 3% 
Total NA 769 100% 336 100% 
 
 
Analysis of Independent Variable 
Table 24 presents descriptive statistics for the primary sample.  The text below Table 
24 compares these values to those presented above for the full sample in Table 15.   
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Table 24: Descriptive Statistics for Primary Sample in 2004 
Measure Obs. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Revenue ($MM) 277 8,438 1,401 27,022 30 263,989 
Net Income ($MM) 277 585 70 2,269 -1,536 25,330 
EPS ($) 277 1.84 1.45 2.87 -12.26 34.59 
Assets ($MM) 277 12,204 1,394 58,389 20 750,507 
Equity ($MM) 277 3,258 596 10,033 -622 110,821 
Revenue Change  277 19% 15% 17% -28% 84% 
EPS Change 275 87% 31% 222% -640% 1655% 
Profitability 277 7% 6% 8% -47% 34% 
ROA  277 6% 6% 7% -23% 32% 
ROE  277 33% 14% 325% -480% 5550% 
CEO Tenure (years) 277 6.94 5.0 6.93 0 50 
Size (m. value $MM) 277 9,977 1,547 35,396 65 386,402 
Acquisition (yes/no) 277 0.28 0 0.52 0 1 
 
 
Comparative analysis between the primary sample and the full sample demonstrates 
many differences.  Firms in the primary sample had higher means on most variables.  On 
only two variables did the primary sample lower values: Revenue Change and CEO 
tenure.  However, statistical analysis demonstrates that none of these differences, positive 
or negative, are significant.    
 
Analysis of Dependent Variable 
To ascertain whether firms in the primary sample use attribution differently than other 
firms, this section compares attribution by firms in the primary sample those in the full 
sample.   The 562 letters in the primary sample contain 5,915 attributions.  Table 25 
below presents the number and type of each of the four types of attribution in the primary 
sample.   
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Table 25: Attributions by Type 
  
  
  Locus of Causality 
  Internal External Total 
Direction 
of 
Influence 
Positive 
Enhancement Good Fortune Positive 
Total = 3,519 Total = 940 Total 4,459 
Mean = 6.3                   
Std. Dev. = 4.3 
Mean = 1.7                   
Std. Dev. = 2.3 
Mean = 8.0                             
Std. Dev. = 6.0 
59.5% 16% 76% 
  Self-Criticism Blame Negative 
Negative 
Total = 425 Total = 1,031 Total = 1,456 
Mean = 0.8                        
Std. Dev. = 1.3 
Mean = 1.8                     
Std. Dev. = 2.6 
Mean = 2.6                            
Std. Dev. = 3.2 
  7% 17.5% 24% 
Total 
Total Internal Total External   
Total = 3,944 Total = 1,971   
Mean = 7.1 Mean = 3.5   
Std. Dev. = 4.4 
67% 
Std. Dev. = 3.9 
33%   
 
 
Firms in the primary sample use attribution in much the same way as firms in the full 
sample.  As would be expected, on average firms in the primary sample use more 
attribution.  However, firms in the primary sample use the same proportions of the 
different types of attribution as firms in the full sample.  Only small changes in the 
proportion of each type of attribution occurred: the percentage of Self-Criticism increased 
from 6% to 7%, and the percentages of Enhancement and Blame each fell by .5%.  
However these differences are not statistically significant. 
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Independent Variables - Performance  
This dissertation's independent variable, achievement of aspired performance, relates 
to firm performance.  This dissertation first describes the distribution of firms' financial 
performance and then describes the distribution of firms' achievement of aspired 
performance levels.   
 
Accounting Measures of Financial Performance 
Tables 26-28 present measures of financial performance for firms in the full sample, 
respectively for 2004, 2005, and the two years combined.  Consistent with strong growth 
in the overall economy in 2004 and moderate growth in 2005, sample firms show 
stronger financial performance in 2004 than in 2005.  Sales and earnings grew more 
rapidly in 2004, as evidenced by higher Revenue Change, earnings increase, and EPS 
Change in 2004.  Nevertheless, on average firms continued to grow revenue and earnings 
in 2005.  Furthermore, firms controlled production costs in 2005, as evidenced by higher 
profitability and ROA in 2005 than in 2004.   
Sample firms also show large differences between mean and median values.  Mean 
values for revenue, Revenue Change, EPS, EPS Change and ROE are markedly higher 
than median values.  This indicates that a small number of firms have very high values in 
these measures.  In contrast, mean values for profitability are markedly lower than the 
median values. This indicates that a few firms recorded exceptionally low profitability.  
Further examination of this dissertation's data identified the causes of many of these 
differences between mean and median values.  Firms in drug development and 
biotechnology achieved the exceptionally high measures of Revenue Change and the 
 146 
 
exceptionally low measures of profitability present in the data.    Firms in oilfield services 
and small firms in a variety of other industries achieved the exceptionally high measures 
of EPS Change that are present in the data.  Firms with large and sudden declines in 
equity account for the exceptionally large ROE measures that are present in the data.  
Though unusual, these extreme values accurately reflect these firms' performance as 
described in corporate annual reports.   
 
Table 26:  2004 Financial Measures of Full Sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Revenue 277 8,438 1,401 27,022 30 263,989 
Revenue Change 277 19% 15% 17% -28% 84% 
EPS  277 1.84 1.45 2.87 -12.26 34.59 
EPS Change 275 87% 31% 2.22% -640% 1655% 
Profitability 277 7% 6% 8% -47% 34% 
ROA 277 6% 6% 7% -23% 32% 
ROE 277 33% 14% 325% -480% 5550% 
 
Table 27:  2005 Financial Measures of Full Sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Revenue 285 $8,329 $1,656 $24,483 $32 $190,215 
Revenue Change 285 17% 11% 28% -40% 280% 
EPS  285 $1.84 $1.59 $4.15 -$32.92 $32.59 
EPS Change 284 41% 11% 508% -4,727% 3283% 
Profitability 285 6% 6% 9% -30% 54% 
ROA 285 6% 6% 8% -42% 39% 
ROE 285 39% 13% 321% -192% 5,313% 
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Table 28:  Combined 2004 and 2005 Financial Measures of Full Sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Revenue 480 $7,860 $1,404 $24,553 $21 $263,989 
Revenue Change 480 19% 15% 17% -28% 84% 
EPS  480 $1.87 $1.49 $2.77 -$12.26 $34.59 
EPS Change 480 82% 28% 249% -2200% 2016% 
Profitability 480 6% 6% 8% -47% 34% 
ROA 480 6% 6% 7% -23% 39% 
ROE 480 26% 13% 239% -480% 5,550% 
 
 
Achievement of Performance Aspirations 
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter II, firms create aspirations in relation 
to two benchmarks: social benchmarks and historical benchmarks.  Firms that perform 
better than their peers achieve their social aspiration.  This dissertation uses the 
abbreviation "S" to refer to social aspirations.  Firms that perform better than their own 
past performance achieve their historical aspiration.  This dissertation uses the letter "H" 
to refer to historical aspirations.  Chapter II also mentions that firms can assess their 
performance like high jumpers with a dichotomous assessment of performance, or like 
golfers with a continuous assessment of performance.  This dissertation uses the 
abbreviation "D" to refer to dichotomous assessments of performance.  When assessing 
performance relative to aspiration in a dichotomous manner, this dissertation codes 
achievement of aspiration as "1" and failure to achieve aspiration as "0".  This 
dissertation uses the abbreviation "C" to refer to continuous performance.  When 
assessing performance relative to aspiration in a continuous manner, this dissertation 
subtracts the firm's aspiration from its performance.  First that surpass their aspiration 
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have a positive difference.  First that fall short of their aspiration have a negative 
difference.  This dissertation uses these abbreviations to designate four types of 
performance assessment: HD (historical dichotomous), HC (historical continuous), SD 
(social dichotomous), and SC (social continuous).   
Tables 29-31 present achievement of dichotomous aspirations, respectively, for 2004, 
2005, and the pooled sample.  The mean of each of these measures represents the 
percentage of firms that achieved their aspired performance levels (firms that received a 
1).   
 
Table 29: Measures of Achievement of Aspirations in 2004 in Primary Sample 
2004 Obs. Achieved Percent 
Failed 
to 
Achieve 
Percent 
SD Revenue Change 277 147 .53 130 .47 
SD EPS Change 277 147 .53 130 .47 
SD Profitability 277 155 .56 122 .44 
HD Revenue Change 277 200 .72 76 .28 
HD EPS Change 277 151 .55 126 .45 
HD Profitability 277 192 .69 85 .31 
 
Table 30: Measures of Achievement of Aspirations in 2005 in Primary Sample 
2005 Obs. Achieved Percent 
Failed 
to 
Achieve Percent 
SD Revenue Change 285 151 .53 134 .47 
SD EPS Change 285 148 .52 137 .48 
SD Profitability 285 180 .63 105 .37 
HD Revenue Change 285 108 .38 177 .62 
HD EPS Change 285 108 .38 177 .62 
HD Profitability 285 151 .53 134 .47 
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Table 31: Measures of Achievement of Aspirations in Primary Sample 
2004 & 2005 Obs. Achieved Percent 
Failed 
to 
Achieve Percent 
SD Revenue Change 562 298 .53 264 .47 
SD EPS Change 562 295 .52 267 .48 
SD Profitability 562 335 .60 227 .40 
HD Revenue Change 562 308 .55 254 .45 
HD EPS Change 562 259 .46 303 .54 
HD Profitability 562 343 .61 219 .39 
 
 
Tables 29-31 show a sharp contrast in firms’ average achievement of social and 
historical performance levels from 2004 to 2005.  The proportion of firms that achieved 
social aspirations was either stable or increased from 2004 to 2005:  SD Revenue Change 
was stable, SD EPS Change dropped by 1%, and SD Profitability increased by 7%.  In 
contrast, the proportion of firms that achieved historical aspirations dropped 
precipitously:  HD Revenue Change dropped by 34%, HD EPS Change dropped by 16%, 
and HD Profitability dropped by 16%.  These drops in the achievement of performance 
aspirations reflect broad economic trends: both the US and the global economies were 
stronger in 2004 than in 2005.   
During the two year period, over 50% of sample firms achieved five of the six aspired 
performance levels.  This suggests that, on average, these firms improved their 
performance from year to year and that these firms outperformed their peers.  Only HD 
EPS Change has an achievement rate below 50% for the entire sample, as shown in Table 
31.  This low achievement rate for HD EPS Change suggests that firms had stronger EPS 
Change in 2003, resulting in a smaller number of firms than achieved their 2004 EPS 
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Change.  In contrast, HD Profitability presents the highest achievement level for the 
pooled sample at 61%.  This high achievement level for HD Profitability suggests that 
sample firms effectively controlled costs and achieved good profitability during the study 
period.      
 
Correlations 
With the above description of the distribution of the independent and dependent 
variables, this analysis examines correlations between the two.  Table 32 provides an 
index of study variables and Table 33 presents correlations for these variables.  It is 
important to note that, although most variables in this table are continuous, six are 
dichotomous.  Those that measure high-jumper like achievement of performance 
aspirations take only two values, 0 or 1.  As a result, correlations between these six 
binary measures and the continuous measures of enhancement and blame represent point-
biserial correlation coefficients.  Mathematically, point-biserial correlation coefficients 
are equivalent to Pearson correlations, however, it is valuable to recognize that the 
correlation table contains both types of correlation.   
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Table 32: Index of Study Variables 
Variable 
Type 
Concept Measured Variable Name 
Dependent 
Variable 
Attribution 
Enhancement and Blame defined from 0 to 1 
Enhancement  
Blame 
Independent 
Variable 
Achievement of Aspiration  
Dichotomous: fail = 0; achieve = 1 
HD = Historical Dichotomous 
SD = Social Dichotomous 
HD Profitability 
HD EPS Change 
HD Revenue Change 
SD Profitability 
SD EPS Change 
SD Revenue Change 
Independent 
Variable 
Difference Between Actual and Aspired 
Performance 
Continuous 
Actual Performance - Aspired Performance 
HC = Historical Continuous 
SC = Social Continuous 
HC Profitability 
HC EPS Change 
HC Revenue Change 
SC Profitability 
SC EPS Change 
SC Revenue Change 
Control 
Variable 
Firm Characteristics Size 
Age 
Industry 
CEO Tenure 
Acquisitions 
 
 
Table 33 presents strong correlations between dependent variables and some 
independent variables.  As predicted, both Enhancement and Blame show significant 
relationships with all six dichotomous measures of achievement of performance 
aspirations (HD and SD variables). Achievement of each of these "high jumper" type 
assessments of performance correlates with an increase in Enhancement (correlations of 
.198 to .457) and a decrease in Blame (correlations of  
-.205 to -.469).  These correlations indicate that when firms achieve an aspired 
performance level they use more enhancement; and that when firms fail to achieve an 
aspired performance level, they use more blame.  These results appear to provide  
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Table 33: Correlation Table: Performance Aspirations with Attributions, n=562 
 
Note:  all correlations over 0.081 are significant at p < .05?   
# Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 Enhancement 1.000
2 Blame -0.667 1.000
3 Profitabilty 0.267 -0.230 1.000
4 EPS Increase 0.236 -0.275 0.332 1.000
5 Revenue Inc 0.263 -0.336 0.171 0.243 1.000
6 HD Profitaiblity 0.457 -0.469 0.224 0.437 0.207 1.000
7 HD EPS Increase 0.353 -0.353 0.091 0.424 0.206 0.426 1.000
8 HD Revenue Inc. 0.225 -0.255 0.023 0.129 0.408 0.163 0.252 1.000
9 SD Profitability 0.198 -0.205 0.586 0.171 0.126 0.157 0.028 -0.002 1.000
10 SD EPS Increase 0.379 -0.360 0.191 0.466 0.175 0.652 0.472 0.161 0.113 1.000
11 SD Revenue Inc 0.224 -0.288 0.068 0.100 0.589 0.114 0.153 0.288 0.166 0.130 1.000
12 HC Profitability 0.323 -0.346 0.463 0.555 0.243 0.514 0.415 0.136 0.208 0.457 0.113 1.000
13 HC EPS Increase 0.156 -0.174 0.141 0.681 0.133 0.308 0.562 0.129 0.058 0.341 0.094 0.464 1.000
14 HC Revenue Inc 0.146 -0.200 -0.012 0.147 0.542 0.143 0.272 0.678 0.039 0.158 0.336 0.207 0.225 1.000
15 SC Profiability 0.243 -0.206 0.954 0.309 0.133 0.220 0.094 0.007 0.662 0.202 0.088 0.447 0.146 -0.015 1.000
16 SC EPS Inc 0.223 -0.250 0.335 0.992 0.203 0.418 0.409 0.101 0.190 0.479 0.097 0.541 0.671 0.116 0.326 1.000
17 SC Revenue Inc 0.219 -0.290 0.138 0.171 0.877 0.134 0.172 0.325 0.181 0.157 0.696 0.168 0.121 0.490 0.147 0.167 1.000
18 Size 0.003 0.021 0.170 -0.019 -0.058 -0.026 -0.027 0.003 0.143 -0.058 -0.155 -0.011 -0.019 -0.047 0.167 -0.022 -0.122 1.000
19 Age 0.012 0.038 0.083 -0.044 -0.181 -0.055 -0.043 -0.096 0.104 -0.016 -0.104 -0.076 -0.021 -0.035 0.105 -0.028 -0.145 0.240 1.000
20 CEO Tenure -0.054 0.044 0.091 -0.006 0.138 -0.023 -0.005 0.063 0.087 -0.007 0.049 0.003 -0.037 0.056 0.068 -0.011 0.107 -0.086 -0.179 1.000
21 Acquisitions 0.094 -0.034 0.041 -0.031 0.181 -0.032 0.010 -0.008 0.105 -0.036 0.155 -0.116 -0.052 -0.019 0.026 -0.034 0.202 0.106 0.071 -0.005 1.000
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evidence in support of Hypotheses 1, that firms that achieve an aspiration use more 
enhancement than firms that fail to achieve an aspiration.  These results also appear to 
provide support for Hypothesis 2, that firms that fail to achieve an aspiration use more 
blame than firms that achieve an aspiration.   
As predicted, both Enhancement and Blame show significant relationships with all six 
continuous measures of the difference between actual and aspired performance (HC and 
SC Variables).  Increases in each of these "golfer" type assessments of performance 
correlates with an increase in Enhancement (correlations of .146 to .323) and a decrease 
in Blame (correlations of -.174 and -.346).  These correlations indicate that firms with 
higher performance in relation to aspirations use more Enhancement; and that firms with 
lower performance in relation to aspirations use more Blame.  These results appear to 
provide support for Hypothesis 5a, that the further a firm's performance is above 
aspiration, the greater its use of enhancement to explain performance; and they appear to 
provide support for Hypothesis 5b, that the further a firm's performance is below 
aspiration, the lesser its use of enhancement to explain performance.  These results also 
appear to provide support for hypothesis 6a, that the further a firm's performance is above 
aspiration, the lesser its use of blame to explain performance; and they appear to provide 
support for Hypothesis 6b, that the further a firm's performance is below aspiration, the 
greater its use of blame to explain performance.   
Table 33 shows few significant correlations between control variables and dependent 
variables.  Only Acquisition shows significant correlations: Acquisition has a significant 
correlation with Enhancement (.094) indicating that firms that make acquisitions use 
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more Enhancement.  However, Table 33 does not show a significant relationship between 
acquisition and Blame.   
Table 33 also presents correlations among independent variables.  As expected, some 
independent variables correlate highly with each other.  As would be expected, variables 
calculated from the same measure of performance correlate with each other.  For 
example, HC Profitability shows a significant correlation with SC Profitability (.662) 
with HD Profitability (.514), and with SD Profitability (.220). Table 33 presently a 
similar pattern of significant correlations for the various assessments of Revenue Change 
and EPS Change.   
Table 33 also presents many significant correlations between variables calculated 
from different performance measures.  For example, HD Profitability correlates strongly 
with HD EPS Change (.426), with HD EPS Change (.652), and with SC EPS Change 
(.418).   
These correlations among independent variables influence how they can be used 
effectively in regression analysis.  Regression coefficients represent an independent 
variable's unique capacity to explain the dependent variable.  When variables are 
combined in a single regression, collinearity reduces the beta coefficients of both 
variables and reduces the model's explanatory power (Kennedy, 2003).  Consequently, 
this dissertation creates separate regression models to test different measures of 
performance (Profitability, Revenue Change, and EPS Change) and different scales for 
assessing firms' performance (historical vs. social and dichotomous vs. continuous).   
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Individual Mean Values 
Analysis of individual mean values of attribution percentages of firms that achieve 
and don't achieve their aspirations provides an initial quantification of the relationship 
between achievement of aspiration and attribution.  It also indicates whether these two 
groups manifest differences.  If these two groups present equivalent means, then this 
dissertation likely will not reveal differences in their use of attribution.  In contrast, if 
these two groups present different means, then this dissertation could reveal a difference 
between the use of attribution by firms that achieve their aspirations and those who fail to 
do so.   
Table 33 presents means of firms that failed to achieve aspired performance levels, 
means of firms that achieved aspired performance levels, and the results of a t-test that 
presents the statistical probability that these two means are equal.  Table 34 reports 
statistics for Enhancement and Table 35 reports statistics for Blame.   
Table 34 reveals that firms that achieve aspirations use more enhancement than firms 
that don't achieve aspirations.  Firms demonstrate the greatest contrast in their use of 
enhancement in relation to aspirations derived from historical profitability: firms that 
achieve historical aspirations related to profitability use 23.7% more enhancement than 
firms that fail to achieve historical aspirations related to profitability.  T-tests indicate that 
this difference is significant (t(562) = 11.869, P<.0001).  Firms that fail to achieve social 
aspirations related to profitability demonstrate the least difference in use of enhancement: 
firms that achieve social aspirations related to profitability only use 10.2% more 
enhancement than firms that fail to achieve social aspirations related to profitability.  
Although this difference is modest, T-tests indicate that it is significant (t(562) = 4.374,  
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Table 34: T-tests of Mean Use of Enhancement (n=562) 
Measure of 
Performance 
Mean of 
Firms that 
Failed to 
Achieve 
Aspiration 
(Std. Error) 
Mean of 
Firms that 
Achieved 
Aspiration 
(Std. Error) 
Difference 
in Mean 
Attribution 
t-Value 
Probability 
of 
Equivalent 
Mean 
HD Revenue 
Change 
0.533 
(.017) 
0.646 
(.013) 
0.114 
(0.021) 
5.367 p< .0001 
SD Revenue 
Change 
0.534 
(0.015) 
0.648 
(0.012) 
0.152 
(0.021) 
5.426 p<.0001 
HD EPS   
Increase 
0.514 
(0.014) 
0.693 
(0.014) 
0.179 
(0.018) 
9.052 p<.0001 
SD EPS    
Increase 
0.500 
(0.016) 
0.687 
(0.012) 
0.192 
(0.020) 
9.615 p<.0001 
HD     
Profitability 
0.451 
(0.016) 
0.688 
(0.012) 
0.237 
(0.020) 
11.869 p<.0001 
SD     
Profitability 
0.535 
(.0167) 
0.637 
(.0134) 
0.102 
(0.021) 
4.374 p<.0001 
 
P<.0001).  These results support Hypothesis 1, that firms that achieve a performance 
aspiration use more enhancement that firms that fail to achieve a performance aspiration.   
Table 35 presents a similar analysis of firms' use of blame in relation to their 
achievement of aspired performance levels.  Table 36 compares the mean use of blame 
by firms that achieve aspirations and firms that fail to achieve aspirations.   
Table 35 reveals that firms that fail to achieve aspirations use more blame than firms 
that achieve aspirations.  Firms demonstrate the greatest contrast in their use of blame in 
relation to aspiration derived from historical profitability: firms that fail to achieve 
historical aspirations related to profitability use 19.6% more blame than firms that 
achieve historical aspirations related to profitability.  T-tests indicate that this difference 
is significant (t(562) = 11.524, P<.0001).  Firms demonstrate the least difference in use of 
enhancement in relation to social aspirations related to profitability: 
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Table 35: T-tests of Mean Use of Blame by Achievement of Aspiration (n=562) 
Measure of 
Performance 
Mean of 
Firms that 
Failed to 
Achieve 
Aspiration 
(Std. Error) 
Mean of 
Firms that 
Achieved 
Aspiration 
(Std. Error) 
Difference 
in Mean 
Attribution 
t-Value 
Probability 
of 
Equivalent 
Mean 
HD Revenue 
Change 
0.231 
(0.014) 
0.127 
(0.010) 
0.105 
(0.017) 
6.065 p< .0001 
SD Revenue 
Change 
0.237 
(0.014) 
0.119 
(0.009) 
0.174 
(0.017) 
6.965 p<.0001 
HD EPS   
Increase 
0.240 
(0.013) 
0.095 
(0.009) 
0.145 
(0.016) 
9.307 p<.0001 
SD EPS    
Increase 
0.251 
(0.014) 
0.104 
(0.009) 
0.149 
(0.016) 
8.986 p<.0001 
HD     
Profitability 
0.293 
(0.015) 
0.097 
(0.008) 
0.196 
(0.017) 
11.524 p<.0001 
SD     
Profitability 
0.224 
(0.014) 
0.140 
(0.010) 
0.085 
(0.017) 
4.802 p<.001 
 
 
firms that fail to achieve social aspirations related to profitability only use 8.5% more 
blame than firms that achieve social aspirations related to profitability.  Although this 
difference is modest, T-tests indicate that it is significant (t(562) = 4.802, P<.001).  These 
results appear to provide support for Hypothesis 2, that firms that fail to achieve a 
performance aspiration use more blame than firms that achieve a performance aspiration.   
 
Multiple Mean Values 
This dissertation also investigates whether achievement of multiple aspirations 
influences firms' use of attribution.  Do firms that achieve multiple aspirations use 
attribution differently than firms that achieve only one aspiration?  For example, do firms 
that achieve two aspirations use more enhancement than firms that achieve only one 
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aspiration?  This dissertation begins to answer these questions by calculating the total 
number aspirations that each firm achieves.  The following analysis creates a new 
variable that sums the number of aspirations that each firm achieves.  Each firm can 
achieve as many as six aspirations: Historical Revenue Change, Social Revenue Change, 
Historical EPS Change, Social EPS Change, Historical Profitability, and Social 
Profitability.  This new variable, Aspirations Achieved, is defined over the range 0 to 6 
and can take the value of any whole number in that range.  This dissertation calculates the 
mean values of Enhancement and Blame for firms with the same value for Aspirations 
Achieved.  For example, firms that achieved a total of 5 aspirations used 78% 
Enhancement and 5% Blame.  Table 36 presents the results of this analysis. 
 
Table 36: Means of Enhancement and Blame by Number of Aspirations Achieved 
Aspirations 
Achieved 
Observations Enhancement Blame 
0 45 35% 39% 
1 67 33% 37%  
2 81 51% 25% 
3 96 64% 15%. 
4 117 71% 9% 
5 100 72% 7% 
6 56 68% 6% 
Total/Average 562 59% 17% 
 
 
In Table 36, there is no significant difference in the mean use of Enhancement or 
Blame between firms that achieved 0 aspirations or 1 aspiration.  In addition, there is no 
significant difference between the mean use of Enhancement or Blame of firms that 
achieved 4, 5, or 6 aspirations.  However, a significant difference in firms’ use of 
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enhancement and blame exits at the p < .001 level between firms that achieve 1 and 2 
aspirations, 2 and 3 aspirations, and 3 and 4 aspirations.   
Figure 14 presents the same data in visual form.  As the amount of attribution in a 
letter to shareholders may jump with the achievement of performance aspiration, Figure 
14 presents these data as points rather than as lines. 
 
Figure 14: Means of Enhancement and Blame by Number of Aspirations Achieved 
 
 
Figure 14 makes clear that firms that achieve 0 or 1 aspirations use approximately the 
same amounts of Enhancement and Blame.  It also makes clear that firms that achieve 4, 
5, and 6 aspirations use approximately the same amount of Enhancement and Blame.  
However, Figure 14 visually illustrates how firms that achieve 2, 3, and 4 aspirations use 
progressively more Enhancement and progressively less Blame.  These results appear to 
provide partial support for hypothesis 3, that the more performance aspirations a firm 
achieves, the more enhancement it uses to explain performance.  These results also 
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appear to provide partial support for Hypothesis 4, that the fewer performance aspirations 
a firm achieves the more blame it uses.   
 
Conclusions from Descriptive Statistics 
These descriptive statistics provide insight on this dissertation's primary sample and 
appears to provide support for each of this dissertation's hypotheses.  This insight also 
provides parameters for the regression analysis conducted in the balance of this chapter.  
Before undertaking regression analysis, this dissertation summarizes six findings from its 
descriptive analysis.    
First, some firms have extreme values for the independent variables related to 
performance.  To eliminate the influence of these outliers, this dissertation removes 
approximately 4% of the sample, 2% from each end of the distribution from its primary 
sample.  This dissertation will conduct robustness checks with a full dataset that includes 
the firms with these extreme performance measures.   
Second, analysis of the distribution of the dependent variable demonstrates that 
Enhancement and Blame are "chunky" variables:  these variables accept a limited number 
of values based on the number of attributions in a given letter to shareholders.  
Consequently, letters with a small number of attributions present very rough and 
potentially inaccurate measures of the amount of enhancement or blame that the firm 
intends to present in its letter.   As a result, this dissertation conducts primary analysis on 
letters that contain 5 or more attributions to provide more nuanced measures of 
Enhancement and Blame.  This dissertation also conducts robustness checks on a full 
dataset that includes all letters to shareholders,  
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Third, the 277 firms in the primary sample are significantly larger and more efficient 
(higher profitability, ROA, & ROE) than the 615 firms in the full sample.  In addition, the 
firms in the primary sample make more acquisitions than the firms in the full sample.  In 
other respects, these two groups demonstrate similar characteristics.  Most notably, 
although firms in the primary sample had higher profitability, ROE, and ROA than firms 
in the full sample, these firms had similar Revenue Changes and similar EPS Changes.  
The most notable distinguishing characteristic of firms in the primary sample is that they 
are larger and more efficient.   
Fourth, the almost 6,000 observations of the dependent variable produced by firms in 
the primary sample show a good deal of variance, ranging from 0 attributions to 50 
attributions in a single letter.  Enhancement and Blame account for over 4,500 
observations, or 77% of the primary sample.  Both Enhancement and Blame range from 
their lower to their upper bounds (0 to 1 with averages of 59.5% and 17.5%, respectively.   
Fifth, dependent and independent variables show significant correlations along 
relationships of interest.  In addition, strong correlations between independent variables 
necessitate models that analyze these independent variables separately.   
Sixth, the above descriptive analysis appears to provide support for each of this 
dissertation's hypotheses.  Correlation analysis produced support for Hypothesis 5, that as 
firm performance improves relative to aspirations, firms use more enhancement.  
Correlation analysis also produced support for Hypothesis 6, that as firm performance 
decreases in relation to aspiration, firms use more blame.  Both correlation analysis and t-
tests of group means produced support for Hypothesis 1, that firms that achieve an 
aspiration use more enhancement than firms that don't.  Correlation analysis and t-tests of 
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group means also produced support for Hypothesis 2, that firms that don't achieve an 
aspiration use more blame than firms that do.  Finally, analysis of the means of firms that 
achieved multiple aspirations produced support for hypothesis 3, that the more 
performance aspirations a firm achieves the more enhancement it uses to explain 
performance.  The analysis of means also produced support for Hypothesis 4, that the 
fewer performance aspirations a firm achieves, the more blame it uses to explain 
performance.   
 
Between-firm Analysis with Pooled Data 
Between-firm analysis uses pooled cross-sectional data to establish differences 
between firms.  It can provide a wealth of descriptive data to better understand the 
nuances of correlations between study variables.  In contrast with the descriptive statistics 
presented above, between-firm analysis can simultaneously analyze the influence of 
multiple independent variables.  Furthermore, it allows this analysis to estimate the 
magnitude of the relationship between variables.   
However, it is important to note that between-firm analysis does not identify how 
achievement of aspiration influences the behavior of individual firms.  It also does not 
control for endogeneity in unobserved firm characteristics (such as the effect of "good 
firms" on both achievement of performance aspirations and on attribution).  As such, 
between-firm analysis cannot establish a causal effect of aspiration on attribution.   
As mentioned in section 4, this dissertation's between-firm analysis uses the 
following equation.   
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(equation 2) Attributionit = α + β1 (Met) it + β2 (Difference) it + β3 (Met) it*(Difference) it  
+ β 4ijt (Controls) ijt +  β5jt (Year) t +  ε it 
 
As discussed in Chapter IV, terms in this equation have the following meanings:   
 "Met" represents whether a firm achieved aspirations.  
 "Difference" represents the difference between actual and aspired 
performance. 
 "Controls" represent focal firm characteristics of firm size, firm age, CEO 
tenure, acquisitions, and industry dummies that are used as control variables.  
Each firm characteristic has a distinct coefficient, identified by β5j, with a 
different "j" for each control variable.   
 "Year" represents a fixed effect (dummy variable) that captures the difference 
in firm's use of attribution in different years.   
This dissertation runs equation 2 separately on six sets of variables, each of which 
tests one of the three measures of performance (profitability, EPS Change, and Revenue 
Change) and one of the two types of aspiration (historical and social) along both 
assessment models (dichotomous and continuous).  This creates a total of 12 performance 
assessments (3 measures x 2 aspirations x 2 assessments).   
Model 1 contains only control variables.  Models 2 - 7 each test one measure of 
performance.  Model 2 tests historical aspirations related to profitability.  Model 3 tests 
social aspirations related to profitability.  Model 4 tests historical aspirations related to 
EPS Change.  Model 5 tests social aspirations related to EPS Change.  Model 6 tests 
historical aspirations relative to Revenue Change.  Model 7 tests social aspirations 
relative to Revenue Change.  Each of these six models contains a dichotomous measure, a 
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continuous measure, and an interaction term.  If the coefficient on the dichotomous 
measure is significant, then firms that achieve aspired performance measures use 
enhancement or blame differently than firms that don't achieve aspired performance 
measures.  If the coefficient on the continuous measure is significant, then the difference 
between a firm's actual and aspired performance is related to its use of enhancement and 
blame.  If the interaction term is significant, then a different relationship exists above and 
below aspiration.   
This dissertation also conducts regressions that include multiple measures of 
performance.  Models with multiple measures of performance allow this dissertation to 
investigate the use of attribution by firms that achieve multiple aspirations.  Model 8 
combines all six dichotomous measures of performance in a single equation.  It tests the 
cumulative effect of achieving multiple aspirations.  Model 9 combines all six continuous 
measures of performance in a single equation.  It tests the cumulative effect of multiple 
differences between actual and aspired performance.  Model 10 combines all of the 
variables in other models into a single estimate of firms' use of enhancement.  It serves as 
a robustness check to assure that results in model 8 are not the result of omission of 
potentially relevant variables.   
The following analysis applies these models to this dissertation's primary sample.  As 
discussed above, the primary sample eliminates letters to shareholders with fewer than 5 
attributions to smooth distribution of the dependent variable.  The primary sample also 
eliminates the most extreme values of the independent variable, eliminating 
approximately the top 2% of values and the bottom 2% of values.   
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Analysis of Enhancement 
Table 37 shows the results of regression analysis of models 1-9.  Table 37 omits the 
16 industry controls.  The text following Table 37 discusses results for industry dummies.   
 
Table 37: Between-Firm Tobit of Enhancing Attributions - Primary Sample 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model Controls Historical Social Historical Social Historical Social Combined Combined Combined
Profitability Profitability EPS EPS Revenue Revenue Dichotomous Continuous All
B1 - HD Profitability 0.196*** 0.142*** 0.122***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.029)
B2 - HC Profitability 1.120*** 1.114*** 0.331
(0.312) (0.421) (0.401)
B3 - HD*HC Profitability -0.797** -0.706 -0.265
(0.368) (0.506) (0.470)
B1 - SD Profitability 0.048 0.079*** 0.029
(0.031) (0.021) (0.027)
B2 - SC Profitability 0.819*** -0.177 0.099
(0.261) (0.291) (0.285)
B3 - SD*SC Profitability -0.110 0.758* 0.332
(0.355) (0.413) (0.379)
B1 - HD EPS Change 0.213*** 0.097*** 0.124***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.026)
B2 - HC EPS Change 0.003 0.000 -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
B3 - HD*HC EPS Change -0.012 0.000 -0.003
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
B1 - SD EPS Change 0.178*** 0.050* 0.045
(0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
B2 - SC EPS Change 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.014
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
B3 - SD*SC EPS Change -0.0584*** -0.043** -0.019
(0.013) (0.020) (0.018)
B1 - HD Revenue Change 0.120*** 0.043* 0.070**
(0.032) (0.022) (0.028)
B2 - HC Revenue Change 0.016 0.054 -0.058
(0.115) (0.102) (0.103)
B3 - HD*HC Revenue Change -0.054 -0.215 -0.267*
(0.163) (0.176) (0.161)
B1 - SD Revenue Change 0.042 0.070*** 0.028
(0.034) (0.023) (0.030)
B2 - SC Revenue Change 0.833*** 0.726*** 0.429*
(0.244) (0.201) (0.224)
B3 - SD* SC Revenue Change -0.609** -0.428* -0.167
(0.264) (0.249) (0.247)
B4.1 - CEO -0.004** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.004** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
B4.2 - Acquisition 0.067*** 0.079*** 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.035 0.051*** 0.053** 0.040**
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
B4.3 - Size 0.000 0.000 -7.00e-07* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.367*** -0.090 -0.089
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.128) (0.127) (0.117)
B4.4 - Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.224 0.055 0.074
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.151) (0.153) (0.141)
B4.5 - Year -0.059** -0.013 -0.064*** -0.022 -0.054*** -0.020 -0.059*** -0.532*** -0.199 -0.221*
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.142) (0.144) (0.132)
Constant 0.648*** 0.533*** 0.648*** 0.906*** 0.636*** 0.544*** 0.638*** 0.727*** 0.704*** 0.504***
(0.137) (0.121) (0.131) (0.132) (0.123) (0.137) (0.135) (0.124) (0.122) (0.118)
Observations 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562
Pseudo-R
2
0.182 0.597 0.335 0.434 0.551 0.253 0.328 0.767 0.568 0.867
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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Individual Measures of Dichotomous Assessment of Performance 
Models 2-7 examine the relationships between individual performance measures and 
firms' use of enhancement.  Each of the three coefficients in each of these models 
represents a different part of the relationship between performance relative to aspiration 
and firms' use of attributions.  In Table 37, Coefficient β1 tests the "high jumper" model 
of performance assessment and indicates whether firms that achieve their aspirations use 
enhancement differently than firms that don't achieve their aspirations.  β1 is positive and 
significant in four of the six models: HD Profitability, HD EPS Change, HC EPS Change, 
and HD Revenue Change.  In each of these four models, β1 is significant at the .01 level.  
These results provide partial support for Hypothesis 1, that firms that achieve a 
performance aspiration use more enhancement.   
The magnitude of the coefficient for β1 in each model indicates the extent to which 
firms that achieve an aspiration use more enhancement than firms that don't achieve that 
aspiration. For example, in model 2, β1 equals .196, indicating that firms that achieve 
aspirations related to historical profitability use 19.6% more enhancement than firms that 
fail to achieve this aspiration.  Comparing coefficient β1 among models provides insight 
on the relative difference in the use of attribution by firms that achieve different 
performance aspirations.  These β1 coefficients show that firms that achieve HD-EPS 
Change produce letters with the most enhancement (β1 = 0.213); firms that achieve HD-
Profitability produce letters with the second most enhancement (β1 = 0.196); firms that 
achieve SD-EPS Change produce letters with the third most Enhancement (β1 = 0.178); 
firms that achieve HD-Revenue Change produce letters with the fourth most 
enhancement (β1 = .120). 
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These results partially support Hypothesis 1, that firms that achieve their aspired 
performance levels use more enhancement.  It is notable that all three historical 
aspirations were significant and only one social aspiration was significant for this "high 
jumper" like dichotomous assessment of performance.   
 
Aspiration's Continuous Relationship with Attribution  
This dissertation also measures the difference between actual and aspired 
performance in order to test the "golfer" model of performance assessment. A firm with a 
large positive difference between actual and aspired performance vastly surpassed its 
expectations.  In contrast, a firm with a small positive difference between actual and 
aspired performance just barely surpassed its expectations.  Similarly, a firm with a small 
negative difference between actual and aspired performance fell just short of its 
expectations.  And, a firm with a large negative difference between actual and aspired 
performance fell far short of its expectations.   
Coefficient β2 indicates whether the difference between actual and aspired 
performance correlates with firms' use of enhancement.  β2 is positive and significant in 
four models: HC-Profitability, SC-Profitability, SC-EPS Change, and SC Revenue 
Change.  β2 is significant at the .01 level in each of these models.  In these models, firms 
with higher actual performance in relation to their aspired performance used more 
enhancement.  These results provide partial support of Hypothesis 2, that firms that fail to 
achieve a performance aspiration use less enhancement.   
Coefficient β2 can be compared across models, but only when the variables to which 
β2 relates operate on the same scale.  Regressions run on the same financial metric have 
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the same scale.  Regressions run on different financial metrics have different scales.  For 
example, HC Profitability (β2 = 1.12) can be compared with SC Profitability but it cannot 
be compared to SC EPS Change or to SC Revenue Change.  To compare across financial 
metrics, this dissertation standardizes each metric by calculating the influence of one 
standard deviation in change in firm performance on a firm's use of enhancement.  Table 
38 presents this standardization.   
  
Table 38: Standardization of β2 Coefficients for Enhancement, P<. 05  
    
Model 
2 HC-
Profit 
Model 
3 SC-
Profit 
Model 
4 HC-
EPS 
Change 
Model 
5 SC-
EPS 
Change 
Model 
6 HC-
Rev. 
Increase 
Model 
7 SC-
Rev. 
Increase 
β2 
Upper Bound 1.73 1.33 0.03 0.07 0.49 1.06 
Average 1.12 0.819 0.003 0.055 0.016 0.833 
Lower Bound 0.51 0.31 -0.02 0.04 -0.46 0.61 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
0.08 0.08 2.22 2.22 0.17 0.17 
Effect 
Size 
Upper Bound 14% 11% 6% 15% 8% 18% 
Average 9% 7% 1% 12% 0% 14% 
Lower Bound 4% 2% -5% 10% -8% 10% 
 
 
Table 38 shows that SC Revenue Change has the largest correlation with firm's use of 
enhancement.  For example, if firm A's Revenue Change fell just short of its social 
aspirations and firm B's Revenue Change fell 0.17 (1 standard deviation) short of its 
social aspirations, firm A's performance explanations would be expected to contain 14% 
more Enhancement than firm B's.  Similarly, if firm C's profitability fell just short of 
social aspirations and firm D's profitability fell 0.08 (1 standard deviation) short of social 
aspirations, firm C would be expected to use 7% more Enhancement than firm D.  These 
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findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 5b, that the further a firm's performance is 
below aspiration, the lesser its use of enhancement to explain performance.  These results 
do not, however, relate to Hypothesis 5a.  To determine whether these results support 
Hypothesis 5a, this dissertation next analyzes coefficient β3. 
 
Rate of Change in Enhancement Above and Below the Aspired Performance Level 
The coefficient on the interaction term, β3, indicates whether the rate of change is the 
same above and below the aspired performance level.  Below aspired performance the 
rate of change is equal to coefficient β2.  If β3 is insignificant, than the rate of change 
above aspired performance is also β2.  If β3 is significant, then above aspired 
performance, the rate of change equals β2 + β3.  In other words, it indicates whether the 
rate of change in enhancement relative to the difference between actual and aspired 
performance changes at the aspired performance level.  Figure 15 below illustrates these 
different rates of change.  Figure 15A on the left depicts a constant rate of change, which 
occurs when β3 is insignificant.  In this case, β2 is the slope both above and below aspired 
performance.  Figure 15B on the right depicts a change in the rate of change, which 
occurs when β2 is significant.  In this case, β2 is the rate of change below aspired 
performance and β2 plus β3 is the rate of change above aspired performance.   
The difference between actual and aspired performance (β2) is significant in four 
models:  models 2, 3, 5, 7.  The interaction term (β3) is significant in three of these 
models:  models 2, 5, & 7).  Furthermore, in each of these three models, the interaction  
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Figure 15: Difference Between Actual and Aspired Performance on Enhancement 
15A: β3 is insignificant   15B: β3 is significant 
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term (β3) is negative, indicating that the rate of change is smaller above aspiration than it 
is below aspiration.  In other words, in these regressions the line on the right hand side of 
the graph in Figure 15B is flatter than the line on the left hand side of the same graph.  
Table 39 calculates the slope of these lines that appear on the right hand side of the graph 
in Figure 15B.   
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Table 39: Continuous Performance Assessment & Enhancement, P< .05 
    
Model 
2 HC-
Profit 
Model 
3 SC-
Profit 
Model 
4 HC-
EPS 
Change 
Model 
5 SC-
EPS 
Change 
Model 
6 HC - 
EPS 
Change 
Model 
7 SC-
Rev. 
Increase 
β2 
Upper Bound 0.93 1.22 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.70 
Average 0.32 0.71 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.22 
Lower Bound -0.29 0.20 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.25 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
0.08 0.08 2.22 2.22 0.017 0.17 
Effect 
Size 
Upper Bound 7.5% 9.8% -2.0% 4.5% -0.1% 11.9% 
Average 2.6% 5.7% -2.0% -0.8% -0.1% 3.8% 
Lower Bound -2.3% 1.6% -2.0% -6.0% -0.1% -4.3% 
 
 
 
This analysis demonstrates that the difference between actual and aspired 
performance has a different relationship with enhancement when performance falls below 
aspiration than when it rises above aspiration.  The results for coefficient β2 in Table 38 
show average slopes ranging from 7% to 14%, while the results for the sum of 
coefficients β2 & β3 in Table 39 show average slopes ranging from -2% to 6%.  These 
findings provide partial support for hypotheses 5a and 5b.  However, they provide much 
stronger support for hypothesis 5b.  Below aspiration a strong relationship exists between 
enhancement and the difference between actual and aspired performance.  Above 
aspiration a weaker relationship exists between enhancement and the difference between 
actual and aspired performance.   
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Combined Models 
As mentioned above, models 8, 9 and 10 combine multiple measures of performance 
in a single regression analysis.  These models analyze the relationship between 
achievement of multiple performance aspirations and firms' use of enhancement.   
Model 8 analyzes dichotomous assessment of all six performance measures.  In 
model 8, if coefficients on individual performance measures are significant, then firms 
that achieve multiple performance aspirations use more enhancement than firms that 
achieve only one aspired performance level.  Model 8 reveals that all six measures of 
performance are significant when combined, indicating that each performance aspiration 
correlates with a cumulative increase in firms' use of enhancement.  As expected, due to 
collinearity each β1 coefficient in model 8 is smaller than the β1 coefficient for the same 
performance measure in models 2-7.  Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of the multiple 
measures can be seen in the Pseudo-R
2
 of 0.77, which is higher than the Pseudo-R
2
 in any 
of the models 2-7.   
It is notable that β1 in model 7, SD Revenue Change, was insignificant when analyzed 
as a single performance measure in model 7, but becomes significant in model 8.  This 
change in significance is not due to the combination of multiple dichotomous assessments 
of different measures of performance in model 8.  Rather it is due to the elimination of β2, 
the continuous assessment of performance that was present in model 7.  In the absence of 
β2 SC Revenue Change, β1 SD Revenue Change is significant.   Analysis of model 8 
provides partial support for hypothesis 3, that the more aspirations a firm achieves the 
more enhancement it uses.   
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Model 9 analyzes the continuous assessment of all six performance measures.  It 
assesses whether the effect of these continuous performance measures is also cumulative.  
In model 9, if coefficients on individual performance measures are significant, then firms 
that perform far below aspirations on numerous measures of performance use less 
enhancement than firms that perform far below aspiration on only one measure of 
performance.  In model 9, three performance measures demonstrate statistical 
significance:  HC Profitability, SC EPS Change, and SC Revenue Change.  All three 
measures are significant at the 1% level.  It is notable that coefficients β2 in model 9 are 
close to the same size as the coefficients for the same measurement in models 2-7: these 
coefficients did not shrink as they did in model 8.  Furthermore, the sizable Pseudo-R
2
 
value of .568 suggests the cumulative explanatory power of multiple continuous 
performance assessments.  Comparing the Pseudo-R
2
 values in model 8 (Pseudo-R
2
 =. 
767) and model 9 (Pseudo-R
2
 =. 568) reveals that model 8 explains a greater percentage 
of variation in Enhancement than model 9.   
Model 10 provides a robustness check for models 8 and 9.  Model 10 combines all 
variables in models 1-9.  It tests the cumulative effect of combining dichotomous and 
continuous models of performance assessment for all six performance measures.  
Variables that demonstrate significance in model 10 can be understood to have a 
correlation with firms' use of enhancement.  No correlations in model 10 result from 
misspecification caused by the absence of other study variables, as was the case with β1 -
SD Revenue Change in model 8.  Three variables related to dichotomous performance 
assessment demonstrate significance in model 10: β1 - HD Profitability, β1 - HD EPS 
Change, and, β1 - HD Revenue Change.  Only one variable related to continuous 
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performance assessment demonstrates significance in model 10: β2 - SC Revenue 
Change.  This analysis of model 10 confirms support for hypothesis 3 relative to 
dichotomous performance assessment, but fails to confirm support for hypothesis 3 
relative to continuous performance assessment.   
 
Control Variables 
Numerous control variables also demonstrated significance in some models.  First, 
the variables New CEO was coded “1” if the firm has a CEO with less than 24 months at 
the CEO position and “0” if the CEO had 2 years or more as the CEO.  New CEO is 
significant and negative in all models, indicating that firms with new CEOs produce 
letters with more enhancement than firms with longer tenured CEOs.  Second, as 
expected, in most models firms that make acquisitions produced letters with more 
enhancement in the year of the acquisition than firms that did not make an acquisition in 
that year.  This increased use of enhancement could represent a way that firms express 
support for their acquisitions.  Third, in six models the dummy variable for year is 
negative and significant, indicating that firms used less enhancement in 2005 than in 
2004.  As most sample firms achieved superior performance in 2004 than in 2005, this 
year-effect is not surprising.  Fourth, in two models size was significant and negative, 
indicating that larger firms use less enhancement than smaller firms.  Finally, none of the 
industry controls showed a consistent and significant effect on firms' use of attribution.   
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Summary of Between-firm Analysis of Enhancing Attributions in Primary Sample 
In sum, this between-firm analysis of enhancing attributions in the primary sample 
finds partial support for Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5.  For Hypothesis 1, it finds partial support 
for dichotomous, 'high jumper' performance assessment with significance in four of the 
six β1 coefficients in Models 2-7.  For Hypothesis 3, it finds full support for multiple 
dichotomous, 'high jumper' like performance assessment with significance in six of the 
six β1 coefficients in Model 8.  Finally, for Hypothesis 5a and 5b, it also finds partial 
support for continuous 'golfer' like performance assessments when firms perform above 
or below aspirations with significance in four of the six β1 coefficients in Models 2-7.  
However, it finds much smaller magnitudes of effect above aspired performance 
(Hypothesis 5a) than below aspired performance (Hypothesis 5b).   
 
Robustness Test 
For robustness, this analysis tests these same ten models on all 903 firms that use 
attribution in their letters to shareholders in 2004 or 2005.  This larger dataset includes 
many letters that contain from one to four attributions.  As described above, letters with 
fewer attributions present less continuous (more "chunky") measures of enhancement.  
As a result, the Pseudo-R
2
 values in the robustness test should be lower than the Pseudo-
R
2
 values in the initial analysis.  In addition, as this larger sample contains extreme 
values of the firm performance, the independent variable, the coefficients in this 
robustness check could be higher than those in the initial analysis.  Table 40 presents the 
results of this robustness check.   
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Table 40: Between-Firm Tobit of Enhancing Attributions - Full Sample 
 
 
 
 
The robustness test in Table 40 provides further insight on initial analysis in Table 37.  
First, this robustness check affirms the relationship between dichotomous performance 
assessment (high jumper performance assessment) and enhancement.   β1 is positive and 
significant in five models (2, 4, 5, 6, and 7).  This confirms the initial finding that firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model Controls Historical Social Historical Social Historical Social Combined Combined Combined
Profitability Profitability EPS EPS Revenue Revenue Dichotomous Continuous All
B1 - HD Profitability 0.325*** 0.188*** 0.194***
(0.026) (0.033) (0.033)
B2 - HC Profitability -0.158 -0.096 -0.319**
(0.099) (0.147) (0.142)
B3 - HD*HC Profitability 0.164* 0.091 0.323**
-0.099 -0.155 -0.149
B1 - SD Profitability 0.049 0.024 -0.002
(0.032) (0.025) (0.028)
B2 - SC Profitability -0.046* -0.038 0.011
(0.026) (0.039) (0.035)
B3 - SD*SC Profitability 0.726*** 0.690*** 0.351*
(0.216) (0.207) (0.198)
B1 - HD EPS Change 0.241*** 0.094*** 0.119***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
B2 - HC EPS Change 0.000 -0.002 -0.008**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
B3 - HD*HC EPS Change -0.003 0.007 0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
B1 - SD EPS Change 0.251*** 0.079** 0.063**
(0.025) (0.032) (0.031)
B2 - SC EPS Change 0.022*** 0.035*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
B3 - SD*SC EPS Change -0.024*** -0.040*** -0.022**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
B1 - HD Revenue Change 0.131*** 0.024 0.0446*
(0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
B2 - HC Revenue Change -0.060** 0.012 -0.026
(0.026) (0.034) (0.031)
B3 - HD*HC Revenue Change 0.076** -0.048 -0.013
(0.032) (0.092) (0.083)
B1 - SD Revenue Change 0.179*** 0.115*** 0.105***
(0.035) (0.027) (0.032)
B2 - SC Revenue Change 0.098 0.843*** 0.130
(0.235) (0.214) (0.240)
B3 - SD* SC Revenue Change -0.077 -0.773*** -0.096
(0.235) (0.233) (0.249)
B4.1 - CEO -0.003* -0.003* -0.004** -0.003* -0.004** -0.003* -0.004** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
B4.2 - Acquisition 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.077*** 0.045* 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.065***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023)
B4.3 - Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.138 -0.178 -0.118
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.123) (0.158) (0.143)
B4.4 - Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.024 -0.072 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.145) (0.179) (0.161)
B4.5 - Year -0.054** -0.007 -0.054** -0.019 -0.049** -0.016 -0.052** -0.222 -0.209 -0.180
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.141) (0.175) (0.157)
Constant 0.761*** 0.538*** 0.755*** 0.686*** 0.697*** 0.689*** 0.662*** 0.492*** 0.819*** 0.456***
(0.130) (0.118) (0.157) (0.152) (0.119) (0.128) (0.129) (0.116) (0.151) (0.141)
Observations 903 903 903 902 903 903 903 903 902 902
Pseudo-R
2
0.046 0.185 0.072 0.121 0.165 0.068 0.090 0.224 0.120 0.264
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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that achieve performance aspirations use more enhancement than firms that fail to 
achieve them.  Only in model 2, SD Profitability, did firms that achieve aspirations not 
use significantly more enhancement than firms that did not achieve aspirations.  
Additional statistical analysis indicates that this loss of significance in model 2 results 
from the "chunky" measure of enhancement in letters with fewer than five attributions.  
Furthermore in the five models in which β1 was significant, the magnitude of coefficient 
β1 increased in each model.  Additional statistical analysis indicates that these increased 
coefficients result from the inclusion of extreme values of performance.  Despite these 
differences with the initial analysis of these models, this robustness check confirms 
partial support for Hypothesis 1, that firms that achieve performance aspirations use more 
enhancement than firms that don't achieve aspirations.   
Second, this robustness test reveals sensitivity in the relationship between continuous 
performance assessment (golfer performance assessment) and enhancement.  Coefficient 
β2 represents this relationship between the difference between actual and aspired 
performance and firm's use of enhancement.  In the initial analysis in Table 37, β2 was 
positive and significant in four models: models 2, 3, 5, and 7.  In this robustness check in 
Table 40, β2 is only positive and significant in one model: model 5 the assessment of SC-
EPS Change.  β2 is significant but negative in models 3 & 6:  tests of SC-Profitability and 
HC-Revenue Change, respectively.  Additional statistical analysis indicates that these 
changes in valence and the significance of coefficients β2 result from the extreme values 
included in the robustness check.  Change in valence between Tables 37 and 40 can be 
understood as sensitivity to extreme performance values: the result of a small number of 
observations, not as the result of a fundamental characteristic of the data.  Consequently, 
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this robustness check reveals that support for Hypothesis 5, the relationship between 
enhancement and the difference between actual and aspired performance, is sensitive to 
the data used to test it.   
Third, the robustness test in Table 40 confirms that firms that achieve many 
aspirations use more enhancement than firms that achieve fewer aspirations.  Model 8 
tests the combination of all six dichotomous assessments of performance (coefficients 
β1).  In model 8, four β1 coefficients demonstrate significance: only β1 SD Profitability 
and β1 HD Revenue Change do not.  In the initial analysis, all six β1 coefficients were 
significant.  Additional analysis shows that this reduction in the number of significant 
coefficients in model 8 results from the "chunky" measurement of attribution in letters 
with fewer than five attributions.  The results in model 8 confirm support for Hypothesis 
3, that firms that achieve more aspirations use more enhancement than firms that achieve 
fewer aspirations.  However, these results also reveal that this relationship may not hold 
in letters to shareholders with fewer attributions.   
Fourth, model 9 in Table 40 provides further support for the robustness test in Table 
40 and confirms the cumulative effect of the difference between actual and aspired 
performance on multiple performance measures.  Model 9 tests the combination of all six 
continuous assessments of performance (coefficients β2).  In model 9, two β2 coefficients 
are positive and significant: SC EPS Change and SC Revenue Change.  Both are 
significant at the 1% level.  In the initial analysis, three β2 coefficients were positive and 
significant at the 1% level.  Additional analysis shows that this reduction in the number 
of significant coefficients in model 9 results from the "chunky" measurement of 
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attribution in letters with fewer than five attributions.  The results in model 9 confirm 
support for Hypothesis 3.   
Fifth, Model 10 tests the combination of all independent variables in this dissertation.  
In model 10 in Table 40, five of the six measures of β1 are significant: only β1 - SD 
Profitability does not demonstrate a positive cumulative relationship with firms' use of 
attribution.  In the initial analysis of model 10 in Table 37, only four of the six measures 
of β1 were significant.  These results provide support for the cumulative nature of 
increases in enhancement with achievement of multiple performance aspirations.  In 
model 10, three of the six measures of β2 are significant: β2 - HC Profitability, β2 - HC 
EPS Change, and β2 - SC EPS Change.  In the initial analysis, only one β2 coefficient is 
significant.  These results confirm that multiple differences between actual and aspired 
performance has a cumulative effect on the relationship with enhancement. These results 
in model 10 confirm support for hypothesis 3, that firms that achieve more aspirations 
use more enhancement than firms that achieve fewer aspirations.   
Finally, this robustness check reveals that the relative magnitude of coefficients is 
sensitive to the changes in the data used to test each model.  Different models produce the 
largest coefficients for β1 in the initial analysis and in the robustness check.  In the 
robustness check, HD Profitability produced the largest coefficient (β1  = .325) and SD 
EPS produced the second largest coefficient (β1  = .251).  In contrast, in the initial 
analysis, HD EPS produced the largest coefficient (β1  = .225) and HD Profitability 
produced the second largest coefficient (β1 = .203).  These results indicate that the 
relative size of coefficients for β1 is sensitive to the data included in the analysis.   
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In sum, the robustness check on the full sample finds that firms that achieve 
aspirations use more enhancement than firms that fail to achieve them, confirming 
support for Hypothesis 1.  It also finds that firms that achieve multiple aspirations use 
more enhancement than firms that achieve fewer aspirations, confirming support for 
Hypothesis 3.  However, this robustness check does not support a relationship between 
firms' use of enhancement and the difference between actual and aspired performance.  
Thus, it fails to confirm support for Hypothesis 5a or 5b.  This robustness check also 
reveals that the magnitude of coefficients in all models is sensitive to the data used to test 
them.  Consequently, this dissertation does make any claims about the size of changes in 
enhancement relative to achievement of a specific performance aspiration.   
 
Analysis of Blame 
As in the analysis of enhancement above, the following analysis of blame first 
analyzes the primary sample: letters to shareholders that contain 5 or more attributions 
and firms with no extreme performance measures.  A subsequent analysis of the full 
sample provides a robustness check.  Table 41 presents the results of analysis of the same 
ten models shown above in Tables 37 and 40.   
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Table 41: Between-Firm Tobit of Blaming Attributions - Primary Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
As in the analysis of enhancement above, tests of equation 2 in models 2-7 assesses 
the influence of individual performance aspirations.  In Table 41, coefficient β1 reveals 
whether firms that achieve a performance aspiration use blame differently than firms that 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model Controls Historical Social Historical Social Historical Social Combined Combined Combined
Profitability Profitability EPS EPS Revenue Revenue Dichotomous Continuous All
B1 - HD Profitability -0.203*** -0.143*** -0.127***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.032)
B2 - HC Profitability -0.751** -0.836* -0.249
(0.331) (0.449) (0.422)
B3 - HD*HC Profitability -0.203 -0.297 -0.184
-0.441 -0.615 -0.543
B1 - SD Profitability -0.123*** -0.134*** -0.092***
(0.035) (0.024) (0.031)
B2 - SC Profitability -0.549*** 0.250 0.225
(0.205) (0.330) (0.316)
B3 - SD*SC Profitability -0.021* -1.322*** -0.831*
(0.007) (0.485) (0.438)
B1 - HD EPS Change -0.225*** -0.104*** -0.121***
(0.031) (0.026) (0.029)
B2 - HC EPS Change -0.001 0.003 0.009
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
B3 - HD*HC EPS Change 0.005 -0.006 -0.004
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
B1 - SD EPS Change -0.198*** -0.046 -0.039
(0.027) (0.031) (0.032)
B2 - SC EPS Change -0.041*** -0.034* -0.004
(0.013) (0.018) (0.017)
B3 - SD*SC EPS Change 0.039*** 0.033 0.009
(0.015) (0.022) (0.020)
B1 - HD Revenue Change -0.115*** -0.073*** -0.069**
(0.036) (0.025) (0.031)
B2 - HC Revenue Change -0.199 -0.260** -0.130
(0.125) (0.115) (0.114)
B3 - HD*HC Revenue Change 0.133 0.369* 0.384**
(0.187) (0.203) (0.185)
B1 - SD Revenue Change -0.037 -0.060** -0.016
(0.039) (0.026) (0.033)
B2 - SC Revenue Change -0.912*** -0.588*** -0.329
(0.269) (0.223) (0.245)
B3 - SD* SC Revenue Change 0.578* 0.220 0.031
(0.296) (0.284) (0.275)
B4.1 - CEO 0.003* 0.003* 0.006*** 0.004* 0.004** 0.004** 0.005** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
B4.2 - Acquisition -0.042 -0.0583** -0.032 -0.036 -0.0468** -0.0445* -0.004 -0.022 -0.033 -0.018
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022)
B4.3 - Size 0.000 0.000 1.01e-06** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238* 0.154 0.146
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.133) (0.121)
B4.4 - Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.021 0.014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.161) (0.163) (0.149)
B4.5 - Year 0.052** -0.003 0.064** 0.014 0.046* -0.003 0.052** 0.222 0.062 0.092
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.151) (0.151) (0.138)
Constant 0.106 0.229* 0.141 0.041 0.131 0.214 0.114 0.241* 0.070 0.287**
(0.147) (0.128) (0.139) (0.143) (0.131) (0.145) (0.143) (0.131) (0.128) (0.122)
Observations 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562
Pseudo-R
2
0.150 0.267 0.282 0.336 0.210 0.238 0.557 0.514 0.402 0.557
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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don't achieve that performance aspiration. β1 is negative and significant at the .01 level in 
five models that test a single performance measure (models 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6).  Coefficient 
β1 is not significant for SD Revenue Change.   
The coefficient for β1 in each of these five models indicates the extent to which firms 
that fail to achieve an aspiration use more blame than firms that don't achieve that 
aspiration.  The coefficients show that firms that fail to achieve HD EPS Change use the 
most blame (β1 = -.225); firms that fail to achieve HD Profitability use the second most 
blame (β1 = -.203); firms that fail to achieve HD EPS Change use the third most blame 
(β1 = -.198); firms that fail to achieve SD Profitability use the fourth most blame (β1 = -
.118); firms that fail to achieve HD Revenue Change use the fifth most blame (β1 = -
.115).   
These results provide partial support for Hypothesis 2, that firms that fail to 
achieve an aspiration use more blame than firms that achieve an aspiration.   
 
Aspiration's Continuous Relationship with Attribution 
 This dissertation also measures the difference between actual and aspired 
performance.  Coefficient β2 indicates whether this difference correlates with firms' use 
of blame.  β2 is negative and significant in four of the six models: model 7 - SC Revenue 
Change, model 5 - SC EPS Change, model 3 - SC Profitability, and model 2 - HC 
Profitability.  In these four models, firms with a larger negative difference between actual 
and aspired performance used more blame than firms with a smaller negative difference.  
Coefficient β2 is negative and insignificant in the other two models.   
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Coefficient β2 can be compared only when the variables to which it relates operate on 
the same scale.  Table 42 presents this standardization.   
 
Table 42: Standardization of β2 Coefficients for Blame, P< .05 
  
  
Model 
2 HC    
Profit 
Model 
  3 SC 
Profit 
Model 
4 HC-
EPS 
Change 
Model 
5 SC 
EPS 
Change 
Model 
6 HC - 
EPS 
Change 
Model 
7 SC 
Rev. 
Change 
β2 
Upper Bound -0.10 -0.15 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.38 
Average -0.75 -0.55 0.00 -0.04 -0.20 -0.91 
Lower Bound -1.40 -0.95 -0.01 -0.07 -0.44 -1.44 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
0.08 0.08 2.22 2.22 0.17 0.17 
Effect 
Size 
Upper Bound -1% -1% 3% -3% 1% -7% 
Average -6% -4% 0% -9% -3% -16% 
Lower Bound -11% -8% -3% -15% -8% -24% 
 
 
Table 42 shows that SC Revenue Change has the largest correlation with firms' use of 
blame.  For example, if firm A's revenue growth fell .17 (1 standard deviation) short of its 
social aspiration and firm B's revenue growth fell just short of its social aspiration, firm 
A's performance explanations would be expected to contain 16% more blame than firm 
B's.  In contrast, if firm C's profitability fell .09 short of its historical aspiration and firm 
D's profitability fell just short of its historical aspiration, firm C's performance 
explanations would be expected to contain 6% more blame than firm D's.   
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Rate of Change in Enhancement Above and Below the Aspired Performance Level 
The coefficient on the interaction term, β3, indicates whether the rate of change in 
blame relative to the difference between actual and aspired performance changes at the 
aspired performance level.  If β3 is insignificant, then the same rate of change applies 
both above and below aspiration.  If β3 is significant, then the rate of change changes at 
the aspired performance level:  the difference between actual and aspired performance 
has one relationship with blame above the aspired performance level and another 
relationship with blame below the aspired performance level.  Refer to Figure 15B for an 
illustration of this change in the rate of change.   
In Table 43, in three of the four models in which β2 is significant, β3 is also 
significant (models 5 & 7, SC EPS Change and SC Revenue Change).  Furthermore, in 
models 5 & 7, β3 is positive and close to the same size but in the opposite direction as β2.  
As a result, the rate of change in blame relative to the difference between actual and 
aspired performance is much smaller above aspiration than below aspiration.  Table 43 
calculates the slope of the lines above aspired performance.   
This analysis demonstrates that in Models 5 & 7 the difference between actual and 
aspired performance has a different relationship with blame when performance falls 
above aspiration than when it falls below aspiration.  For example, if firm A just achieves 
its aspirations for Revenue Change and firm B performs .17 above its aspirations for 
Revenue Change, firm A would be expected to use 6% more blame than firm B.  In 
contrast, if firm C misses its aspiration for Revenue Change by .17, and firm D just 
misses its aspiration for Revenue Change, firm C would be expected to use 16% more 
blame than firm D.    
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Table 43: Continuous Performance Assessment and Blame, P< .05 
  
  
Model 
2 HC 
Profit 
Model 
3 SC 
Profit 
Model 
4 HC-
EPS 
Change 
Model 
5 SC 
EPS 
Change 
Model 
6 HC - 
EPS 
Change 
Model 
7 SC 
Rev. 
Increase 
β2 
Upper Bound -0.10 -0.17 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.19 
Average -0.75 -0.57 0.004 -0.002 -0.07 -0.33 
Lower Bound -1.40 -0.97 -0.01 -0.03 -0.31 -0.86 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
0.08 0.08 2.22 2.22 0.17 0.17 
Effect 
Size 
Upper Bound -1% -1% 4% 5% 3% 3% 
Average -6% -5% 1% 0% -1% -6% 
Lower Bound -11% -8% -2% -6% -5% -15% 
 
 
 
Combined Models 
As described above, Models 8, 9, and 10 combine multiple measures of performance 
in a single regression analysis.  These models analyze the relationship between 
achievement of multiple performance aspirations and firms' use of blame.    
Model 8 analyzes dichotomous assessment of all six performance measures.  In 
model 8, significant coefficients indicate that firms that fail to achieve multiple 
performance aspirations use more blame than firms that fail to achieve a single 
performance aspiration. Model 8 reveals that five of the six measures of performance are 
significant in combination:  failing to achieve each of these five measures has a 
cumulative relationship with firms' use of blame.  As expected, due to collinearity of 
measures of performance, most β1 coefficients in model 8 are smaller than the 
corresponding β1 coefficients in models 2-7.  Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of the 
multiple measures can be seen in the Pseudo-R
2
 of 0.514, which is higher than the 
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Pseudo-R
2
 value in any of the five models 2-6 in which coefficient β1 is significant.    
These findings support hypothesis 4, that firms that fail to achieve more performance 
aspirations use more blame than firms that fail to achieve fewer performance aspirations.   
Model 9 analyzes continuous assessment of all six performance measures.  In model 
9, significant correlations reveal the cumulative effect of the difference between actual 
and aspired performance.  Model 9 reveals that four of the six β2 coefficients are 
significant, indicating that these four have a cumulative effect on the relationship with 
firms' use of blame.  Comparing the Pseudo-R
2
 values in model 8 (Pseudo-R
2
 =. 514) and 
model 9 (Pseudo-R
2
 =. 402) reveals that model 8 explains a greater percentage of 
variation in Blame than model 9.   
Finally, model 10 combines all variables in models 1-8.  It tests the cumulative effect 
of combining dichotomous and continuous models of performance assessment for all six 
performance measures.  Variables that demonstrate significance in model 10 can be 
understood to have a correlation with firms' use of blame: no correlations in model 10 
result from the absence of other study variables. Four of six β1 coefficients related to 
dichotomous assessment of performance are negative and significant in model 10: HD 
Profitability, SD Profitability, HD EPS Change, and HD Revenue Change.  These results 
provide further support for hypothesis 4, that firms that fail to achieve multiple 
aspirations use more blame than firms that fail to achieve fewer aspirations.   
 
Control Variables 
Numerous control variables demonstrated significance.  First, CEO tenure (B4.1 - 
CEO) is significant and positive (as expected) in all ten models, indicating that veteran 
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CEOs use more blame than new CEOs.  Prior studies have suggested that new CEO's use 
less blame because they use more self-criticism, attributing poor performance to the prior 
CEO.  Second, as expected, acquisition is negative in all models and significant in some 
models, indicating that firms that make acquisitions used less blame in the year of the 
acquisition than firms that did not make acquisitions.  This reduced use of blame could 
represent an expression of support for the firm's recent acquisition.  Third, firm size is 
positive in all models and significant in two models, suggesting that larger firms use 
more blame.  Fourth, year is positive and significant in four models, indicating that firms 
used more blame in 2005 than in 2004.  As the economic climate in 2005 was weaker 
than it was in 2004 and sample firms achieved fewer performance aspirations in 2005, 
this increased use of blame in 2005 is expected.   
 
Summary of Between-firm Analysis of Blaming Attributions in Primary Sample 
In sum, this between-firm analysis of blaming attributions in the primary sample finds 
partial support for Hypotheses 2, 4, and 6.  For Hypothesis 2, it finds partial support for 
dichotomous, 'high jumper' performance assessment with significance in five of the six β1 
coefficients in Models 2-7.  For Hypothesis 4, it finds partial support for multiple 
dichotomous, 'high jumper' like performance assessment with significance in five of the 
six β1 coefficients in Model 8.  Finally, for Hypothesis 6a and 6b, it also finds partial 
support for continuous 'golfer' like performance assessments when firms perform above 
aspiration with significance in four of the six β1 coefficients in Models 2-7.  However, it 
finds much smaller magnitudes of effect above aspired performance (Hypothesis 5a) than 
below aspired performance (Hypothesis 5b).   
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Robustness Test 
For robustness, this analysis tests these same 9 models on all 903 observations in the 
sample.  This larger sample contains many letters that contain 5 or fewer attributions, 
which is expected to reduce the Pseudo-R
2
 values.  This larger sample also contains firms 
with extreme values on performance measures, which is expected to increase the 
magnitude of coefficients (β1, β2, β3).  Table 44 presents the results of this robustness 
check.   
Many of the results in this robustness check confirm the initial analysis.  First, this 
robustness check affirms the relationship between dichotomous performance assessment 
(high jumper performance assessment) and blame.  In all six models from 2-7, β1 is 
negative and significant, indicating that firms that fail to achieve performance aspirations 
use more blame than firms that achieve them.  This confirms support for Hypothesis 1, 
that firms that achieve performance aspirations use less blame than firms that fail to 
achieve their performance aspirations.   
Second, this robustness check raises questions about the relationship between blame 
and the difference between actual and aspired performance.  Although β2 is significant in 
five of the six models in Table 44, four of the five significant coefficients are positive in 
the robustness check.  These positive coefficients indicate that firms that just miss their 
performance aspirations use more blame than firms that fall far short of their performance 
aspirations.  In the initial analysis, by contrast, all values of β1 were negative.  Additional 
statistical analysis reveals that the change in valence from negative to positive in these 
five models results from the extreme performance values included in the robustness   
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Table 44: Between-Firm Tobit of Blaming Attributions - Full Sample 
 
 
 
check.  Consequently, this change in valence can be understood to be the result of a small 
number of observations, not as the result of a fundamental characteristic of the data.  
However, this reversal of valence indicates that this relationship is sensitive to extreme 
values.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model Controls Historical Social Historical Social Historical Social Combined Combined Combined
Profitability Profitability EPS EPS Revenue Revenue Dichotomous Continuous All
B1 - HD Profitability -0.335*** -0.182*** -0.188***
(0.029) (0.035) (0.035)
B2 - HC Profitability 0.191* 0.035 0.351*
(0.115) (0.194) (0.197)
B3 - HD*HC Profitability -0.222* -0.041 -0.388*
-0.117 -0.204 -0.212
B1 - SD Profitability -0.095** -0.066** -0.045
(0.037) (0.027) (0.033)
B2 - SC Profitability 0.092** 0.078 -0.005
(0.040) (0.064) (0.061)
B3 - SD*SC Profitability -1.049*** -1.196*** -0.543*
(0.324) (0.296) (0.294)
B1 - HD EPS Change -0.246*** -0.079*** -0.109***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
B2 - HC EPS Change 0.007* 0.014** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
B3 - HD*HC EPS Change -0.013** -0.036*** -0.031***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
B1 - SD EPS Change -0.251*** -0.100*** -0.0790**
(0.025) (0.035) (0.035)
B2 - SC EPS Change -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.021***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
B3 - SD*SC EPS Change 0.024*** 0.032** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.011)
B1 - HD Revenue Change -0.200*** -0.078*** -0.130***
(0.033) (0.028) (0.031)
B2 - HC Revenue Change 0.159** 0.044 0.128**
(0.067) (0.049) (0.062)
B3 - HD*HC Revenue Change -0.213*** 0.098 0.084
(0.076) (0.130) (0.132)
B1 - SD Revenue Change -0.190*** -0.117*** -0.094***
(0.039) (0.029) (0.035)
B2 - SC Revenue Change -0.160 -0.928*** -0.116
(0.250) (0.234) (0.255)
B3 - SD* SC Revenue Change 0.081 0.702*** -0.080
(0.254) (0.270) (0.275)
B4.1 - CEO 0.003 0.003 0.004** 0.003 -0.004** 0.003 0.004* 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
B4.2 - Acquisition -0.050* -0.065** -0.050* -0.057** 0.083*** -0.047* -0.011 -0.033 -0.041 -0.029
(0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025)
B4.3 - Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.205 0.148
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.127) (0.167) (0.149)
B4.4 - Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.129 0.254 0.178
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) (0.188) (0.167)
B4.5 - Year 0.026 -0.024 0.030 -0.006 -0.049** -0.034 0.024 0.067 0.120 0.090
(0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.030) (0.028) (0.146) (0.185) (0.164)
Constant 0.068 0.313** 0.011 0.051 0.697*** 0.180 0.169 0.370*** -0.049 0.381**
(0.137) (0.124) (0.168) (0.165) (0.119) (0.133) (0.135) (0.120) (0.160) (0.148)
Observations 903 903 903 902 903 903 903 903 902 902
Pseudo-R
2
0.075 0.213 0.111 0.145 0.165 0.120 0.129 0.266 0.166 0.316
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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Third, this robustness check confirms that the difference between actual and aspired 
performance has a different relationship with blame above and below aspired 
performance.  In the robustness check, β3 is significant and negative in the same models 
in which β2 is significant and positive.  In other words, a graph of the relationship 
between blame and the difference between actual and aspired performance would have an 
inflection point at the aspired performance level.   
Fourth, this robustness check confirms that firms that fail to achieve many aspirations 
use more blame than firms that fail to achieve fewer aspirations.  Model 8 simultaneously 
analyzes the combination of all six dichotomous assessments of performance 
(coefficients β1).  In model 8, significant coefficients indicate that when a firm fails to 
achieve an additional performance aspiration, it uses more blame than it did when it 
achieved that aspiration.  Model 8 reveals that all six measures of performance are 
significant in combination:  failing to achieve each measure has a cumulative relationship 
with firms' use of blame.  As expected, due to collinearity of measures of performance, 
each β1 coefficient in model 8 is smaller than the corresponding β1 coefficient in models 
2-7.  Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of the multiple measures can be seen in the R
2
 of 
0.26, which is higher than the R
2
 value in any model from 2-7.  These results confirm 
support for hypothesis 4, that firms that fail to achieve many performance aspirations use 
more blame than firms that fail to achieve fewer performance aspirations.   
Fifth, model 9 analyzes the continuous assessment of all six performance measures.  
It assess whether the effect of these continuous measures is also cumulative.  In model 9, 
two performance measures (coefficients β2) are negative and significant.  HC EPS 
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Change is significant but positive.  Taken independently, this result suggests that as a 
firm’s EPS rises above further and further above aspiration that the firm uses more 
blame.  However, independent regressions of HC EPS on blame produced insignificant 
results.  Consequently, it is more likely that this significant and positive result in Model 9 
appears because HC EPS correlates with the error term in the regression of SC EPS 
Change and SC Revenue Change.    More importantly, Model 9 provides valuable 
contrast with model 8.  In comparison, model 8 has more coefficients that are negative 
and significant (six in model 8 vs. 2 in model 9) and model 8 explains a greater 
proportion of the variance in firms use of blame (Pseudo-R
2
 =.266 in model 8 vs. Pseudo-
R
2
 = .166 in model 9).  These results confirm support for Hypothesis 4, that firms that fail 
to achieve multiple aspirations use more blame than firms that fail to achieve fewer 
aspirations.   
Finally, model 10 combines all variables in models 1-8.  It tests the cumulative effect 
of combining dichotomous and continuous models of performance assessment for all six 
performance measures.  Variables that demonstrate significance in model 10 can be 
understood to have a correlation with firms' use of blame.  No correlations in model 10 
result from the absence of other variables. Five of six coefficients related to dichotomous 
assessment of performance are negative and significant in model 10: HD Profitability, 
HD EPS Change, SD EPS Change, HD Revenue Change, and SD Revenue Change.  Four 
of these five variables are significant at the .01 level; SD EPS Change is only significant 
at the .05 level.  These results provide further support for hypothesis 4, that firms that fail 
to achieve many aspirations use more blame than firms that fail to achieve fewer 
aspirations.   
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However, in other respects, this robustness check counters the findings of the original 
analysis.  Notably, the robustness test produced contrasting values of β1.  In the 
robustness check, HD Profitability produced the largest absolute value for β1 (β1 = -.335); 
SD EPS produced the second highest absolute value (β1, is = -.251), and HD EPS 
produced the third highest absolute value (β1 = -.246).  In contrast, in the initial analysis, 
HD EPS produced the highest absolute value (β1 = -.225); HD profitability produced the 
second highest absolute value (β1 =  
-.203); and SD EPS produces the third highest absolute value (β1 = -.198).  These results 
indicate that the relative magnitude of coefficient β1 is sensitive to the presence of 
extreme values of performance.   
In sum, this robustness check confirms that firms that fail to achieve aspirations use 
more blame than firms that achieve aspirations, providing support for Hypothesis 2.  It 
also confirms that firms that fail to achieve many aspirations use more blame than firms 
that fail to achieve fewer aspirations, providing support for Hypothesis 4.  Finally, this 
robustness check provides little insight on the relationship between firms' use of blame 
and the difference between actual and aspired performance: firms with a larger negative 
difference between actual and aspired performance may use more enhancement than 
firms with a smaller negative difference between actual and aspired performance, but this 
relationship is very sensitive to inclusion of extreme performance measures.   
 
Conclusions from Between-Firm Analysis 
The between-firm analysis presented above consistently demonstrates numerous 
significant relationships between firms' performance relative to aspiration and firms' 
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causal descriptions of performance.  First, this analysis shows a significant relationship 
between achievement of a single performance aspiration and causal descriptions of 
performance.  In support of Hypothesis 1, firms that achieve an aspiration use more 
enhancement than firms that don't achieve an aspiration. In support of Hypotheses 2, 
firms that fail to achieve an aspiration use more blame than firms that achieve an 
aspiration.  These relationships hold for enhancement in four of the six models that assess 
a single performance measure; they hold for blame in five of the six models that assess a 
single performance measure.  In other words, firms' use of enhancement and blame 
reflects whether or not firms achieve a performance aspiration.   
Second, between-firm analysis consistently demonstrates a significant relationship 
between achievement of multiple aspired performance levels and use of enhancement and 
blame.  In support of hypothesis 3, all six dichotomous assessments of performance 
showed a significant relationship with enhancement when tested simultaneously.  In other 
words, firms that achieved many aspirations used more enhancement than firms that 
achieved fewer aspirations.  In support of Hypothesis 4, five of six dichotomous 
assessments of performance showed a significant relationship with blame tested 
simultaneously.  In other words, firms that achieved many aspirations used less blame 
than firms that achieved fewer aspirations.  These results indicate that firms' use of 
enhancement and blame reflects the number of aspirations that they achieve.   
Third, the between-firm analysis presented above demonstrates a relationship 
between the difference between actual and aspired performance and causal descriptions 
of performance.  In support of hypothesis 5b, firms that perform just below aspiration 
generally use more enhancement than firms that perform far below aspiration.  Four of 
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six continuous measures of performance demonstrated significance.  In support of 
hypothesis 6b, firms that perform far below aspiration generally use more blame than 
firms that perform just below aspiration.  Three of six continuous measures of 
performance demonstrated significance.  This analysis supports similar relationships 
above aspired performance, but with a lower rate of change.  In support of hypothesis 5a, 
firms that perform far above aspiration generally use more enhancement than firms that 
perform just above aspiration.  However, this effect is partial and muted: it shows a 
smaller effect size than performance below aspiration.  In support of hypothesis 6a, firms 
that perform far above aspiration use less blame than firms that perform far above 
aspiration.  However, this effect is also partial and muted: it shows a smaller effect size 
than performance below aspiration.   
In conclusion the above between-firm analysis finds support for hypotheses 1 & 2, 
that achievement of a single performance aspiration is related to attribution, and for 
hypotheses 3 and 4, that achievement of multiple aspirations is related to attribution.  It 
also finds support for hypotheses 5b and 6b, that below aspired performance the 
difference between actual and aspired performance relates to firm's use of enhancement 
and blame.  However, it finds muted support for hypotheses 5a and 6a, that above aspired 
performance, the difference between aspired and actual performance influences firms' use 
of attribution.  The following section tests these same six hypotheses in a within-firm 
analysis.   
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Within-Firm Analysis with Longitudinal Data 
Within-firm analysis uses longitudinal data to measure changes within firms over 
time.  This dissertation conducts within-firm analysis for two reasons.  First, this 
dissertation postulates that a mechanism internal to the firm drives firm's use of 
attribution: firms do not measure the amount of enhancement and blame used by other 
firms or  modify their use of enhancement and blame in response.  Rather, firms assess 
their performance relative to aspiration and use attributions that reflect their assessment 
of their performance.  Second, within-firm analysis controls for endogeneity by 
mitigating for persistent "good" or "bad" firm effects.  Endogeneity is present if some 
firms may use attribution differently than other firms independent of performance relative 
to aspirations.  For example, some firms might consistently take responsibility for their 
performance while other firms consistently blame their performance on external 
influences.  These differences between firms could create noise in the estimation of the 
relationship between attribution and performance relative to aspiration.  Within-firm 
analysis eliminates these persistent differences between firms, creating a more reliable 
estimate of the influence of performance relative to aspiration on attribution.  This 
dissertation's within-firm analysis compares changes in attribution to changes in 
performance relative to aspired performance.  As discussed in Chapter III, this 
dissertation predicts that as firm performance improves relative to firm aspiration, firms 
use more enhancement.  Similarly, this dissertation predicts that as firm performance 
declines relative to firm aspiration, firms use more blame.   
The "good firm" effect is an example of this potential for unobserved endogeneity.  It 
is possible that better firms have higher performance, that better firms achieve their 
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aspired performance levels, and that better firms consistently use enhancing rather than 
blaming attributions.  The "good firm" effect could create a correlation between 
performance and attribution independent of causality.  Demonstrating that the "good 
firm" effect is not responsible for observed correlation between performance and 
attribution is necessary to demonstrate a causal relationship between performance and 
attribution.  Within-firm analysis effectively mitigates the "good firm" effect.   
The within-firm effect does not, however, mitigate all possible confounds.  Dynamic 
firm characteristics or dynamic characteristics of the firm's environment could also cause 
observed changes in firm attribution.  To control for observed dynamic variables, this 
analysis includes two control variables: change in CEO and change in acquisition.  
Bringing in a new CEO could cause firms to change their use of attribution.  New CEOs 
have the opportunity to blame their firm's performance on the firm's prior management 
team, potentially resulting in less use of enhancement and less use of blame.  
Acquisitions could also cause firms to change their attributions.  As demonstrated above, 
firms that make acquisitions use more enhancement than firms that don't.  Applying this 
finding across time, it is possible that firms that make acquisitions in one year but not in 
another will use more enhancement in years in which they make an acquisition(s) and 
more blame in years in which they don't make an acquisition(s).   
This dissertations within-firm analysis controls for time invariant firm characteristics 
(observed or unobserved) and for the two observed time varying firm characteristics of 
CEO change and change in acquisitions.  This model does not control, however, for 
unobserved time variant firm characteristics.  Nevertheless, it provides reasonable 
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assurance that any observed correlation between changes in firms' use of attribution and 
firm performance relative to aspiration result from a causal relationship.   
This dissertation calculates within-firm effects with a first-difference model rather 
than the more standard mean-differences model.  The first-difference model mitigates 
serial correlation, which could result from unobserved variables in the business 
environment from one year to the next.  In addition, first-differences analysis facilitates 
this dissertation's regression analysis by transforming the distribution of this dissertation's 
dependent variables to more closely resemble a normal distribution.  Figures 16 and 17 
illustrate this transformation of the distribution of dependent variables Enhancement and 
Blame.   
Figure 16A presents a histogram of pooled panel data for the dependent variable, 
Enhancement.  These data are defined over the range 0 to 1.  A bound distribution cannot 
be assumed to present a normal distribution.  Even more important to assumptions of 
normal distribution, the distribution of Enhancement in this dissertation has a mode of 1, 
the upper limit of the data range.  Any estimator that assumes a normal distribution will 
underestimate the error term for measurements near this upper limit and overestimate the 
significance of regression coefficients (Kennedy, 2003; Kieschnick & McCullough, 
2003).   
Figure 16B shows a histogram of the same variable, use of enhancement, but as 
annual change (i.e. Δ Enhancement = Enhancement2005 minus Enhancement2004).  Δ 
Enhancement is defined over the range -1 to 1.  It also cannot be assumed to be a normal 
distribution.  However, its mode is zero, and the majority of observations cluster around 
the mode.  Only a small proportion of observations fall close to the bounds of the range.  
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Consequently, for Δ Enhancement, regression can be conducted with a technique that 
assumes normal distribution, such as ordinary least squares.  As the distribution is bound, 
any estimator that assumes a normal distribution will still underestimate the error term 
and overestimate the significance of regression coefficients, but the overestimation will 
be minor.   
 
Figure 16: Histograms of Enhancement 
16A: Enhancement     16B: Δ Enhancement 
 
 
 
 
Figures 17A and 17B show the same graphs for Blame.  Figure 17A shows that 
Blame is defined over the range 0 to 1 with a mode of zero and most observations 
clustered around the extremes of the range.  Figure 17B shows that change in Blame (i.e. 
Δ Blame = Blame2005 minus Blame2004) is defined over the range -1 to 1.  Furthermore it 
shows that Δ Blame's mode is zero and that the majority of observations cluster around 
the mode.  Only a small proportion of observations fall close to the bounds of the range.  
Consequently, regression can be conducted with a technique that assumes normal 
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distribution with only minor overestimation of the significance of regression coefficients 
(Kennedy, 2003; Kieschnick & McCullough, 2003).    
 
Figure 17: Histograms of Blame 
17A: Blame     17B: Δ Blame 
 
 
 
The transformation of the dependent variable in first differences presented above 
requires a similar differencing of the regression equation.  Transforming equation 2, used 
above for the between-firm analysis, yields the equation presented below in equation 3.   
 
(equation 3)  Δ Attributionit = α + β1 (Δ Met) it + β2 (Δ Difference) it  
+ β3 (Δ Met) it (Δ Difference) it + β4 (Variable Firm) ijt + ε it 
 
Terms in this equation are defined as follows:   
 "i" represents individual firms  
 "t" represents individual years 
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 "j" represents individual variables in a class of variables 
 Δ Attribution = Attributiont - Attributiont-1.  Attribution represents the % 
of a specific type of attribution in a firm's letter to shareholders.  This 
dissertation runs separate regressions for two measures of Attribution: 
Enhancement and Blame.   
  Δ Met = Mett - Mett-1.  Met measures whether a firm achieves (1) or fails 
to achieve (0) aspired performance levels.   
 Δ Difference = Differencet - Differencet-1.  Difference measures the 
difference between a firm's actual performance and its aspired 
performance.   
 Variable Firm = observed, variable firm characteristics.  This dissertation 
analyzes two such observed, variable firm measures: change in CEO and 
change in Acquisitions.  Each firm characteristic has a distinct coefficient, 
identified by β4j, with a different "j" for each control variable.  Equation 3 
omits the firm characteristics age, size, and industry.  Although these three 
firm characteristics change over time, they change so slightly over the two 
year time frame of the study's sample that they are effectively fixed. 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Within-firm Analysis 
This dissertation uses within-firm analysis to test all six of its hypotheses.  Although 
within-firm analysis begins with the same data as between-firm analysis, first 
differencing in within-firm analysis produces an entirely new set of variables.  In first 
differencing, the variable's value in 2004 is subtracted from its value in 2005.  This 
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dissertation uses the symbol "Δ" to designate this change in performance.  This section 
presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in within-firm analysis.  It presents 
data that describe the independent variable, Δ performance, the dependent variable, Δ 
attribution, and relationships between the two.   
 
Dependent Variables - Change in Attribution 
To understand how firms' use of Enhancement and Blame changes from 2004 to 
2005, the following analysis presents first-differences data for these variables.  First-
differences data subtract values for each variable for 2004 from values for 2005.  For 
example, if Firm A's letter to shareholders contains 75% Enhancement in 2004 and 50% 
Enhancement in 2005, Firm A's use of Enhancement decreased by 25%.   
Tables 45 and 46, below, present data for firms that use 5 or more attributions in both 
2004 and 2005.  This results in a smaller dataset than was used in the between-firm 
analysis above: letters to shareholders with 5 or more attributions in either year were 
included in between-firm analysis; within-firm analysis includes only firms whose letters 
included 5 or more attributions in both years.  Table 45 presents data for Enhancement 
for 2004, 2005, and the difference between the two years.  It provides information on 
both the number of enhancing attributions and the % of each type of attribution.   
Table 45 shows that firms decreased their use of enhancing attributions from 2004 to 
2005.  On average firms use .68 fewer enhancing attributions, a decrease of 8%.  One 
firm decreased its use of enhancing attributions by 92%.  Such a change could result from 
a firm that used 100% enhancing attributions in 2004 and only 8% enhancing attributions 
in 2005.  However, not all firms decreased their use of enhancing attributions: one firm  
202 
 
 
Table 45: Change in Use of Enhancement from 2004 to 2005 
Variable Obs Mean Median S. Dev. Min Max 
Enhancing Attributions 2004 215 7.28 7 3.92 1 25 
Enhancing Attributions 2005 215 6.60 5 4.69 0 27 
Change in Enhancing Attributions 215 -0.68 -1 4.81 -20 15 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median S. Dev. Min Max 
% Enhancement 2004 215 63% 64% 22% 8% 100% 
% Enhancement 2005 215 55% 55% 26% 0% 100% 
Change in % Enhancement 215 -8% -5% 31% -92% 83% 
 
 
increased its use of enhancing attributions by 83%.   
Table 46 presents the same information for blaming attributions.   
 
Table 46: Change in Use of Blame from 2004 to 2005 
Variable Obs Mean Median S. Dev. Min Max 
Blaming Attributions 2004 215 2.19 2 2.30 0 12 
Blaming Attributions 2005 215 2.71 2 2.97 0 17 
Change in Blaming Attributions 215 0.52 0 3.12 -10 15 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
% Blame 2004 215 15% 10% 18% 0% 90% 
% Blame 2005 215 21% 14% 21% 0% 80% 
Change in % Blame 215 6% 0% 24% -82% 80% 
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Table 46 shows that firms used .52 more blaming attributions in 2005 than in 2004, 
an increase of 6%.  The greatest increase in the use of blame was 80%.  Such an increase 
would be possible for a firm that used 20% blame in 2004 and 100% blame in 2004.   
 
Independent Variables - Change in Performance 
This dissertation collects data on three performance measures.  Table 47 presents the 
average change in each of these measures from 2004 to 2005.   
 
Table 47: First Difference of Basic Performance Metrics 
Variable Obs Mean Median S. Dev. Min Max 
Δ Profitability 215 0.1% 0.1% 8% -35% 46% 
Δ EPS Change 215 -44% -12% 627% -4641% 3368% 
Δ Revenue Change 215 -3% -4% 27% -84% 238% 
 
 
Table 47 shows that 215 firms used 5 or more attributions in their letter to 
shareholders in both 2004 and 2005.  It shows that, despite the decline in the overall 
economy from 2004 to 2005, on average, sample firms' profitability increased by .1%.  In 
contrast, in line with the slowdown in the overall economy, firms' average EPS Change 
fell by 44% and their average Revenue Change fell by 3%.  The changes in all three 
variables echo the summary statistics presented in Tables 26 and 27   
This dissertation combines these three measures of performance (Profitability, EPS 
Change, and Revenue Change) with two benchmarks (historical aspirations and social 
aspirations).  This produces six different measures of performance, each of which can be 
assessed with two models of performance assessment: a high jumper's dichotomous 
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mental model of performance or a golfer's continuous mental model of performance.  
Table 47 presents descriptive statistics for these six measures under a high jumper's 
dichotomous mental model of assessment.  As dichotomous assessment creates only two 
values (0 or 1), first differences combines these values to create three possible values: -1, 
0, or 1(e.g. 0 - 1 = -1; 1 - 1 = 0; 1 - 0 = 1).  Table 48 presents the number and percentage 
of sample firms that achieved each measure.   
 
Table 48: First Difference of Dichotomous Assessment of Performance 
Variable 
-1 0 1 Total 
# % # % # % # % 
Δ HD Profitability 74 34% 108 50% 33 15% 215 100% 
Δ HD EPS Change 94 44% 63 29% 58 27% 215 100% 
Δ HD Revenue Change 115 53% 69 32% 31 14% 215 100% 
Δ SD Profitability 17 8% 173 80% 25 12% 215 100% 
Δ SD EPS Change 66 31% 84 39% 65 30% 215 100% 
Δ SD Revenue Change 39 18% 141 66% 35 16% 215 100% 
 
Table 48 shows that a general decline in achievement of aspired performance levels 
from 2004 to 2005.  Large number of firms failed to meet their historical performance 
aspirations:  34% saw a decrease in their achievement of HD Profitability, 44% saw a 
decrease in their achievement of HD EPS Change, and 53% saw a decrease in their 
achievement of HD Revenue Change.  These results reflect the decline in the general 
economy from 2004 to 2005.  In contrast, the majority of firms saw no change in their 
achievement of social performance aspirations: 80% of firms saw no change in their 
achievement of SD Profitability, 39% saw no change in their achievement of EPS 
Change, and 66% saw no change in their achievement of Revenue Change.  These results 
reflect a general stability in firm performance relative to competitors.  Despite the 
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downturn in the overall economy, firms' achievements relative to their peers changed 
little from 2004 to 2005.   
Table 49 presents descriptive statistics for these same six measures of performance, 
but does so in the golfer's mental model of continuous performance.  As these continuous 
measures can take any value, the difference between the values for 2004 and 2005 are 
also continuous.  For example, if firm A performed 10% above aspired historical 
Revenue Change in 2004 and 15% below aspired revenue change in 2005, the firm's 
performance relative to aspired historical revenue change fell by 25% (-15% - 10% = -
25%).   
 
Table 49: First Difference of Continuous Measures of Performance 
Variable Obs Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Δ HC Profitability 215 -3% -1% 12% -66% 44% 
Δ HC EPS Change 215 -92% -16% 768% -4542% 3614% 
Δ HC Revenue Change 215 -12% -10% 33% -138% 114% 
Δ SC Profitability 215 0% 0% 8% -37% 41% 
Δ SC EPS Change 215 2% -1% 532% -2689% 3458% 
Δ SC Revenue Change 215 0% -1% 21% -71% 154% 
 
 
Table 49 shows that on average, firm performance fell in relation to each of the three 
historical aspirations: firms' Profitability declined by 3% in relation to historical 
aspiration, firms' EPS Change declined by 92% in relation to historical aspirations, and 
firms' Revenue Change declined 12% in relation to historical aspirations.  These 
decreases reflect the overall decline in the economy from 2004 to 2005.  In contrast, 
Table 49 shows that firm performance changed very little in relation to social aspirations.  
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Firm performance did not change in relation to social aspirations for Profitability, nor did 
it change in relation to social aspirations for Revenue Change.  Firm performance 
changed marginally in relation to social aspirations for EPS Change, but this change is 
very small: the 2% change in the median is a very small fraction of the standard deviation 
of 532%.   
This analysis of the independent variables for within-firm analysis shows that firm 
performance declined in relation to historical aspirations, especially in relation to EPS 
Change and Revenue Change.  This analysis also shows that firm performance relative to 
social aspirations remained relatively constant.   
Correlations 
With the above description of the distribution of the independent and dependent 
variables, this analysis examines correlations between the two.  Table 50 presents 
correlations for these variables.  
Table 50 presents strong correlations between dependent and some independent 
variables.  Enhancement and Blame show significant correlations with almost all of the 
study's independent variables.  Only Δ SD Revenue Change does not show a significant 
correlation with Enhancement or Blame.  With the exception of Δ SD Revenue Change, 
high-jumper like dichotomous assessments of performance correlate with an increase in 
Enhancement (correlations of .146 to .475) and a decrease in Blame (correlations of -.143 
to -.434).  This correlation indicates that when firms achieve an aspired performance 
level that they didn’t previously achieve, they use more Enhancement;  when firms fail to 
achieve an aspired performance level, they use more Blame.  These results provide 
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Table 50: Correlation Matrix of First-Difference Data (n=215) 
 
Note: all correlations over .135 are significant at p<.05.   
 
 
 
# Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 Δ Enhancement 1.000
2 Δ Blame -0.734 1.000
3 Δ Profitability 0.316 -0.293 1.000
4 Δ EPS Change 0.213 -0.214 0.561 1.000
5 Δ Revenue Change 0.146 -0.143 0.049 0.133 1.000
6 Δ HD Profitability 0.475 -0.484 0.390 0.320 0.072 1.000
7 Δ HD EPS Change 0.459 -0.434 0.282 0.324 0.091 0.534 1.000
8 Δ HD Revenue Change 0.196 -0.194 0.022 -0.018 0.448 0.065 0.160 1.000
9 Δ SD Profitability 0.334 -0.319 0.781 0.498 0.147 0.507 0.452 0.032 1.000
10 Δ SD EPS Change 0.249 -0.251 0.508 0.924 0.170 0.391 0.491 0.038 0.579 1.000
11 Δ SD Revenue Change 0.110 -0.116 0.043 0.100 0.696 0.065 0.166 0.637 0.176 0.168 1.000
12 Δ HC Profitability 0.300 -0.275 0.386 0.253 0.102 0.257 0.094 -0.004 0.346 0.192 0.123 1.000
13 Δ HC EPS Change 0.478 -0.425 0.409 0.329 0.124 0.676 0.597 0.115 0.503 0.405 0.138 0.277 1.000
14 Δ HC Revenue Change 0.186 -0.187 0.054 0.057 0.373 -0.023 0.099 0.419 0.071 0.074 0.424 0.168 0.164 1.000
15 Δ SC Profitability 0.296 -0.290 0.963 0.554 0.058 0.375 0.246 -0.015 0.745 0.486 0.009 0.451 0.433 0.094 1.000
16 Δ SC EPS Change 0.213 -0.211 0.560 0.998 0.126 0.312 0.312 -0.028 0.490 0.915 0.085 0.255 0.335 0.064 0.558 1.000
17 Δ SC Revenue Change 0.187 -0.171 0.061 0.127 0.779 0.035 0.118 0.428 0.133 0.151 0.756 0.133 0.176 0.537 0.066 0.129 1.000
18 Δ CEO 0.102 -0.087 -0.008 0.137 0.000 0.105 0.044 0.064 -0.011 0.123 0.058 0.136 0.025 0.064 0.027 0.137 0.035 1.000
19 Δ Acquisition 0.001 0.034 -0.070 -0.069 -0.033 -0.089 -0.054 -0.068 -0.124 -0.104 -0.050 0.002 -0.062 0.040 -0.072 -0.077 -0.061 0.009 1.000
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evidence that seems to support Hypothesis 1, that when a firm achieves an aspired 
performance level, it uses more Enhancement.  These results also appear to support  
Hypothesis 2, that when a firm fails to achieve an aspired performance level it uses more 
blame. 
As predicted, both Enhancement and Blame show significant relationships with all six 
continuous measures of the difference between actual and aspired performance (HC and 
SC variables).  A firm that increases these golfer-like assessments of performance uses 
more Enhancement (correlations of .186 to .478) and less Blame (correlations of -.187 to 
-.425).  These results support Hypothesis 5, that when a firm improves its performance in 
relation to aspirations, it increases its use of Enhancement.  These results also support 
Hypothesis 6, that when a firm improves its performance in relation to aspirations, it uses 
less Blame.   
 
Individual Mean Values 
Analysis of firms' mean values for each of these measures provides an initial 
quantification of the relationship between performance relative to aspiration and firms' 
use of enhancement and blame.  As noted above, after first-differences analysis, the six 
high jumper like dichotomous variables take one of three values: -1, 0, or 1. Table 51 
presents the number of firms that record each of these three values for each measure of 
dichotomous performance.  In addition, it presents the mean values of Enhancement and 
Blame for firms at each level.   
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Table 51:  Change in Attribution by Change in Achievement of Aspiration (n=215) 
 
Variable -1 0 1 
Δ HD Profitability 74 108 33 
Δ  % Enhancement -23% -7% 25% 
Δ % Blame  20% 2% -14% 
        
Δ HD EPS Change 94 63 58 
Δ % Enhancement -22% -7% 14% 
Δ in % Blame 14% 9% -12% 
        
Δ HD Revenue Change 115 69 31 
Δ % Enhancement -14% -2% 1% 
Δ % Blame 11% 1.5% 2% 
        
Δ SD Profitability 17 173 25 
Δ % Enhancement -29% -9% 14% 
Δ % Blame 22% 6% -8% 
        
Δ SD EPS Change 66 84 65 
Δ % Enhancement -28% -5% 10% 
Δ % Blame 20% 4% -6% 
        
Δ SD Revenue Change 39 141 35 
Δ % Enhancement -20% -6% 0% 
Δ % Blame 16% 4% 1% 
 
 
Table 51 shows a consistent pattern in which an increase in achievement of an 
aspiration corresponds with an increase in the use of Enhancement and a decrease in the 
use of Blame.  Only one aspiration, Δ SD Revenue Change does not present this 
relationship.  For Δ SD Revenue Change, when firms increases their achievement of 
aspirations related to SD Revenue Change they continue to use the same amount of 
Enhancement and increase their use of Blame by 1%.  Nevertheless, even when firms 
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improve their achievement of aspirations related to SD Revenue Change, they increase 
their use of Blame less than when they don't increase their achievement of aspirations 
related to SD Revenue Change.   These results provide evidence that appears to support 
Hypothesis 1, that when a firm achieves its aspirations it uses more Enhancement.  These 
results also appear to provide evidence to support Hypothesis 2, that when a firm 
achieves its aspirations it uses less Blame.    
 
Multiple Mean Values 
This dissertation also investigates whether achievement of multiple aspirations 
influences firms' use of attribution.  When a firm achieves more aspirations does it use 
attribution differently that when it achieves fewer aspirations?  For example, if a firm 
achieved one aspiration in 2004 and achieved four aspirations in 2005, would it increase 
its use of Enhancement?  This dissertation begins to answer this question by first-
differencing the variable Aspirations Achieved, the total number of aspirations a firm 
achieves in one time period.  Each firm can achieve as many as six aspirations.  Thus, 
after first differencing, the variable Aspirations Achieved could increase by any number 
from 0 to 6.  Similarly, the variable Aspirations Achieved could decrease by any number 
from 0 to 6.  Consequently, Δ Aspirations Achieved can take the value of any whole 
number from -6 to 6.  This dissertation calculates the mean values of Change in 
Enhancement and Change in Blame for each value of Change in Aspirations Achieved.  
Table 52 presents the results of this analysis.   
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Table 52: Change in Attribution by Change in Number of Aspirations Achieved 
 
Δ Aspirations 
Achieved 
Observations Δ Enhancement Δ Blame 
6 0 NA NA 
5 2 16% -13% 
4 6 30% -18% 
3 16 20% -17% 
2 16 16% -10% 
1 38 2% -1% 
0 28 -1% -3% 
-1 25 -12% 10% 
-2 24 -18% 15% 
-3 21 -14% 15% 
-4 23 -36% 26% 
-5 16 -42% 25.5% 
-6 2 -21% 24.5% 
Total/Average 215 -8% 6% 
 
 
Figure 18 presents the same information in visual form.   
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Figure 18: Change in Attribution by Change in Aspirations Achieved 
 
 
 
The above analysis of means demonstrates that, in general, the greater a firm's 
increase in Aspirations Achieved, the greater its increase in Enhancement and the greater 
its reduction in Blame.  For both Enhancement and Blame, this relationship generally 
holds for firms that change their aspirations achieved by from -4 to 4.  For example, 
assume that Firm A achieved zero aspirations in 2004 and used 40% enhancement and 
60% blame.  If Firm A achieved four aspirations in 2005 (an increase of 4), it would be 
expected to use 70% enhancement (an increase of 30%) and 22% Blame (a decrease of 
18%).   
However, this relationship does not hold at the extremes of the range.  First, no firm 
increased aspirations by 6, so no data are available on the top extreme of the range.  
Second, Firms that increase Aspirations Achieved by 5 make smaller increases in their 
use of Enhancement and smaller decreases in Blame than firms that increase their 
Aspirations Achieved by 4.  Similarly, firms that decrease their Aspirations Achieved by 
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6 make smaller decreases in their use of Enhancement and smaller increases in their use 
of Blame than firms that decrease their Aspirations Achieved by 5.  The small sample 
size at the extremes of the range could contribute to these breaks in the pattern that exists 
in the middle of the range (n=2 for Δ Aspirations Achieved of -6 and Δ Aspirations 
Achieved of 5).   
Finally, this pattern also does not hold throughout the middle of the range for Δ 
Aspirations Achieved.  Firms with Δ Aspirations Achieved of -3 increase their use of 
Enhancement more and decrease their use of Blame less than firms with Δ Aspirations 
Achieved of -2.   
Despite these negative results, the above analysis of Δ Aspirations Achieved displays 
a general pattern in which greater increases in the number of aspirations achieved occur 
with greater increases in use of Enhancement and greater decreases in use of Blame.  
These results provide evidence that seems to support Hypothesis 3, that the more a firm 
increases its achievement of aspiration, the more it increases its use of Enhancement.  
Similarly, these results provide evidence that seems to support Hypothesis 4, that the 
more a firm increases its use of attribution, the more it decreases its use of Blame.   
 
Conclusions to Descriptive Statistics of Within-firm Analysis 
These descriptive statistics provide insight on the relationships between changes in 
firms' achievement of aspirations and changes in firms' use of Enhancement and Blame to 
describe their performance.  Before undertaking within-firm regression analysis, this 
dissertation summarizes six findings from its descriptive of first-differenced variables.   
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First, firms decreased their use of Enhancement and increased their use of Blame 
from 2004 to 2005.  This change in the proportion of each dependent variable in firm's 
letters to shareholders reflects a decline in economic conditions and a larger proportion of 
firms failing to achieve their historical performance aspirations.   
Second, dependent and independent variables show significant correlations along 
relationships of interest.  These strong correlations exist for both Enhancement and 
Blame, for both historical and social aspirations, and for both dichotomous and 
continuous mental models of assessment.   
Third, the above descriptive analysis provides evidence that seems to support each of 
the dissertation's hypotheses.  First, both correlation analysis and analysis of individual 
mean values provide findings that seem to support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, that 
when a firm achieves an aspiration it uses more Enhancement and less Blame than when 
it fails to achieve the same aspiration.  Second, analysis of multiple mean values provides 
evidence that seems to support Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, that the more a firm 
improves its achievement of aspirations, the more it increases its use of Enhancement and 
the less it uses Blame.  Third, correlation analysis appears to provide support for 
Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6, that as firm performance improves relative to aspirations, 
firms use more Enhancement and less Blame.   
  
Analysis of Enhancement   
This dissertation uses ten models to test the relationship between change in 
performance and change in enhancement.   These ten models are identical to those 
presented above in Tables 37, 40, 41, and 44 for between-firm analysis.  Model 1 
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contains only control variables.  Model 2 tests change in achievement of historical 
aspirations related to profitability.  It includes a measure of change in achievement of a 
binary measure of historical profitability (β1-HD Profitability), a measure of change in 
achievement of a continuous measure of historical profitability (β2-HAD Profitability), 
and an interaction term (β3-HD*HAD Profitability).  Model 3 conducts the same tests 
with changes in achievement of social aspirations related to profitability.  Model 4 
conducts the same tests with changes in achievement of historical aspirations related to 
EPS Change.  Model 5 conducts the same tests with changes in achievement of social 
aspirations related to EPS Change.  Model 6 conducts the same tests with changes in 
achievement of historical aspirations relative to Revenue Change.  And model 7 conducts 
the same tests with achievement of social aspirations relative to Revenue Change.  Model 
8 tests the cumulative effect of the change in achieving multiple aspirations.  Model 9 
tests the cumulative effect of the change in multiple differences between actual and 
aspired performance.  Model 10 combines all variables that measure change in 
achievement of aspirations used in other models as a robustness check.  Table 53 presents 
the results of this analysis with change in Enhancement as the dependent variable in each 
of the ten models.   
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Table 53: Within-Firm Analysis of Enhancing Attributions - Primary Sample 
 
 
 
 
Dichotomous Performance Assessment  
Tests of Models 2-7 in Table 53 consistently show a significant relationship between 
changes in achievement of aspired performance and changes in use of enhancement.  
Coefficient β1 is positive and significant in five of the six models.  It is only insignificant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model Controls Historical Social Historical Social Historical Social Combined Combined Combined
Profitability Profitability EPS EPS Revenue Revenue Dichotomous Continuous All
B1 - HD Profitability 0.188*** 0.105*** 0.113***
(0.032) (0.037) (0.034)
B2 - HC Profitability 0.473** 0.459 0.361
(0.207) (0.317) (0.312)
B3 - HD*HC Profitability 0.292 0.273
(0.225) (0.273)
B1 - SD Profitability 0.154*** 0.130*** 0.132***
(0.052) (0.043) (0.047)
B2 - SC Profitability 0.827*** 0.573 0.018
(0.286) (0.451) (0.420)
B3 - SD*SC Profitability -0.071 -0.410
(0.395) (0.404)
B1 - HD EPS Change 0.166*** 0.088*** 0.121***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.030)
B2 - HC EPS Change 0.003 0.010 -0.013
(0.003) (0.008) (0.009)
B3 - HD*HC EPS Change 0.005 -0.007
(0.004) (0.006)
B1 - SD EPS Change 0.148*** 0.043 0.029
(0.031) (0.034) (0.036)
B2 - SC EPS Change 0.036** -0.008 0.010
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
B3 - SD*SC EPS Change 0.010 0.009
(0.017) (0.008)
B1 - HD Revenue Change 0.088** 0.0458* 0.086**
(0.039) (0.027) (0.036)
B2 - HC Revenue Change 0.017 -0.109 -0.208*
(0.104) (0.095) (0.112)
B3 - HD*HC Revenue Change 0.058 0.139
(0.103) (0.097)
B1 - SD Revenue Change 0.053 0.041 0.025
(0.052) (0.035) (0.038)
B2 - SC Revenue Change 0.594** 0.366** 0.375**
(0.287) (0.151) (0.144)
B3 - SD* SC Revenue Change -0.143 0.012
(0.388) (0.182)
B4.1 - CEO 0.051 0.031 0.104 0.068 0.027 0.067 0.067 0.073 0.101 0.080
(0.077) (0.068) (0.073) (0.070) (0.070) (0.076) (0.073) (0.064) (0.074) (0.065)
B4.2 - Acquisition -0.004 0.026 -0.001 0.008 -0.018 0.004 -0.022 0.018 0.020 0.022
(0.038) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031)
Constant -0.081*** -0.044** -0.089*** -0.068*** -0.079*** -0.058* -0.079*** -0.034 -0.078*** -0.066**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029)
Observations 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215
R
2
0.002 0.247 0.132 0.219 0.230 0.044 0.036 0.358 0.160 0.403
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
217 
 
in model 7, SD Revenue Change.  Furthermore, coefficient β1 is significant at the .01 
level in four of the five models.  Only in model 6, HD Revenue Change is it only 
significant at the .05 level.  These results indicate that when firms achieve a performance 
aspiration they use more Enhancement.  These findings generally support Hypothesis 1, 
that when firms achieve an aspired performance level they use more Enhancement.   
The size of the coefficients for β1 in each model indicates the extent to which firms 
increase their use of Enhancement when they achieve a specific performance aspiration.  
Comparing these coefficients in Table 53 shows that achieving historical aspirations 
related to profitability (HD Profitability) has the greatest influence on firms' use of 
enhancement (Model 2, β1 = .188) .  Achieving HD EPS Change has the second greatest 
impact on firms' use of enhancement (Model 4, β1 = .166).  Achieving SD Profitability 
has the third greatest impact on firms' use of enhancement (Model 3, β1 = .154).  
Achieving SD EPS Change correlates with the fourth greatest increase in firms' use of 
enhancement (Model 5, β1 = .148).  Achieving HD Revenue Change has the fifth greatest 
impact on firms' use of enhancement (Model 6, β1 = .088).   
The R
2
 values in Table 53 indicate how well each model explains distribution of the 
dependent variable, change in Enhancement.  The study's control variables explain almost 
none of the change in firms' use of enhancement (model 1, R
2
 = .002).   Historical 
aspiration relative to Profitability provides the best explanation of change in firms use of 
enhancement (model 2, R
2
 = .247).  Social aspiration relative to EPS Change provides the 
second best explanation of change in firms use of enhancement (model 5, R
2
 = .230). 
Historical aspiration in relation to EPS Change provides the third best explanation of 
change in firms' use of enhancement (model 4, R
2
 = .219). Social aspiration in relation to 
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Profitability provides the fourth best explanation of change in firms' use of enhancement 
(model 3, R
2
 = .132).  Historical aspiration in relation to Revenue Change provides the 
fifth best explanation of change in firms' use of enhancement (model 3, R
2
 = .044).  
Historical aspiration in relation to Revenue Change provides the least amount of 
explanation of change in firms' use of enhancement (model 6, R
2
 = .036).   
As would be expected, most of the models with a larger coefficient for β1 have higher 
values of R
2
.  For example, model 2, profitability in relation to historical aspiration, has 
the highest value for β1 (.188) and the highest value for R
2
 (.247).   
 
Continuous Performance Assessment 
Tests of Models 2-7 show general support for the relationship between change in the 
difference between actual and aspired performance and change in firms' use of 
Enhancement.  Coefficient β2 is positive in models 2-7, and is significant in four of these 
six models.  It is only insignificant in model 4 (HD EPS Change) and model 6 (HD 
Revenue Change).  Coefficients can only be compared between models when the 
variables to which they relate have the same scale.  This dissertation standardizes each of 
the four significant coefficients by multiplying them by their standard deviations.  Table 
54 presents this standardization.     
The results in Table 54 indicate the extent by which a firm is expected to change its 
use of enhancement in conjunction with a change in its performance.  For example, when 
a firm increases its profitability by one standard deviation (.08) in relation to historical 
aspiration, it is expected to increase its use of enhancement by 5.7%.  When a firm 
increases its profitability by one standard deviation in relation to social aspiration, it is 
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Table 54: Standardization of β2 Coefficients for Δ Enhancement 
  
  
Model 
2 HC 
Profit 
Model 
3 SC 
Profit 
Model 
4 HC-
EPS 
Change 
Model 
5 SC 
EPS 
Change 
Model 
6 HC - 
EPS 
Change 
Model 
7 SC 
Rev. 
Increase 
β2 
Upper Bound 0.88 1.39 0.009 0.06 0.22 1.16 
Average 0.47 0.83 0.003 0.04 0.02 0.59 
Lower Bound 0.07 0.27 -0.003 0.01 -0.19 0.03 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
0.12 0.12 5.32 5.32 0.21 0.21 
Effect 
Size 
Upper Bound 11% 17% 5% 34% 5% 24% 
Average 6% 10% 2% 19% 0% 12% 
Lower Bound 1% 3% -2% 5% -4% 1% 
 
 
expected to increase its use of enhancement by 6.6%.  These results provide partial 
support for hypothesis 5b, that the further a firm's performance is below aspiration, the 
less enhancement it uses.    
 
Rate of Change in Enhancement above the Aspired Performance Level 
The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant in all six models.  This 
indicates that a single rate of change applies both above and below each aspired 
performance level.  This indicates that hypothesis 5a receives the same support as 
hypothesis 5b above.  Thus, these results provide partial support for hypothesis 5a, that 
the further a firm's performance is above aspiration, the more enhancement it uses.   
 
Combined Models 
As described above, models 8, 9, and 10 combine multiple measures of performance 
in a single regression analysis.  These models analyze the relationship between changes 
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in firms' achievement of multiple performance levels and changes in firms' use of 
enhancement.   
Model 8 analyzes dichotomous assessment of all six performance measures.  In 
model 8, if coefficients on individual performance aspirations demonstrate statistical 
significance, then the effect of achieving that aspiration has a cumulative correlation with 
firms' use of enhancement.  In other words, when firms achieve many aspirations they 
use more enhancement than when they achieve few or no aspirations.  Tests of model 8 in 
Table 53 shows that four of the six coefficient β1 coefficients are significant.  β1 is 
significant at the .01 level for HD Profitability, SD Profitability, and HD Revenue 
Change; it is significant at the .01 level for HD Revenue Change. Each coefficient β1 in 
model 8 is smaller than the corresponding coefficient β1 in models 2-7.  This is expected 
due to collinearity between different measures of performance.  Model 8's R
2
 value 
confirms this cumulative effect (R
2
 = .358): model 8's R
2
 value is higher than the R
2
 
value in any of the models  2-7 that test single measures of performance.  These results 
provide partial support for Hypothesis 3, that the more aspirations a firm achieves, the 
more enhancement it uses.   
Model 9 provides a robustness check for model 8.  Model 9 tests the cumulative 
effect of multiple continuous assessments of performance.  It assesses whether the effect 
of these continuous measures is also cumulative.  In model 9, one performance measure 
(coefficients β2) is significant: SC Revenue Change.  Model 9 provides valuable contrast 
with model 8.  In comparison, model 8 has more coefficients that are positive and 
significant (four in model 8 versus one in model 9) and model 8 explains a greater 
proportion of the variance in firms' use of enhancement (Pseudo-R
2
 =.358 in model 8 vs. 
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Pseudo-R
2
 = .16 in model 9).  This contrast affirms the cumulative relationship between 
achievement of multiple dichotomous measures and use of enhancement.  These results 
confirm support for Hypothesis 3, that the more aspirations a firm achieves the more 
enhancement is uses in performance explanations.   
Model 10 also provides a robustness check for model 8.  As model 8 excludes 
measures of the difference between actual and aspired performance, it is possible that this 
absence influences the significance of coefficients.  Model 10 includes all variables used 
in this study to assess the magnitude of coefficients β1 in the presence of other study 
variables.  The results in model 10 show that all four variables that were significant in 
model 8 are also significant in model 10.  These results in model 10 confirm the 
significance of the cumulative effect of these three variables in relation to enhancement.  
These results provide further partial support for Hypothesis 3, that the more aspirations a 
firm achieves the more enhancement it uses.   
 
Control Variables 
Changes in control variables in this within-firm analysis show no correlation with 
changes in enhancement.  β4.1 is insignificant, indicating that changes in a sample firm's 
CEO demonstrate no significant correlation with changes in that firm's use of 
enhancement.  β4.2 is also insignificant, indicating that changes in a sample firm's 
acquisitions demonstrate no significant correlation with changes in that firm's use of 
enhancement.   
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Summary of Within-firm Analysis of Enhancing Attributions in Primary Sample 
In sum, this within-firm analysis of enhancing attributions in the primary sample 
finds partial support for Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5.  For Hypothesis 1, it finds partial support 
for dichotomous, 'high jumper' performance assessment with significance in five of the 
six β1 coefficients in Models 2-7.  For Hypothesis 3, it finds partial support for multiple 
dichotomous, 'high jumper' like performance assessment with significance in four of the 
six β1 coefficients in Model 8.  Finally, for Hypothesis 5a and 5b, it also finds partial 
support for continuous 'golfer' like performance assessments when firms perform above 
or below aspirations with significance in four of the six β1 coefficients in Models 2-7.  It 
finds equivalent magnitudes of effect above (Hypothesis 5a) and below aspired 
performance (Hypothesis 5b).   
 
Robustness Check 
As discussed in the methods section, this dissertation conducts a robustness check for 
each regression analysis.  This robustness check of within-firm analysis uses the same 
equation (equation 3) and the same ten models as the analyses presented above.  The 
within-firm analysis presented above in Table 53 excludes letters with fewer than five 
attributions and firms with extreme performance measures.  The robustness check below 
includes all letters, regardless of the number of attributions in each letter.  The "chunky" 
measurement of the percentage of attributions in these letters is expected to reduce the R
2
 
values in these regressions.  The robustness check below also includes firms with extreme 
performance values.  These extreme values are expected to result in larger regression 
coefficients.  Table 55 presents the results of this robustness check.   
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Table 55: Within-Firm Analysis of Enhancing Attribution - Full Sample 
 
 
 
This robustness check confirms numerous aspects of the initial analysis.  First, it 
confirms the initial analysis that firms that when firms achieve an aspired performance 
level they use more enhancement.  Coefficient β1 is positive and significant at the .01 
level in models 2-7.  These results confirm support for Hypothesis 1.   
Second, this robustness check confirms lack of support for a relationship between the 
difference between actual and aspired performance and a firm's use of enhancement.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model Controls Historical Social Historical Social Historical Social Combined Combined Combined
Profitability Profitability EPS EPS Revenue Revenue Dichotomous Continuous All
B1 - HD Profitability 0.256*** 0.147*** 0.161***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.032)
B2 - HC Profitability -0.011 0.031 -0.010
(0.013) (0.029) (0.025)
B3 - HD*HC Profitability -0.003 -0.0841** -0.005
(0.013) (0.040) (0.035)
B1 - SD Profitability 0.1785*** 0.100*** 0.117***
(0.041) (0.037) (0.038)
B2 - SC Profitability -0.015** 0.069 -0.002
(0.007) (0.048) (0.042)
B3 - SD*SC Profitability 0.123 0.028 -0.005
(0.159) (0.021) (0.185)
B1 - HD EPS Change 0.194*** 0.077*** 0.108***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.027)
B2 - HC EPS Change -0.003** 0.004 -0.005*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
B3 - HD*HC EPS Change 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
B1 - SD EPS Change 0.206*** 0.044 0.033
(0.023) (0.030) (0.031)
B2 - SC EPS Change 0.002 -0.005 0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
B3 - SD*SC EPS Change 0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
B1 - HD Revenue Change 0.098*** 0.027 0.028
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027)
B2 - HC Revenue Change -0.040* 0.006 0.007
(0.023) (0.039) (0.036)
B3 - HD*HC Revenue Change -0.034 0.071 0.014
(0.024) (0.049) (0.046)
B1 - SD Revenue Change 0.095*** 0.024 0.037
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
B2 - SC Revenue Change -0.017 0.122 0.016
(0.028) (0.082) (0.078)
B3 - SD* SC Revenue Change -0.161** -0.132 0.012
(0.065) (0.109) (0.096)
B4.1 - CEO 0.105* 0.0829* 0.049 0.091* 0.087 0.106* 0.105* 0.042 0.067 0.051
(0.056) (0.049) (0.050) (0.052) (0.048) (0.055) (0.055) (0.045) (0.048) (0.046)
B4.2 - Acquisition 0.018 0.027 0.021 0.025 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.024 0.016 0.024
(0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026)
Constant -0.114*** -0.070** -0.086*** -0.079*** -0.082*** -0.081** -0.103*** -0.038* -0.096*** -0.035
(0.031) (0.028) (0.020) (0.030) (0.019) (0.032) (0.031) (0.019) (0.028) (0.022)
Observations 433 433 433 432 433 433 433 433 432 432
R
2
0.010 0.232 0.063 0.162 0.164 0.041 0.046 0.259 0.050 0.308
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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Coefficient β2 is not positive and significant in any of the models 2-7.  Coefficient β2 was 
positive and insignificant in models 3, 4, and 6 in the initial analysis.  Although 
coefficient β2 is significant in models 3, 4, and 6 in the robustness check, it is negative in 
these models.  The predicted result for coefficient β2 is positive.  These results confirm a 
lack of support for hypothesis 3.   
Third, this robustness check confirms support for the cumulative effect of achieving 
aspired performance levels on the relationship with enhancement.  In model 8, all six β1 
coefficients are positive.  Of these six, three demonstrate significance at the .01 level (HD 
Profitability, SD Profitability, and HD EPS Change).  In addition, model 8 explains a 
greater proportion of variance (R
2
 = .259) than any of the models that test individual 
measures of performance (models 2-7).  These results confirm support for a cumulative 
relationship between achieving multiple aspirations and a firms' use of enhancement.  
These results confirm support for Hypothesis 3. 
Model 9 tests the cumulative effect of multiple continuous assessments of 
performance.  It assesses whether the effect of these continuous measures is cumulative.  
In model 9, no performance measures (coefficients β2) are significant.  In comparison 
with model 9, model 8 has more coefficients that are positive and significant (three in 
model 8 vs. zero in model 9) and model 8 explains a greater proportion of variance in 
firms' use of enhancement (Pseudo-R
2
 =.259 in model 8 vs. Pseudo-R
2
 = .05 in model 9).  
These results confirm support for Hypothesis 3.  
Results in model 10 further support this conclusion.  Model 10 includes all study 
variables.  Despite the inclusion of all study variables in the regression, the three 
variables that demonstrate significance in model 8 also demonstrate significance in model 
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10: HD Profitability, SD Profitability, and HD EPS Change.  Moreover, these three β1 
coefficients are larger in model 10 than in model 8.  These results confirm partial support 
for Hypothesis 3, that the more aspirations a firm achieves, the more enhancement it uses.   
 
Analysis of Blame 
This dissertation conducts the same analysis of change in Blame that was performed 
above with change in Enhancement.  Again, it conducts its primary analysis on a trimmed 
sample of letters that contain 5 or more attributions and on firms with non-extreme 
performance.  It applies the same nine models used above to this analysis.  Model 1 
contains only control variables. Model 2 tests historical aspirations in relation to 
profitability.  Model 3 tests social aspirations in relation to profitability. Model 4 tests 
historical aspirations in relation to EPS Change.  Model 5 tests social aspirations in 
relation to EPS Change.  Model 6 tests historical aspirations in relation to Revenue 
Change. Model 7 tests social aspirations in relation to Revenue Change.  Model 8 tests 
the cumulative effect of achieving multiple performance aspirations.  Model 9 tests the 
cumulative effect of the difference between multiple measures of actual and aspired 
performance.  And, model 10 combines all variables used in this study as a robustness 
check for model 8.  Table 56 presents the results of this analysis on change in use of 
Blame.   
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Table 56: Within-Firm Analysis of Blaming Attribution - Primary Sample 
 
 
 
Dichotomous Performance Assessment 
Tests of models 2-7 in Table 56 consistently show a significant relationship between 
aspired performance and use of Blame.  Five of the six coefficients of β1 are negative and 
significant: only in model 7, SD Revenue Change, is coefficient β1 not significant.  In 
models 2-5, β1 is significant at the .01 level; in model 6, HD Revenue Change is 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model Controls Historical Social Historical Social Historical Social Combined Combined Combined
Profitability Profitability EPS EPS Revenue Revenue Dichotomous Continuous All
B1 - HD Profitability -0.153*** -0.115*** -0.110***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.027)
B2 - HC Profitability -0.179 -0.236 -0.012
(0.156) (0.242) (0.242)
B3 - HD*HC Profitability 0.051 -0.096
(0.170) (0.211)
B1 - SD Profitability -0.104*** -0.075** -0.082**
(0.039) (0.032) (0.036)
B2 - SC Profitability -0.608*** -0.535 -0.116
(0.217) (0.344) (0.326)
B3 - SD*SC Profitability 0.355 0.514
(0.300) (0.313)
B1 - HD EPS Change -0.118*** -0.045** -0.079***
-0.021 -0.021 -0.023
B2 - HC EPS Change -0.002 -0.009 0.007
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
B3 - HD*HC EPS Change -0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.005)
B1 - SD EPS Change -0.106*** -0.015 0.014
(0.024) (0.026) (0.028)
B2 - SC EPS Change -0.024** 0.009 -0.007
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
B3 - SD*SC EPS Change -0.003 -0.004
(0.014) (0.006)
B1 - HD Revenue Change -0.073** -0.0349* -0.063**
(0.029) (0.021) (0.028)
B2 - HC Revenue Change 0.058 0.058 0.183**
(0.079) (0.073) (0.087)
B3 - HD*HC Revenue Change 0.076 0.022
(0.078) (0.076)
B1 - SD Revenue Change -0.034 -0.039 -0.023
(0.037) (0.016) (0.030)
B2 - SC Revenue Change -0.276** -0.227** -0.197*
(0.146) (0.115) (0.112)
B3 - SD* SC Revenue Change 0.184 0.025
(0.164) (0.141)
B4.1 - CEO 0.008 0.025 -0.031 -0.002 -0.012 -0.002 -0.019 -0.016 -0.028 -0.007
(0.058) (0.051) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.058) (0.058) (0.049) (0.056) (0.050)
B4.2 - Acquisition 0.013 -0.009 0.012 0.003 0.023 0.010 0.015 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002
(0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024)
Constant 0.057*** 0.019 0.057*** 0.038** 0.023** 0.021 0.051*** 0.012 0.053*** 0.010
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.040) (0.023) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023)
Observations 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215
R
2
0.001 0.243 0.120 0.192 0.199 0.043 0.060 0.314 0.140 0.370
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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significant the .05 level.  Significance in five of the six models indicates that a change in 
firms' achievement of a performance aspiration generally corresponds with a change in 
firms' use of blame.  The findings confirm hypothesis 2, that when a firm fails to achieve 
a performance aspiration it uses more blame.   
The size of the coefficient for β1 in each model indicates the extent to which firms 
increase their use of blame when they fail to achieve a specific performance aspiration.  
Comparing these coefficients in Table 56 shows that failing to achieve historical 
aspirations in relation to profitability has the greatest influence on firms' use of blame.  
When firms fail to achieve HD Profitability, they increase their use of Blame by 15.3%.  
When firms fail to achieve HD EPS Change, they increase their use of Blame by 11.8%.  
When firms fail to achieve SD EPS Change, they increase their use of Blame by 10.6%.  
When firms fail to achieve SD Profitability, they increase their use of Blame by 10.4%.  
When firms fail to achieve HD Revenue Change, they increase their use of Blame by 
7.3%.   
The R
2
 values in Table 56 indicate how well each model explains the distribution of 
the dependent variable, change in Blame.  The study's control variables explain less than 
1% of change in firms' use of Blame (model 1, R
2
 = .006).  Historical aspiration relative 
to Profitability provides the best explanation of change in firm's use of Blame (model 2, 
R
2
 = .253).  Social aspiration relative to EPS Change provides the second best 
explanation of change in firms' use of Blame (model 4, R
2
 = .199).  Historical aspiration 
in relation to EPS Change provides the third best explanation of change in firms' use of 
Blame (model 4, R
2
 = .192).  Social aspiration relative to Profitability provides the fourth 
best explanation of change in firms' use of Blame (model 3, R
2
 = .12).  Social aspiration 
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in relation to Revenue Change provides the fifth best explanation of change in firm's use 
of Blame (model 7, R
2
 = .060).  And, historical aspiration in relation to Revenue Change 
provides the least explanation of change in firms' use of Blame (model 6, R2 = .043).   
These results support hypothesis 2, that a when a firm fails to achieve an aspiration, it 
uses more Blame than when it achieves an aspiration.   
 
Continuous Performance Assessment 
Tests of models 2-7 show partial support for the relationship between change in the 
difference between actual and aspired performance and change in firms' use of Blame.  
Coefficient β2 is significant in three models:  it is significant at the .01 level in model 3 
(SC Profitability), at the .05 level in model 5 (SC EPS Change), and at the .05 level in 
model 7 (SC Revenue Change).  It is notable that coefficient β2 is significant in relation 
to all three social aspirations but not in relation to any of the historical aspirations.   
Coefficients can only be compared between models when the variables to which they 
relate have the same scale.  This dissertation standardizes each coefficient by multiplying 
it by the standard deviation for each measure.  Table 57 presents these standardized 
coefficients.   
These results indicate that Change in SC EPS Change has the greatest influence on 
firms' use of blame.  A decrease in EPS Change of 5.32 (one standard deviation) is 
expected to occur with a 12.8% increase in blame.   
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Table 57: Standardization of β2 Coefficients for Change in Blame 
  
  
Model 
2 HC 
Profit 
Model 
3 SC 
Profit 
Model 
4 HC-
EPS 
Change 
Model 
5 SC 
EPS 
Change 
Model 
6 HC - 
EPS 
Change 
Model 
7 SC 
Rev. 
Increase 
β2 
Upper Bound 0.13 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.01 
Average -0.18 -0.61 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.28 
Lower Bound -0.48 -1.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.56 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
0.12 0.12 5.32 5.32 0.21 0.21 
Effect 
Size 
Upper Bound 2% -2% 1% -1% 4% 0% 
Average -2% -7% -1% -13% 1% -6% 
Lower Bound -6% -12% -3% -24% -2% -12% 
 
 
Combined Models 
As described previously, models 8, 9, and 10 combine multiple measures of 
performance in a single regression analysis.  Model 8 analyzes dichotomous assessment 
of all six performance measures.  In model 8, if coefficients on individual performance 
aspirations demonstrate statistical significance, then the effect of achieving that aspiration 
has a cumulative relationship with firms' use of Blame.  Tests of model 8 in Table 57 
show that four of the six β1 coefficients are negative and significant.  Coefficient β1 is 
significant at the .01 level in HD Profitability.  It is significant at the .05 level in SD 
Profitability and SD Revenue Change. It is significant at the .1 level in HD Revenue 
Change.  Each coefficient β1 in model 8 is smaller than the corresponding coefficient in 
models 2-7.  This smaller size is expected due to collinearity in model 8.  Model 8's R
2
 
value confirms the cumulative effect of achieving multiple aspirations (R
2
 = .314).  
Model 8's R
2
 value is higher than the R
2
 value in models 2-7 that test single measures of 
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performance.  These results provide strong partial support for hypothesis 4, that the fewer 
aspirations a firm achieves, the more Blame it uses.   
Model 9 provides a robustness check for model 9.  Model 9 tests the cumulative 
effect of multiple continuous assessments of performance.  It assesses whether the effect 
of these continuous measures is also cumulative.  In model 9, only one performance 
measure is significant:  SC Revenue Change is significant at the .05 level.  Model 9 
provides valuable contrast with model 8.  In comparison, model 8 has more variables that 
are negative and significant (four in model 8 versus one in model 9) and model 8 explains 
a greater proportion of the variance in firms' use of blame (Pseudo-R
2
 =.314 in model 8 
vs. Pseudo-R
2
 = .140 in model 9).  These results confirm support for Hypothesis 4, that 
the fewer aspirations a firm achieves, the more blame it uses.   
Model 10 also provides a robustness check for model 8.  As model 8 excludes 
measures of the difference between actual and aspired performance, it is possible that this 
absence influences the significance of coefficients.  Model 10 includes all variable used 
in this study to assess the magnitude of coefficients β1 in the presence of other study 
variables.  The results in model 10 show that all four variables that were negative and 
significant in model 8 are also negative and significant in model 10: HD Profitability, SD 
Profitability, and HD EPS Change.  In addition, in model 10, HD Revenue Change is also 
significant.  These results in model 10 confirm the significance of the cumulative effect 
of dichotomous assessments of performance on firms' use of Blame.  These results 
confirm support for Hypothesis 4, that the more performance aspirations a firm fails to 
achieve, the more Blame it uses to describe its performance.   
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Control Variables 
Changes in control variables in this analysis show no correlation with changes in 
Blame.  B4.1 is insignificant, indicating that changes in sample firms' CEO demonstrate 
no significant correlation with changes in blame.  β4.2 is also insignificant, indicating that 
changes in sample firms' acquisitions demonstrate no significant correlation with changes 
in Blame.   
 
Robustness Check 
As discussed in the methods section, this dissertation conducts a robustness check for 
all regression analyses.  This robustness check of within firm analysis uses the same 
equations and the same ten models as the analysis presented in Table 57.  Due to the 
inclusion of firms with letters that contain fewer than 5 attributions, the R
2
 values in the 
robustness check are expected to be lower than they were in the initial analysis in Table 
57.  In addition, due to the inclusion of firms with extreme measures of performance, 
coefficients β1, β2, and β3 are expected to be larger in the robustness check than they were 
in the initial analysis in Table 44.  Table 58 presents the results of this robustness check.   
The robustness check for change in Blame largely confirms the findings of the initial 
analysis.  First, it confirms the relationship between change in achievement of aspirations 
and change in Blame.  In the robustness check, coefficient β1 is negative and significant 
in each model from 2-7.  In all six models, β1 is significant at the .01 level.  This confirms 
support for Hypothesis 4, that when a firm fails to achieve an aspiration, it uses more 
blame than when it achieves an aspiration.    
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Table 58: Within-Firm Analysis of Blaming Attribution - Full Sample 
 
 
 
 
This robustness check provides no confirmation of a significant relationship between 
change in the difference between actual and aspired performance and change in firms' use 
of Blame.  Coefficient β1 is insignificant in each model from 2-7.  As coefficient β2 is 
insignificant, the interaction term between β1 and β2 is of little interest.  However, it is 
notable that β3 is also insignificant in each model from 2-7.  These results fail to confirm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model Controls Historical Social Historical Social Historical Social Combined Combined Combined
Profitability Profitability EPS EPS Revenue Revenue Dichotomous Continuous All
B1 - HD Profitability -0.181*** -0.120*** -0.125***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.024)
B2 - HC Profitability 0.005 0.010 0.017
(0.009) (0.019) (0.018)
B3 - HD*HC Profitability -0.004 -0.009 -0.032
(0.010) (0.020) (0.026)
B1 - SD Profitability -0.094*** -0.032 -0.040
(0.030) (0.027) (0.028)
B2 - SC Profitability -0.002 -0.039 0.027
(0.005) (0.029) (0.031)
B3 - SD*SC Profitability 0.012 -0.034 0.138
(0.117) (0.032) (0.137)
B1 - HD EPS Change -0.130*** -0.051*** -0.067***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.020)
B2 - HC EPS Change 0.000 0.000 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
B3 - HD*HC EPS Change -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
B1 - SD EPS Change -0.136*** -0.017 -0.017
(0.017) (0.022) (0.023)
B2 - SC EPS Change 0.000 -0.131*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.018) (0.027)
B3 - SD*SC EPS Change -0.003 0.011 0.001
(0.003) (0.025) (0.004)
B1 - HD Revenue Change -0.092*** -0.045** -0.049**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
B2 - HC Revenue Change 0.010 -0.020 0.002
(0.016) (0.021) (0.027)
B3 - HD*HC Revenue Change 0.005 -0.026 0.017
(0.017) (0.032) (0.034)
B1 - SD Revenue Change -0.086*** -0.031 -0.041*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
B2 - SC Revenue Change -0.001 -0.028 0.035
(0.021) (0.051) (0.057)
B3 - SD* SC Revenue Change 0.034 0.061 -0.003
(0.047) (0.073) (0.071)
B4.1 - CEO -0.093** -0.079** -0.061** -0.075** -0.072** -0.094** -0.089** -0.055* -0.068* -0.051
(0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.039) (0.040) (0.033) (0.036) (0.034)
B4.2 - Acquisition 0.000 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
Constant 0.054** 0.023 0.035** 0.033 0.034** 0.026 0.049** -0.009 0.037* -0.012
(0.022) (0.020) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016)
Observations 433 433 433 432 433 433 433 433 432 432
Pseudo-R
2
0.012 0.210 0.033 0.154 0.145 0.065 0.047 0.260 0.160 0.277
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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support for hypotheses 6a and 6b, that the difference between a firm's actual and aspired 
performance shows no correlation with changes in a firm's use of blame.   
Third, the robustness check confirms that failure to achieve multiple performance 
aspirations correlates with cumulatively higher amounts of blame.  In model 8, three of 
the β1 coefficients are negative and significant: HD Profitability, HD EPS Change, and 
HD Revenue Change.  In addition, the R
2
 value in model 8 demonstrates the cumulative 
effect of achieving multiple aspired performance levels.  The R
2
 value of .260 in model 8 
is higher than the R
2
 values for any model from 2-7.   
The results in model 9 provide counterpoint to those in model 8.  Model 9 shows little 
significant relationship between changes in multiple continuous measures of performance 
and changes in firms' use of Blame to describe performance.  Only SC EPS Change is 
significant.  The lack of explanatory power from combining multiple measures of the 
difference between actual and aspired performance in model 9 makes clear the 
explanatory power of model 8.   
Finally, the results in model 10 further confirm the cumulative nature of achieving 
multiple aspired performance levels on Blame.  The same 3 coefficients that demonstrate 
significance in model 8 also demonstrate significance in model 10.  This result further 
confirms that when a firm fails to achieve more aspirations it uses more Blame.  These 
results in models 8, 9, and 10 confirm support for hypothesis 4, that the more aspirations 
a firm fails to achieve, the more Blame it uses.   
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Conclusions from Within-Firm Analysis 
The within-firm analysis presented above consistently demonstrates numerous 
significant relationships between firms' performance relative to aspirations and firms' 
causal descriptions of performance.  First, within-firm analysis demonstrates a significant 
relationship between achievement of a single performance aspiration and causal 
descriptions of performance.  In support of Hypothesis 1, when firms achieve 
performance aspirations, they use more Enhancement than when they fail to achieve 
performance aspirations.  In support of Hypothesis 2, when firms fail to achieve 
performance aspirations, they use more Blame than when they achieve performance 
aspirations.  These relationships hold for Enhancement and Blame in five of the six 
models.  Firms' use of Enhancement and Blame reflects whether or not they have 
achieved aspired performance levels.   
Second, within-firm analysis consistently demonstrates a significant relationship 
between achievement of multiple performance aspirations and use of Enhancement and 
Blame.  In support of Hypothesis 3, four of the six dichotomous assessments of 
performance were significant when tested simultaneously.  In other words, firms that 
achieved multiple aspirations used more enhancement than firms that achieved fewer 
aspirations.  In support of Hypothesis 4, four of the six dichotomous assessments of 
performance were significant when tested simultaneously.  In other words, firms that 
achieve many aspirations used less Blame than firms that achieved fewer aspirations.  
These results indicate that firms' use of Enhancement and Blame reflects the number of 
aspirations that they achieve.   
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Third, within-firm analysis reveals a relationship between the difference between 
actual and aspired performance and causal descriptions of performance.  In support of 
Hypothesis 5a, when firms increased the positive difference between their actual and 
aspired performance, they used more Enhancement.  In support of Hypothesis 5b, when 
firms increase the negative difference between their actual and aspired performance, they 
use less Enhancement.  Four of six continuous measures of performance demonstrate 
significance.  This analysis supports a similar relationship between Blame and the 
difference between firms' actual and aspired performance.  As the positive difference 
between firms' actual and aspired performance increased, they used less Blame.  As the 
negative difference between firms' actual and aspired performance increased, firms used 
more Blame.  Three of six measures of the difference between actual and aspired 
performance demonstrated significance.   
In conclusion, the above within-firm analysis provides support for hypotheses 1 & 2, 
that achievement of a single aspiration is related to attribution, and for hypotheses 3 & 4, 
that achievement of multiple aspirations is related to attribution.  This analysis also finds 
support for hypotheses 5 & 6, that the difference between firms' actual and aspired 
performance correlates with firms' use of enhancement.   
 
Summary of Findings 
The above empirical analysis tests the relationship between firm attribution and 
performance related to aspiration.  It used six hypotheses to answer three questions about 
the relationship between performance and attribution:  1) Do firms that achieve an 
aspiration use attribution differently than firms that fail to do so? 2) Do firms that achieve 
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many aspirations use attribution differently than firms that achieve fewer aspirations?  3) 
Does the difference between a firm's actual and aspired performance correlate with the 
way firms use attribution.  To investigate these questions, this dissertation gathered data 
on three performance metrics (Profitability, EPS Change, and Revenue Change) and 
applied two mental models of performance assessment (dichotomous and continuous) to 
each metric to create 6 performance aspirations.  With these six performance aspirations, 
this dissertation conducted two types of analysis (between-firm analysis and within-firm 
analysis) to determine whether a significant relationship exists between each of these six 
performance aspirations and the two most common types of attribution (Enhancement 
and Blame).  This analysis provides partial support for all six of this dissertation's 
hypotheses.  This summary reviews the general support received by all six hypotheses.  It 
also analyzes patterns in this support, identifying the relationships that were most 
consistently significant.   
 
General Support for Hypotheses 
All six hypotheses were generally supported in both descriptive analysis and 
regression analysis.  Table 59 presents a tally of the number of variables that 
demonstrated significance in regression analysis.  Table 59 organizes variables in relation 
to the three questions that this dissertation asks about the relationship between firm 
aspiration and firm attribution. 1) Does firm attribution change with achievement of a 
single aspiration? 2) Does firm attribution change with achievement of multiple 
aspirations? 3) Does firm attribution change when the difference between actual and 
aspired performance changes?  This dissertation tests each question in four empirical 
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analyses: 2 types of attribution (Enhancement & Blame) * 2 types of analysis (between-
firm analysis and within-firm analysis).  As a result, each question can receive support 
from a total of 24 empirical tests.   
 
Table 59: Number of Significant Relationships for Each Aspiration 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 tested whether firms that achieve an aspiration use more 
Enhancement and less Blame than firms that fail to achieve that same aspiration.  By 
demonstrating support in 19 tests, this dissertation shows that firms change their use of 
Enhancement and Blame in relation to achievement of a single dichotomous aspiration.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 tested whether firms that achieve numerous aspirations use more 
Enhancement and less Blame than firms that achieve fewer aspirations.  By 
demonstrating support in 19 tests, this dissertation shows that firms change their use of 
Enhancement and Blame in relation to achievement of multiple dichotomous aspirations.  
Hypotheses 5 and 6 tested whether the difference between actual and aspired 
performance corresponds with the amount of Enhancement and Blame in firms' 
explanations of performance.  By demonstrating support in 15 tests, this dissertation 
shows that firms change their use of Enhancement and Blame in relation to the difference 
Enhancement Blame Enhancement Blame
H1 & H2: Single Aspiration 4 5 5 5 19
H3 & H4: Multiple Aspirations 6 5 4 4 19
H5 & H6: Actual minus Aspired 4 4 4 3 15
Total 14 14 13 12 53
Total
Cross Firm Analysis Fixed Firm Analysis
Hypothesis
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between actual and aspired performance.  These results provide general support for each 
of the six hypotheses.   
In addition to showing consistent support for all six hypotheses, Table 59 shows two 
clear contrasts.  First, Hypotheses 5 & 6 received less consistent support than Hypotheses 
1-4.  This reduced level of support could indicate that dichotomous performance 
assessment plays a larger role than continuous performance assessment in how firms 
assess their performance.  This reduced level of support could also result from the 
empirical testing performed.  Tests of continuous performance assessment are more 
nuanced and could fail due to errors in measurement, such as the "chunky" and non-
normal nature of the distribution of the dependent variables, Enhancement and Blame, 
discussed above.   
Second, Table 59 reveals that between-firm analysis generated marginally weaker 
support than between-firm analysis.  This difference likely results from the different 
number of observations in each analysis.  Between-firm analysis was conducted on 562 
observations while within-firm analysis was conducted on 215 observations.    
In sum, empirical analysis generally supported all six hypotheses.  Differences in 
levels of support could result from technical challenges in empirical analysis.   
 
Patterns of Support 
In addition to the general support that empirical analysis demonstrated for this 
dissertation's six hypotheses, this results also produced distinct trends:  some measures of 
performance consistently demonstrated a significant relationship with firms' use of 
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Enhancement and Blame while others did not. These patterns could reveal subtleties in 
the ways organizations assess their performance.    
To identify patterns of support, Table 59 summarizes the significance of each of the 
six performance aspirations for each of the six hypotheses.  Like Table 59, Table 60 
groups results by the three concepts that this dissertation tests:  single dichotomous 
aspirations, multiple dichotomous aspirations, and the difference between actual and 
aspired performance.  However, Table 60 presents more detail by breaking out the 
significance for each of the six individual aspirations.   
Table 60 reveals two trends.  First, when assessing current performance in relation to 
past performance, firms assess their performance like high jumpers.  In other words, 
firms use dichotomous performance assessment with historical performance aspirations.  
In tests of dichotomous performance assessment (Hypotheses 1-4), all three historical 
performance aspirations demonstrate significance (HD Profitability, HD EPS Change, 
and HD Revenue Change) in all four types of analysis.  In contrast, in tests of continuous 
performance assessment (Hypotheses 5 & 6), two of the three measures of historical 
aspirations demonstrate no significance:  HC Revenue Change and HC EPS Change 
demonstrate no significance in tests of Hypotheses 5 & 6.  In addition, the third historical 
performance measure, HC Profitability, demonstrates inconsistent significance in tests of 
Hypotheses 5 & 6:  it is only significant in three of the four tests.  The contrast between 
the consistent significance of historical aspirations in dichotomous performance 
assessments (Hypotheses 1-4) and their lack of significance in continuous performance 
assessments indicates that firms use dichotomous performance assessment selectively.  
Firms consistently use dichotomous performance assessment with historical performance.    
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Table 60: Significance of Individual Regression Analyses  
  
Between-firm Analysis Within-firm Analysis 
Enhancement Blame Enhancement Blame 
H1 & H2: Single Aspiration 
HD Profitability *** *** *** *** 
SD Profitability   *** *** *** 
HD EPS Change  *** *** *** *** 
SD EPS Change  *** *** *** *** 
HD Revenue Change  *** *** ** ** 
SD Revenue Change         
H3 & H4: Multiple Aspirations 
HD Profitability  *** *** *** *** 
SD Profitability *** *** *** ** 
HD EPS Change  *** *** *** ** 
SD EPS Change *       
HD Revenue Change * *** * * 
SD Revenue Change  *** **     
H5 & H6: Actual minus Aspired 
HC Profitability  *** ** **   
SC Profitability  *** *** *** *** 
HC EPS Change         
SC EPS Change  *** *** ** ** 
HC Revenue Change         
SC Revenue Change  *** *** ** ** 
 
***<.01; **<.05; *<.10 
 
They do not consistently use continuous performance assessment with historical 
performance.  When assessing their current performance in relation to past performance, 
firms think like high jumpers:  if firms reach their historical performance aspiration, they 
deem their performance a success and pay little to no attention to the extent by which 
they surpassed their historical performance aspiration.   
Second, when assessing their performance against that of peers, firms assess their 
performance like golfers. In other words, firms use continuous performance assessment 
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with social performance aspirations.  In tests of continuous assessment of performance 
(Hypotheses 5 & 6), all three measures of performance demonstrate significance in all 
tests when assessed in relation to social aspirations (SC Profitability, SC EPS Change, 
and SC Revenue Change).  In contrast, in tests of dichotomous assessment of 
performance (Hypotheses 1-4), social aspirations demonstrated inconsistent significance: 
SD Profitability demonstrates no significance in one of four tests of single aspirations 
(Hypothesis 1 & 2);  SD EPS Change demonstrates no significance in three of the four 
tests of multiple aspirations (Hypotheses 3 &4);  SD Revenue Change demonstrates no 
significance in four out of four tests of single aspirations (Hypotheses 1 & 2) and fails to 
demonstrate significance in two out of four tests of multiple aspirations (Hypotheses 3 & 
4).  In sum, every test that fails to demonstrate significance in the analysis of 
dichotomous performance assessment (Hypotheses 1-4) occurs in relation to social 
aspirations.  In contrast, social aspirations demonstrate significance in every test of 
continuous performance assessment (Hypotheses 5 &6).  When assessing performance in 
relation to that of their peers, firms think like golfers: firms use different amounts of 
enhancement and blame in relation to the difference between their actual and aspired 
performance.   
This analysis also provides a measure of effect size for significant variables.  
Regression coefficients in within-firm analysis provide this measure of effect size.  As 
this dissertation uses OLS regression to conduct within-firm analysis, these coefficients 
have been calculated to scale, allowing coefficients to be standardized and compared 
across models.  In contrast, this dissertation uses Tobit in its between-firm analysis.  
Tobit analysis operates an on arbitrary scale which prevents comparison of coefficients 
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across different tests (Kennedy, 2003).  Table 61 presents the effect size of each 
aspiration.  These effect sizes all operate on the same scale.  In Hypotheses 1-4 each 
coefficient operates on a dichotomous scale (0/1).  Firms either achieve the aspiration in 
question or they do not.  In Hypotheses 5 & 6, coefficients have been standardized to 
represent the difference in firms' use of Enhancement and Blame that corresponds with a 
one standard-deviation change in a given measure of performance. 
Table 61 suggests that, with the exception of SC EPS Change, the dichotomous 
assessments of performance tested in Hypotheses 1 & 2 have larger effect sizes than the 
continuous assessments of performance in hypotheses 5 & 6.  However, the continuous 
assessments of performance in hypotheses 5 & 6 are calculated for one standard deviation 
of change in performance.  As a firm's performance can change by more than one 
standard deviation, the effect size of the continuous assessments of performance could be 
a multiple of the percentages in Table 61.  For example if a firm's profitability increased 
by  four standard deviations, it would decrease its use of enhancement by 10% as a result 
of failing to achieve its performance aspiration and by 20% (4 standard deviations x 5% 
per standard deviation) as a result of the extent by which it failed to achieve its 
performance aspiration.  However, few firms experienced large drops in their 
profitability:  only three firms in the primary sample experienced a drop of four standard 
deviations in profitability; fewer than 43 firms (20%) experienced a drop in profitability 
of more than one standard deviation.  As a result, for the vast majority of firms, 
dichotomous assessment of performance has a stronger correlation with firms' use of 
Enhancement and Blame than continuous assessment of performance.  However, for the 
minority of firms with dramatic changes in performance, the change in the firms' use of 
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Table 61: Effect of Performance Aspirations on Firms' Use of Attribution 
Aspiration Enhancement  Blame 
 Low Med High  Low Med High 
 
H1 & H2: Single Aspiration 
  
HD Profitability 13% 19% 25%  -20% -15% -10% 
SD Profitability 5% 15% 25%  -18% -10% -2% 
HD EPS Change 12% 17% 22%  -16% -12% -8% 
SD EPS Change 9% 15% 21%  -16% -11% -6% 
HD Revenue Change 1% 9% 17%  -13% -7% -1% 
SD Revenue Change -5% 5% 15%  -16% -9% -1% 
 
H3 & H4: Multiple Aspirations 
  
HD Profitability 3% 11% 18%  -17% -12% -6% 
SD Profitability 5% 13% 21%  -14% -8% -1% 
HD EPS Change 3% 9% 14%  -9% -5% 0% 
SD EPS Change -2% 4% 11%  -7% -2% 4% 
HD Revenue Change -1% 5% 10%  -8% -3% 1% 
SD Revenue Change -3% 4% 11%  -7% -4% -1% 
 
H5 & H6: Actual minus Aspired 
  
HC Profitability 1% 6% 11%  -6% -2% 2% 
SC Profitability 3% 10% 17%  -12% -7% -2% 
HC EPS Change -2% 2% 5%  -3% -1% 1% 
SC EPS Change 5% 19% 34%  -24% -13% -1% 
HC Revenue Change -4% 0% 5%  -2% 1% 4% 
SC Revenue Change 1% 12% 24%  -12% -6% 0% 
  
Enhancement and Blame in relation to the difference between actual and aspired 
performance could have a larger effect.   
 
Combined with the finding presented above, that firms generally use dichotomous 
performance assessment with historical measures of performance and continuous 
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performance assessment with historical measures of performance, the effect sizes in 
Table 61 can be used to estimate how a firm's use of enhancement and blame change in 
relation to changes in a specific performance measure.  For example, if a firm's 
Profitability rose above historical aspiration, it would be expected to increase its use of 
Enhancement by 19% (the coefficient for HD Profitability in Hypothesis 1).  In addition, 
for each additional increase in Profitability of .08 (one standard deviation), a firm would 
be expected to increase its use of Enhancement by 7% (the coefficient for SC Profitability 
in Hypothesis 5).  Similarly, if a firm's Profitability rose above historical aspiration, it 
would be expected to decrease its use of blame by 15% (the coefficient for HD 
Profitability in Hypothesis 2).  In addition, for each decrease in Profitability of .08 (one 
standard deviation), a firm would be expected to increase its use of blame by 5% (the 
coefficient for SC Profitability for Hypothesis 6).   Figure 19 presents the expected 
change in a firm's use of Enhancement and Blame in relation to changes in its 
Profitability.    
In sum, empirical analysis provides general support for all six of this dissertation's 
hypotheses.  In addition, it indicates that firms use dichotomous assessment with 
historical aspirations and continuous assessment with social aspirations.  Chapter IV 
discusses the meaning of these findings.   
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Figure 19: Change in Enhancement and Blame with Changes in Profitability 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Dissertation Summary 
One of organizational scholars' key achievements in the 20th century was 
establishing that organizations matter:  "We cannot assume that a rational manager can 
treat the organization as a simple instrument in his dealings with the external world" 
(Cyert & March, 1963, p. 205). Rather, organizations compensate for individuals’ 
limitations in decision making (Cyert & March, 1963).  Over the past half-century, 
organizational scholars have greatly expanded our understanding of how individuals act 
in organizations, the environments around organizations, and the importance of resources 
in organizations, but have said little about organizations themselves (King et al., 2009).  
Recent studies propose that scholars can advance our understanding of organizations 
themselves by borrowing theories of behavior developed at the level of the individual and 
applying them at the level of the organization.  Importing theories across levels requires 
care, especially in empirical research (King et al., 2009).   Individuals and organizations 
operate in different contexts and failure to conceptualize the context in which 
organizations operate may not only obfuscate empirical relationships but also 
anthropomorphize the organization, making it more difficult to understand (Andersen, 
2008).   
This dissertation furthers our understanding of organizational behavior by examining 
how organizations assess their performance and generate causal attributions of their 
performance.  Scholars have previously studied organizational attribution by borrowing 
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behavioral theories developed at the level of the individual and applying them at the level 
of the firm.  However, these studies suffer from the shortcomings described above by 
King, Felin, and Whetten (2009): poor conceptualization of context around key variables 
at the level of the organization.  Even though studies of the relationship between 
performance and attribution at the level of the individual had repeatedly demonstrated a 
robust relationship, this conceptual shortcoming prevented scholars from revealing a 
similar relationship at the level of the organization.  In contrast, this dissertation creates a 
new model of attribution at the level of the organization by adding aspiration theory to its 
theoretical model.  With the addition of aspiration theory, this dissertation reveals a 
relationship between attribution and firm performance in relation to aspiration.   
This new model and the relationship that it reveals make six contributions to our 
understanding of organizations. First, this dissertation adds breadth to aspiration theory.  
Over the past few decades, scholars have demonstrated that aspirations play a role in 
explaining numerous firm behaviors, including risk taking (Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum 
& Thomas, 1988), innovation (Greve, 1998, 2003; Levinthal & March, 1981), and 
learning (J. A. C. Baum & Dahlin, 2007).  This dissertation extends aspiration theory into 
a new domain, causal attribution, and demonstrates that aspiration plays an important role 
in understanding organizations' formulation of causal explanations of performance.   
Second, this dissertation has refined aspiration theory.  Prior studies of organizational 
aspirations have examined behaviors that require time and resources to change, such as 
partnering (J. A. C. Baum & Dahlin, 2007), factory expansion (Audia & Greve, 2006), 
accidents (J. A. C. Baum & Dahlin, 2007), and strategic persistence (Audia et al., 2000).  
In contrast, attributions in firms' public descriptions of performance can be changed very 
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quickly at little to no cost.  As a result, attribution represents a very sensitive measure of 
firm behavior in relation to achievement of aspirations and has permitted this dissertation 
to examine some of the finer points of how firms use aspiration in performance 
assessment.  This dissertation empirically demonstrates that firms assess their 
performance in relation to both historical aspirations and social aspirations.  It shows that 
firms make different attributions when they achieve historical and social aspirations.  
This confirms Greve's (1998) argument that firms maintain distinct aspirations for each 
reference point.  Furthermore, this dissertation demonstrates that in relation to their 
historical aspiration, firms assess their performance like high jumpers with dichotomous 
assessments of performance.  This dissertation also demonstrates that in relation to their 
social aspirations, firms assess their performance like golfers with a performance 
assessment that accounts for the extent by which they surpassed or fell short of 
aspiration.  These pairings, assessing social aspiration on a continuous scale and historic 
aspiration on a dichotomous scale, can be understood through the salience of data.  Firms 
construct historic aspirations from specific, salient, and available performance data.  
Investors receive a firm’s letter to shareholders as part of the corporate annual report, 
which contains measures of that firm’s current and past financial performance.  
Furthermore, when investors access a firm’s financial data through other sources (such as 
the internet), these sources also present both current and past financial data.  
Consequently comparisons between a firm’s current and past performance are readily 
available, uniform, and rather easy to interpret, allowing investors to easily assess 
whether a firm has achieved its historical aspiration.   
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In contrast, investors have less access to clear, uniform, easy to interpret data on the 
performance of a firm’s peers.  A firm’s corporate annual report does not include such 
information, nor do many other sources of information on a firm’s performance.  
Furthermore, those sources that provide information on a firm’s peers typically provide it 
on a separate webpage or a separate subsection of a printed report.  Finally, performance 
data on a firms’ industry is typically incomplete.  Although investors can readily find 
information on an industry’s average earnings, far fewer sources provide information on 
average industry sales or average industry profitability.  Consequently, data on the 
performance of a firm’s peers is less readily available to investors than historic 
performance data.   
Finally, this dissertation demonstrates that achievement of multiple aspirations 
influences a firm's performance assessment:  the more aspirations a firm achieves the 
higher it rates its performance.  These findings increase both the breadth and depth of 
aspiration theory.   
Third, this dissertation furthers attribution theory by revealing a parallel between 
causal explanations by firms and by individuals. In contrast with prior studies of firm 
attribution that failed to find a reliable relationship between firm attribution and firm 
performance, this dissertation reveals a consistent and robust relationship between firm 
attribution and firm performance in relation to aspiration.  This dissertation suggests that 
identifying such a relationship requires not only careful conceptualization of firm 
performance in relation to aspirations, but also careful selection of performance measures 
(profitability, EPS change, or revenue change) and careful consideration of mental 
models of performance assessment (high-jumper like dichotomous assessment or golfer-
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like continuous assessment).  Through vigilant consideration of these aspects of firms’ 
performance assessment, this dissertation convincingly disproves the findings of prior 
studies of firm attribution:  it demonstrates that firms that perform well describe their 
performance with enhancing attributions and firms that perform poorly describe their 
performance with blaming attributions.  This dissertation reveals the relationship that 
scholars have sought since 1983 (Bettman & Weitz, 1983).  Furthermore, these findings 
are consistent with attribution scholars' claim that image management drives firms' use of 
attribution.   
Fourth, this dissertation furthers the study of organizational image management.  In 
contrast to prior studies of organizational image management that adopt case study 
methodologies to elicit anecdotal evidence, this study has analyzed data from a large 
sample of firms operating in multiple industries.  These data support generalization of 
findings to a wider domain of formal organizations.  The study’s findings suggest that 
when a firm’s performance meets aspirations, the firm is likely to turn to enhancement in 
explaining performance in order to improve its image.  On the other hand, when a firm’s 
performance fails to meet aspirations, the firm is likely to defend its image by resorting to 
blame.  These results demonstrate that firms modify their image management strategies 
in relation to their performance.  It also shows that firms do not manage their image in 
line with normative recommendations:  that is, firms typically do not candidly 
acknowledge and take responsibility for poor performance (Elsbach, 1994).   
Although this dissertation does not collect data on the impact of a firm’s attributions 
on its image, its results suggest that a firm’s attributions may improve its image.  Prior 
study suggests that firms that use enhancing attributions to tout their accomplishments 
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have the greatest potential to enhance their image (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Bowman, 
1976; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw et al., 1983).  
However, this dissertation suggests that only when a firm achieves its performance 
aspirations does it have the credence to use enhancement.  In contrast, firms that use 
enhancement independent of performance harm their image (Schwenk, 1990).  Firms that 
don’t achieve their aspirations must resort to blame to protect their image.  In effect, 
achieving performance aspirations legitimizes a firm’s enhancing attributions.   
In addition, this dissertation provides insight on firm’s motivations for image 
management.  If a firm’s top priority in image management were to protect the image of 
the management team, then achieving social aspiration would be more important than 
achieving historical aspiration.  Regardless of historic aspiration, when a firm achieves 
social aspiration, its management has performed as well or better than other firms in its 
industry.  In this scenario, firms would be expected to make greater changes in their use 
of enhancement and blame in relation to achievement and failure to achieve social 
aspirations.   
In contrast, if a firm’s top priority in image management were to retain current 
investors, then achieving historic aspiration is more important than achieving social 
aspiration.  Current investors likely would continue to hold their stock in the company 
when it performs as well or better than it improved in the past.  However, when the firm’s 
performance drops, investors would experience disappointment and would have reason to 
seek more promising investments, even if this search requires them to invest in firms in 
different industries or even to invest in invest in a different asset class, such as bonds or 
money market accounts.   
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This dissertation’s results show that firms generally make larger changes in their use 
of enhancement and blame in relation to historical aspirations rather than in relation to 
social aspirations.  Firms changed blaming attributions more in relation to historic 
aspirations than in relation to social aspirations.  In addition, firms changed enhancing 
attributions more in relation to two of the three historic aspirations than in relation to 
social aspirations.  Only for profitability did firms change enhancing attributions more in 
relation to social aspiration than historic aspiration.  This dissertation’s findings suggest 
that firms manage their image primarily to retain current investors and that they place less 
importance on protecting the image of management.   
Fifth, this dissertation furthers scholars' understanding of how to study organizations 
as social agents.  It follows the prescription of organizational scholars who seek to revive 
the study of organizations as social agents (e.g. Gavetti et al., 2007; Heath & Sitkin, 
2001; King et al., 2009; Whetten et al., 2009).  These scholars recommend drawing on 
theories of individual behavior and carefully conceptualizing variables at the level of the   
organization to further our understanding of organizations.  This dissertation confirms 
that carefully conceptualizing variables allows scholars to transfer theory from one level 
of analysis to another.   
Finally, this dissertation provides guidance for practitioners.  First, regulators can 
expect that firms' causal explanations of performance reflect their reported financial 
performance.  Contrary to the claims of some studies (Walter Aerts, 2005; M. Clatworthy 
& Jones, 2003; M. A. Clatworthy & Jones, 2006), additional regulation is not necessary 
to require firms to provide causal explanations of performance that reflect their reported 
financial performance.  Although these findings do not demonstrate that a firm’s 
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performance results from the causes to which a firm attributes its performance, it 
demonstrates that attributions correspond with financial performance.  Second, these 
findings confirm what practitioners have long suspected, that firms use their 
communications with investors, including causal explanations of performance, to 
improve their image in investors' eyes.  Investors are well advised to expect firms to 
engage in self-serving attribution and to believe that firms are more responsible for their 
failures and less responsible for their successes than they claim.  Investors would be well 
served if firms identified more factors beyond the firms’ control that contribute to their 
achievement of aspirations and more factors within the firms’ control that contribute their 
failure to achieve aspirations.   
 
Implications of Causality 
This dissertation provides a strong indication that performance relative to aspiration 
levels influences firms’ propensity to use enhancement and blame in their public 
descriptions of performance.  Two separate empirical analyses were conducted:  a 
between-firm analysis and a within-firm analysis.  Each analysis found significant 
relationships between the aspiration-performance gap and the causal explanations that 
firms advance to describe their performances.  Correlation, of course, does not imply 
causation.  However, taken together these two empirical analyses mitigate the majority of 
possible confounds.  Latent endogenous variables represent the greatest obstacle to 
establishing a causal relationship between firms’ aspiration-performance gaps and their 
use of enhancement and blame.  For example, both performance and firms' use of 
enhancement and blame could result from a "good firm effect".  It is possible that better 
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firms have higher performance, that better firms achieve their aspired performance levels, 
and that better firms consistently use enhancing attributions.  This "good firm" effect 
would create a correlation between firm performance and firms’ use of enhancement, 
independent from any actual causal relationship.  This dissertation uses within-firm 
analysis to mitigate the "good firm" effect and any other potential latent endogenous 
variables.   
Within-firm analysis does not, however, mitigate the influence of variables that 
change over time.  Factors other than firm performance relative to aspirations that change 
over time could be the cause of firms' use of enhancement and blame.  To mitigate the 
effects of variables that change over time, this dissertation conducts between-firm 
analysis with a set of control variables that includes year, firm age, firm size, CEO 
tenure, and industry.  Results demonstrate that none of these control variables had a 
significant effect on firms' use of enhancement and blame in the within-firm analysis.  As 
a result, this dissertation can conclude that none of these observed time-variant variables 
cause the relationship observed between firm performance relative to aspiration and to 
firms' use of enhancement and blame.   
 
Limitations 
Despite its accomplishments, this dissertation contains limitations.  These limitations 
pertain to the dissertation's data and measures.  This study's most significant limitation is 
limited data for within-firm analysis.  First, as this dissertation collects data during only 
two years, it can calculate only one set of differences between the two years: the change 
from 2004 to 2005.  Analyzing change over a single period prevents this dissertation 
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from observing or controlling for any uncommon events that characterize firm 
performance during this period.  Adding more periods would allow this dissertation to 
control for changes over time.  Second, as was reported in Chapter IV, this dissertation's 
within-firm analyses on a trimmed sample of firms with 5 or more attributions were 
conducted on 215 firms and 430 letters to shareholders.  This limited number of 
observations reduces this dissertation's ability to detect nuance in empirical analysis and 
its ability to demonstrate significant relationships.  Collecting additional data and 
conducting within-firm analysis on a larger sample that includes observations in multiple 
years would significantly improve the reliability of relationships between variables.   
This dissertation is also limited in its measures.  It assumes that firms weight each 
type of aspiration equally.  However, it is possible that firms consider some aspirations 
more important than others and make greater changes in their use of enhancement and 
blame when firms achieve some aspirations rather than others.   
Finally, this dissertation is limited by omissions in its dataset.  This dissertation only 
collects data on manufacturing firms.  Service firms may use enhancement and blame 
differently than manufacturing firms.  In addition, this dissertation only collects data on 
large firms.  Small firms may use enhancement and blame differently than large firms.   
 
Future Study 
By establishing a relationship between performance relative to aspiration and firms' 
use of enhancement and blame, this dissertation creates numerous opportunities for future 
study.  These opportunities include additional data collection, manipulation of 
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aspirations, examination of other types of firm attribution, studying the consequences of 
attribution, or studying additional aspects of attribution theory.   
First, future studies can gather additional data in order to conduct more complete 
tests.  Collecting data over multiple years would allow for more complete testing of 
within-firm analysis.  Collecting data over multiple years would create a broader dataset, 
eliminating the possibility that conclusions drawn from the data reflect the idiosyncratic 
nature of a single period.  Collecting data over multiple years would also provide 
additional data on each firm, creating an opportunity to investigate multiple aspects of 
firms' use of attribution.  For example, it is possible that some firms use more 
enhancement than others regardless of their performance relative to aspirations.  Or, it is 
possible that some firms change their attribution more dramatically than others, using 
enhancing attributions exclusively when they achieve aspirations and using defensive 
attributions exclusively when they fail to achieve aspirations.  In addition, collecting data 
over multiple years would allow an analysis of the number of attributions firms use in 
their letters rather than the analysis of the proportion of attribution in this dissertation.  
Finally, collecting data over multiple years would provide a larger number of 
observations and facilitate more reliable analysis of the effects of different types of 
aspirations, such as social vs. historical aspirations or high jumper performance 
assessment vs. golfer performance assessment.   
Second, future studies could investigate the reference points that firms use to create 
their social and historical aspiration points.  These studies could calculate multiple 
possible historical aspirations by varying the weighting of performance in prior years.  
For example, this dissertation weighted the prior year (t-1) at 100% and all other years at 
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0%.  However, future studies could test different weights, such as weighting the prior 
year (t-1) at 75%, two years prior (t-2) at 20%, and three years prior (t-3) at 5%.  These 
studies could also calculate multiple possible peer groups by segmenting firms by size 
and by industry.  For example, this dissertation divided firms by industry according to 2 
digit SIC codes.  Future studies could divide firms by industry according to 3 or 4 digit 
SIC codes or divide firms into multiple groups by size.  The results of these studies 
would provide additional insight on how firms use information on their past performance 
and their competitors’ performance to create performance aspirations.  Third, future 
studies could investigate firms' use of different types of attribution.  Do firms' use of self-
criticism and blame also correlate with firm performance relative to aspiration?  Such a 
study could elucidate how firms use these other types of attribution to manage their 
image.   
Fourth, future studies could analyze the consequences of firm attribution.  For 
example, how do investors respond to firms' use of enhancement and blame?  It could be 
argued that, independent of performance, investors place additional value on firms that 
use enhancing attributions and create a more positive view of the firm's future.  It could 
also be argued that, independent of performance, investors place additional value on 
firms that make internal attributions, creating a stronger sense that the firm is able to 
control its future performance.  By measuring fluctuations in stock prices when 
explanations of earnings are released, such a study could analyze the effectiveness of 
different image management strategies.   
Finally, future studies could investigate whether other aspects of attribution theory 
that have been developed at the level of the individual also apply at the level of the firm.  
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For example, at the level of the individual scholars have investigates the actor-observer 
asymmetry, that actors and observers predictably make different observations about the 
same event (Johns, 1999; Malle et al., 2007; Mezulis et al., 2004; Weary et al., 1989).  As 
discussed above, actors typically take credit for good performance and blame poor 
performance on external factors.  In contrast, observers often blame an actor for poor 
performance and give credit for good performance to environmental factors.  Such a 
study could be conducted at the level of the organization by comparing explanations that 
firms provide for their performance and the explanation that analysts provide of firms' 
performance.   
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation began by asking how firms describe their performance.  It has 
investigated this question by conceptualizing how firms assess their performance.  
Through empirical analysis of letters to shareholders of publicly traded manufacturing 
firms, it has revealed three things.  First, it has revealed that firms use attribution to 
improve their image.  In itself, this is not surprising.  However, the manner in which 
firms use attribution is surprising.  Firms do not avoid giving performance descriptions 
for fear these descriptions will harm their image (Schwenk, 1990).  Firms do not only 
discuss their accomplishments to give an aura of success (Aerts, 2001).  Firms do not 
consistently take credit for both success and failure to demonstrate symbolic leadership 
(Salancik and Meindl, 1984).  Rather, in contrast to the body of prior research that 
concludes that attribution bears no relationship with performance (W. Aerts, 2001; M. 
Clatworthy & Jones, 2003; M. A. Clatworthy & Jones, 2006; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; 
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Staw et al., 1983), this dissertation demonstrates that firms use attribution in exactly the 
same manner as individuals:  firms take credit for good performance and blame poor 
performance on influences in their environment.    Second, this dissertation has revealed 
that firms assess their performance in a dichotomous manner in relation to historical 
aspirations and in a continuous manner in relation to social aspirations.  This use of 
different scales for social and historical performance is more nuanced than prior 
assessments of firm performance.  Furthermore, this finding suggests that salience of 
information drives firm’s assessment of performance: the availability of historical data 
leads firms to assess historical aspirations on a dichotomous scale.  In contrast, the 
challenge in effecting a direct comparison with competitors leads firms to assess social 
aspirations on a continuous scale.  Third, this dissertation demonstrates, that scholars can 
effectively import theory developed at the level of the individual to the level of the firm.  
This dissertation succeeded in importing attribution theory to the level of the firm by 
carefully analyzing the context around key variables, most notably by developing 
concepts of firm aspiration that provide context for this dissertation's independent 
variable, firm performance.  With this finding, this dissertation furthers the rejuvenated 
tradition of studying organizations as social actors begun by Cyert and March (1963) in 
the Behavioral Theory of the Firm.   
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